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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
WELCOMING REMARKS
MS. VARELA: Some of you may have seen Barney's windows
on Madison Avenue that are celebrating talk. Windows designed
by Simon Doonan celebrate talk. The talk today, however, I think
you will find is, paradoxically, valuable yet cheap. We are offering
it at low cost since, as a municipal agency, we have a stake in public
education on civil rights. It is our view that the better members of
the public, and, not incidentally, practitioners, understand the com-
plexities of issues in civil rights law, the more equipped our society
is to grapple with them.
Hence, for its Forty-Fifth Anniversary, the New York City Com-
mission on Human Rights (the "Commission") wanted to offer a
Symposium on topics that lie at the intersection of law and policy.
The panel topics all touch upon areas that generate enormous in-
terest: sexual orientation, sexual harassment, disability, mediation,
domestic violence and hate crimes. As the Chair, it is my hope that
by offering discussions of these topics within the context of recent
legal developments, the legal personnel of the Agency, along with
our distinguished colleagues, can shed some light on these difficult
issues which matter so much to so many of us.
I want to express my thanks to the Fordham Urban Law Journal
for doing all the spade work to get the conference up and running,
particularly to Alicia Mioli, who worked tirelessly to make sure
that all of the details were in place. I look forward to a very suc-
cessful conference today and a volume to appear sometime later
next year, which will flesh out much of the discussions today in
legal, footnoted detail.
With that, it is my pleasure to introduce the Dean of Fordham
Law School, Dean John Feerick, to say a few remarks. I am very
glad to see him today.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.
On behalf of Fordham Law School, I would like to welcome you
to this very important Symposium on Civil Rights Law in Transi-
tion, celebrating at the same time the Forty-Fifth Anniversary of
the Commission.
It is certainly a distinct pleasure and privilege for our Urban Law
Journal and our Law School to co-sponsor this event with the Com-
mission and, as I said before, to be so much a part of an important
anniversary celebration.
I would like to extend a special welcome to the moderators of
the various panels in today's program, to all the panelists in addi-
tion to the moderators who will be presenting different points of
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view, and I would like to recognize as well the participants in your
very interesting luncheon program.
Let me conclude with just a few brief reflections. The Commis-
sion has been rightly heralded as one of the stellar organizations of
its kind in this nation. It has earned a reputation as a leader in the
struggle for justice and human dignity, and it has inspired many
other organizations and individuals by its shining example of, and I
use the word deliberately, compassion and concern for others, par-
ticularly many vulnerable communities out there.
This Symposium reflects the diversity and reach of the Commis-
sion's mission through addressing developments in such areas as
mediation, domestic violence, disability law, hate crimes legisla-
tion, sexual harassment, and sexual orientation law. It also reveals
the Commission's continuing commitment to the fundamental prin-
ciples of justice that lie at the core of our society and its tireless
dedication to assuring that all citizens are equal under the law.
Those of us who work at Fordham Law School are extremely
proud of the magnificent work and achievements of the Commis-
sion, and we take particular delight in the fact that its current Chair
is a graduate of our school. We salute her and we salute all those
associated with the Commission on this very special occasion. We
wish all of you a most enjoyable and successful participation in this
program today.
Let me end by saying that outside on the table there are two
important documents, obviously among many other important doc-
uments, but two that I was asked to call your attention to. One is a
time line of international human rights milestones over a period of
time that starts with the Administration of Franklin Roosevelt and
comes right down to the present by different time periods. There is
also a time line with respect to the development of the Commission
and the human rights law here in New York City. You will most
likely want to capture those two documents, among others, as you
leave the program today.
Thank you very much. I hope all goes well for you.
PROFESSOR PEARCE: Hi. My name is Russ Pearce. I am a
Professor here at the Law School. I want to add a welcome on
behalf of the Law School's Louis Stein Center for Ethics and Law.
The Stein Center is committed to encouraging collaboration be-
tween the Law School, practicing lawyers, government institutions
and judges in exploring issues of ethics and public policy. I think
that this Symposium represents the best of what we are trying to
foster. My particular role was, I think, quite minimal here. I am a
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former counsel to the Commission on Human Rights and I think I
helped make the shidduch, or the match, between the Commission
and the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
I just want to add a few words of thanks to the people who made
this possible. The students of the Urban Law Journal have once
again done their exemplary job in helping to put together a very
important Symposium on this topic. I would especially like to sin-
gle out Bob Schumacher and Alicia Mioli, who have worked tire-
lessly on this project and has done wonderful work. I would also
like to acknowledge and thank Helen Herman, Director of our Of-
fice of Academic Support, without whose efforts this conference
and other conferences that we hold here at Fordham would not be
possible.
My most important thanks goes to Commissioner Marta Varela.
She is a model of a public servant who is not afraid to explore the
most complex and challenging intellectual implications of public
policy issues. Indeed, in my experience she is one of the best read
and most thoughtful public servants I have ever met. In addition to
exploring these issues, she is also very committed, as you have
heard this morning, to fostering public dialogue. We are very ap-
preciative that she has invited Fordham to collaborate on this pro-
ject. I would like to thank her for sharing her efforts and sharing
the work of the Commission, which we will all learn much more
about today.
Welcome.
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MEDIATION
MS. HOWARD: This is a panel on mediation in New York
State. Mediation has grown in prominence and use throughout the
legal profession as a way to resolve disputes quickly, efficiently,
and economically. Although it has been around for a long time, it
is still in its infancy.
Mediation has only recently begun to move into institutions
throughout the nation, and it is taking on different forms. It is im-
portant for practitioners to know that the practice of mediation
varies depending on the practitioner. Mediation is shaped by the
institution in which it is practiced.
Today, we have a panel consisting of representatives from the
New York City Commission on Human Rights (the "Commis-
sion"), the New York State Division of Human Rights (the "State
Division") and the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commis-
sion ("EEOC"), as well as a noted private mediator, Susan Mac-
kenzie. We will discuss the different types of mediation available
in New York State.
I would like to take this opportunity to introduce our panelists.
I am Cheryl Howard, the General Counsel and the Director of
Mediation at the Commission. I first became interested in media-
tion when I worked on an Apache Reservation, where they avoid
legal channels and rely on mediation and facilitation to resolve im-
portant tribal disputes. After I came to the Commission as an ad-
ministrative law judge ("AL"), I received mediation training from
Ms. Mackenzie. The Commission's Office of Mediation and Con-
flict Resolution grew out of the ALJ mediation program.
Gina Lopez is the General Counsel at the State Division and a
former member of the staff at the Commission. Ms. Lopez is ex-
perienced in mediation and discrimination law and has recently
come to the State Division in an effort to institute more mediation
and conciliation there.
Michael Bertty is the distinguished Director of the EEOC's Me-
diation Program. The EEOC's newly launched mediation program
has been very successful. The New York office is the second-most
productive office in the nation. Their mediation program has
caused quite a buzz in the community because it has provided
many opportunities for mediators throughout the City to practice,
and it promises to be one of the real engines for integrating media-
tion into the practice of law in New York.
Susan Mackenzie, despite her youth, is in some ways the mother
of us all because she trained all of us to mediate. She trained the
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administrative law judges at the Commission, as well as the
mediators at the EEOC, and is a noted and very well-respected
mediator herself. She is a member of the Committee on Labor and
Employment Law at the Association of the Bar, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the NASD Na-
tional Arbitration and Mediation Committee, and the NASDR
Working Group in Employment Discrimination Claims. She has
been a strong influence on the practice of mediation by qualified,
well-trained mediators in New York City. We are going to depend
upon her, after we all make our presentations, to make sense of all
the different methods of mediation available, and to explain how
mediation in an agency works in contrast to private mediation.
Without further ado, let us get started.
The Commission's Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution
is an integral part of the agency's effort to enforce the New York
City Human Rights Law (the "Human Rights Law").1 Our media-
tion staff is available to mediate cases filed at the Commission.
The Commission is charged with enforcement of the Human
Rights Law.2 The Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodation.3 Discrimination
is prohibited on the basis of actual or perceived race, color, creed,
age, national origin, citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, marital status, criminal conviction or arrest record, the
presence of children in the household, and relationship or associa-
tion with a member of a protected class.4 Acts evincing bias as well
as discriminatory harassment are prohibited. It is also illegal to
discriminate against any person due to his or her opposition to a
practice prohibited under the Human Rights Law.'
Pursuant to the terms of a work-sharing agreement with the
EEOC, the Commission is designated a Fair Employment Practices
Agency. We have, therefore, the authority to file and process com-
plaints alleging violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19646 and under the Americans with Disabilities Act.7 Cases filed
under both statutes are generally investigated by the Commission's
Law Enforcement Bureau (the "Bureau") rather than the EEOC,
and may be mediated at the Commission.
1. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1996).
2. See id. § 8-105.
3. See id. § 8-107.
4. See id,
5. See id.
6. PUB. L. No. 101-336, 104 STAT. 327 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
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As mentioned earlier, the creation of the Commission's Office of
Mediation and Conflict Resolution was based upon the success of a
pilot mediation program involving the ALJ's. In January 1997, the
Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution was placed under the
authority of the General Counsel's office, and at that time we im-
posed a number of changes. The two most important changes were
the creation of a brochure allowing the parties to choose media-
tion, and the formulation of rules for mediation.
The Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution consists of
three full-time mediators who are employees of the Commission.
That we have full-time mediators on staff sets us apart from most
agencies. Most agencies have per diem mediators or contract out
for mediation. The Commission has funded the Office of Media-
tion and Conflict Resolution as a demonstration of our commit-
ment to alternative dispute resolution. We believe that having our
mediators on-staff enables them to become experts in the narrow
area of the law with which the Commission's mediation program
deals so that the Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution func-
tions more efficiently.
The Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution is completely
separate from the Bureau, which investigates and prosecutes cases,
and the office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, which con-
ducts administrative hearings on cases. The Office of Mediation
and Conflict Resolution reports to the General Counsel, who re-
ports directly to the Commissioner. In this way the Commission
avoids the possibility of conflicts of interest.
Since its inception at the Commission, mediation has proven a
fast and effective method for resolving complaints. Cases can be
referred to the Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution at any
stage in the process. We do not limit mediation to a particular class
of cases or any particular stage in the process. The great majority
of our cases, however, are referred to mediation from the Bureau
at the pre-investigation stage.
The Bureau and the Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution
recently started a program where we review cases jointly and,
based upon a joint assessment, refer cases for mediation. Cases
may also be referred at the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner
for Law Enforcement or his designated staff. Parties may also re-
quest mediation by speaking to the Bureau or attorneys assigned to
a case, or by filling out our brochure, which allows parties to re-
quest mediation. Those referrals are sent to us along with the cases
if the Bureau deems the case appropriate for mediation. Once a
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case is referred to the Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution,
we send out an opening letter, as well as a brochure explaining the
program and the rules. If the parties agree, the case is scheduled
for mediation.
Mediation is totally voluntary. If the parties decide against me-
diation, the case just continues in the process and is investigated
and a decision is made in turn. If the parties agree to mediate, but
the mediation is unsuccessful, there are no consequences for the
failure to reach an agreement at the Commission. The case simply
goes back into the process, as if no referral to mediation had been
made. Most mediations are held at the Commission. If, however,
circumstances warrant it, our mediators will meet with parties on-
site.
In mediations held at the Commission, the Commission itself
may be a party to the complaint, so it may have an independent
interest in the case pursuant to the Commission Law.8 Our media-
tions, therefore, look somewhat different than other mediations be-
cause we have three parties: the Bureau, the complainant, and the
respondent. No agreement can be reached at the Commission
without the consent of all three parties.
Our mediators are neutral third parties and their only responsi-
bility is to facilitate settlement discussions among the parties. They
will not take sides and they do not make decisions. Confidential
information disclosed to a mediator by parties or witnesses during
the course of a mediation will not be divulged by the mediator. It
is the policy of the Commission that we will resist any effort to
have a mediator disclose information. In the seven years that the
program has been in existence, no mediator has ever been
subpoenaed.
If a case is settled in mediation, the parties draft an agreement.
Commission-generated conciliation agreements, unlike settlements
negotiated privately between complainants and respondents, are
executed by all of the parties and the Chair of the Commission.
Once signed by the Chair, an agreement becomes an enforceable
order of the Commission. Any party who fails to comply with the
order may be liable for civil penalties of not more than $50,000 and
an additional penalty of not more than $100 per day.9
Complainant and respondent may agree that they will not dis-
close the terms of an agreement. The agreements, however, are
public documents and are subject to the Freedom of Information
8. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1996).
9. See id. § 8-124.
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Act.' 0 Accordingly, the Commission can rarely agree to nondisclo-
sure. In some instances to ensure nondisclosure subsequent to a
successful mediation, parties withdraw their case with the Bureau's
consent and draft a private agreement. Those agreements, how-
ever, are not enforceable by the Commission.
In our seven years, we have found that the greatest resistance to
mediation generally comes from attorneys. Over time, we realized
that the resistance is due to unfamiliarity more than outright hostil-
ity. The Commission, in an effort to overcome that resistance, de-
veloped a checklist for attorneys that informs them about the
process and answers most of the commonly asked questions.
Our mediation program is somewhat different than others in that
we spend a lot of time up-front talking to the parties before they
mediate. We want to be sure that the procedures are clear and
people understand what they are getting into. We are available to
talk extensively to any attorneys who would like to understand out
program better. We do our best to be sure there are no surprises.
The Bureau is also available to the parties and their attorneys,
and is very helpful in preparing cases for mediation. We, at the
Commission, believe that mediation is an effective way to resolve
cases, and that it gives the parties much more power to resolve
their own disputes than going through the administrative process.
Now Gina Lopez will describe the efforts of the State Division at
conciliation and mediation.
MS. LOPEZ: The State Division also recognizes that mediation
is an effective manner of resolving disputes quickly prior to investi-
gation or a hearing. Unlike the Commission's Office of Mediation
and Conflict Resolution and the Bureau, which is located in one
office, the State Division has nine offices across the state that con-
duct investigations. The State Division's early resolution programs
need to take into account the different regions in which the offices
are located.
The State Division uses two techniques for early case resolution,
mediation and conciliation. The State Division also uses a pre-
hearing settlement calendar, which is a conciliation attempt post-
probable cause determination. Nearly our entire staff of investiga-
tors and attorneys have been trained in mediation, and those skills
are used to conduct mediation and/or conciliation sessions.
At the investigative stage of a case, each of the nine offices en-
gages in conciliation efforts, and some regional offices engage in
10. 6 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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mediation. The process works as follows: when a complaint is
served on the parties, a letter is also sent asking the parties if they
are interested in engaging in alternative dispute resolution or con-
ciliation efforts. If the parties are amenable, they contact the re-
gional office, and a conciliation session is scheduled. In most cases,
the conciliation session is held at a State Division office. In areas,
such as Buffalo, Binghamton, and offices upstate, where the re-
gional offices cover a wide area, conciliation sessions may occasion-
ally be held over the telephone, as it may not be practical for the
parties to travel to the office.
The State Division engages in conciliation rather than mediation,
because frequently the investigator assigned to a case will conduct
the conciliation. The number of cases assigned to each investigator
and the number of staff members at each office also contributes to
the decision to hold conciliation sessions rather than mediation ses-
sions. Some directors believe that having the investigator assigned
to the case conduct the conciliation session has practical benefits.
They believe it expedites an investigation, in that if a case is not
resolved, the issues are hashed out and they are brought to light
and an investigative plan can be drawn narrowly to explore the
pertinent issues in the case.
The State Division uses two types of mediation: in-house and
contracted-out mediation. The in-house mediation is currently
used by the Brooklyn and Buffalo offices. In those offices, a letter
is sent to the parties inquiring whether they would be interested in
mediation. This is separate from the original letter offering concili-
ation, which goes out with the complaint. If the parties are amena-
ble to mediation, a session will be scheduled. In those cases, the
director or an investigator not assigned to the case will conduct the
mediation. If it is successful, the parties will draft an agreement in
plain language and the mediator will sign off on the agreement.
This differs from the conciliation sessions in that the mediator
does not conduct the investigation. If the case is assigned to an
investigator, a different person will conduct the mediation. If it is
pre-assignment, the mediator of a case will not conduct the investi-
gation of the case. This policy upholds the confidentiality of the
mediation. Because everything is confidential and no notes are
taken, there is nothing put in a file unless a mediated agreement is
reached.
In the past, the State Division has had contracts with Victim
Services. Victim Services conducted mediations for the Brooklyn
office as well as the Office of Sexual Harassment Issues, which is
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located in Brooklyn as well. In Rochester, the Center for Dispute
Resolution conducted mediations.
The director reviews cases for referral and if it appears as if the
case would be appropriate for mediation, it is referred. The respec-
tive Centers then contact the parties and conduct the mediation. If
mediation results in a resolution of the matter, a letter is sent to the
State Division so stating, and the case is withdrawn.
At present there is a new pilot program in the Long Island Re-
gional Office. The Office is working in conjunction with the Nas-
sau County Bar Association, particularly the Labor and
Employment Committee. The Labor and Employment Committee
now has fifteen certified mediators, and has agreed to mediate be-
tween fifteen and twenty cases for the State Division. The State
Division submits cases to the Committee for mediation, and the
Committee sends out a list of fifteen mediators to the parties, who
then rate mediators in order of preference. When that information
is returned, a mediation session is scheduled. The mediation ses-
sions are held at the State Division offices, but there is no State
Division representative at the session.
Although conciliation is used rather than mediation, all of the
regional directors have reported an increase in the number of re-
spondents requesting conciliation or mediation. They attribute the
increase to education and familiarity with the process. Especially
in Rochester and Brooklyn, parties who have gone to Victim Serv-
ices or the Center for Dispute Resolution are now more familiar
with mediation and are more open to alternative methods for case
resolution. The directors have also reported that attorneys who
have come to the State Division and engaged in either conciliation
or mediation continue to request those services. Again, education
and experience with the process seem to be the cause of the in-
creased awareness and interest in early case resolution.
The other resolution effort I wanted to speak about is the Pre-
Hearing Settlement Unit (the "Unit"). The Unit attempts to medi-
ate or otherwise resolve cases after a probable cause determination
has been issued. All cases where probable cause has been issued
are invited to participate in the settlement process. The Unit is
staffed by an ALJ, as well as two human rights specialists who are
located in the Legal Unit and act as State Division representatives.
Settlement conferences are scheduled two to three times per
month, and are conducted throughout New York State. The Unit
travels statewide to conduct settlement conferences.
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At a conference, settlement options are discussed. The role of
the ALJ is to facilitate the settlement discussions. Rose Ferradina,
an ALJ, conducts the conferences, and, rather than arbitrate the
cases, she conducts mediations. Although she does not call herself
a "mediator," in essence that is what she does, because if a case
does not settle, there are no notes taken and she does not have the
file. As a result, whatever was discussed remains confidential and a
different ALJ is assigned to hear the case. The State Division rep-
resentative at the conference is not an attorney, and does not pros-
ecute the case. The conference is entirely confidential and separate
from any subsequent legal action.
If a case is settled the parties can either put the settlement on the
record or draft a settlement agreement. Unlike the Commission,
the State Division does not sign off on any agreements. The State
Division annexes a Commissioner's order to the agreement.
Cheryl Howard mentioned earlier that the State Division is cur-
rently reviewing its mediation and conciliation efforts and assessing
the feasibility of instituting a formal mediation unit.
Thank you.
MR. BERRTY:11 I am the ADR Program Coordinator for the
New York District Office of the EEOC (the "New York District
Office").
The New York District consists of three offices: one in New
York City, one in Boston, Massachusetts, and one in Buffalo, New
York. The District covers the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
the United States Virgin Islands, and Vermont, making it the most
populous EEOC District in the nation.
The mission of the EEOC is to promote equal opportunity in
employment through administrative and judicial enforcement of
the Federal Civil Rights laws12 and through education and techni-
cal assistance. The EEOC utilizes a multi-pronged approach in its
efforts to eliminate employment discrimination: prevention of dis-
crimination through education and outreach, the voluntary resolu-
tion of disputes when possible, and, where voluntary resolution
fails, strong and fair enforcement.
11. The views expressed by Mr. Bertty are his own. No official support or en-
dorsement by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or any
other agency of the United States Government is intended or should be inferred.
12. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1
(1998).
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In 1995, the EEOC adopted the Priority Charge Handling Proce-
dures ("PCHP") to address a growing backlog of charges, while
effectively achieving the EEOC's mission of eradicating employ-
ment discrimination. The PCHP standards give field personnel
flexible procedures for processing charges, including the discretion
to decide the appropriate level of resources to be utilized for each
charge based upon its merit. Charges are prioritized with those
that are most likely to result in a finding of a violation given
priority.
Because charge intake is critical to the effectiveness of the
PCHP, our intake staff obtains early, in-depth information from
charging parties. Detailed interviews are conducted, and all rele-
vant information available is gathered from the charging parties.
As appropriate, attorneys are involved in the intake of charges that
are complex or require legal input.
Potential charging parties are not discouraged from filing
charges. Where, based upon the initial interviews, the charges ap-
pear to be without merit, the individuals are so advised, and coun-
seled about our process. If they wish nonetheless to file charges,
they are told that the charges will be served on the respondents
and may be dismissed at that time or shortly thereafter. A charge
may be filed in person at one of our offices, by telephone, or by
mail.
Mediation is a form of dispute resolution that is offered by the
EEOC as an alternative to the traditional investigative process.
Mediation does not replace an investigation. It is a supplement to
the EEOC's toolbox that allows parties to have a choice between
mediation and an investigation. There are many benefits to media-
tion. First, there is no finding of fact. Second, there is no position
statement required of the respondent if he agrees to participate in
mediation. There is no right or wrong, and it is a speedy process.
We can process a case through mediation within thirty days. If the
parties are willing, we can do it even more quickly than that.
The mediation process allows a win/win situation. In one of our
training programs we employ a principle that we refer to as the
"YTT" formula. YTT stands for "Yesterday," "Today" and "To-
morrow." During a mediation session, we stand "Today" looking
briefly back at "Yesterday" in the hope of resolving the dispute for
"Tomorrow." Our focus is on tomorrow, however, not yesterday.
The parties in a mediation decide the settlement, not the media-
tor. Before we begin our mediation sessions and after we have dis-
cussed the ground rules with the parties, we verify that the
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participants at the mediation table have the authority to make a
decision that would resolve the issues of the charge. Mediation
sessions are informal and the entire process is confidential. Prior
to commencing a mediation session, all participants must sign a
confidentiality agreement as well as an agreement to mediate.
In the New York District Office, all case files that go through
mediation and are closed with a settlement are kept in yellow fold-
ers. The yellow folders send a message to staff that the contents of
the folders are confidential. A case closed though our mediation
program stays in the yellow file folder and is placed in a special
section of our control room. Those cases are not touched by any of
the investigators or anyone other than the staff of our ADR Unit.
At the beginning of a mediation session we give the participants
paper so they may take notes. We encourage participants to take
as many notes as they wish. Each participant, however, is re-
minded that the paper is ours, and at the end of the mediation ses-
sion we want our paper back. While we cannot erase from their
minds the things that take place in a session, we collect the notes as
a reminder of our confidentiality policy. At the conclusion of a
mediated case, our files only contain the charge, the confidentiality
agreement, an agreement to mediate, and the settlement agree-
ment. All notes are destroyed. If a case is unsuccessful in media-
tion, the charging party and the respondent lose nothing as the case
is then referred to our Enforcement Unit for investigation. No in-
formation obtained during the course of the mediation process fol-
lows the case file to the Enforcement Unit.
There is a wall around our mediation program. In our mediation
program, the charging party and respondent are bound by a confi-
dentiality agreement and agree not to share any information
learned during the mediation session. The mediators (staff, pro
bono, and contractors) also agree that they will not share any infor-
mation learned during the mediation in compliance with our confi-
dentiality agreement. It is fairly easy to safe-guard this policy
because our pro bono and contract mediators are not EEOC em-
ployees and do not know the staff or to whom the case would be
referred were mediation unsuccessful.
For EEOC staff mediators, there is an additional safe-guard.
First, there is a policy that, if not followed, may result in the staff
member losing his or her job for breaching confidentiality. Second,
there is a fine. More important than a fine, however, is the fact
that a breach of confidentiality may result in imprisonment. If the
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other safe-guards fail, the threat of imprisonment will certainly
keep us on the straight and narrow.
The New York District Office has a viable program in each of its
three offices (Boston, Buffalo and New York City). Staff media-
tion is augmented by pro bono and contract mediation services.
One of the roles of the mediator is to gently guide the charging
party and the respondent through the mediation process, looking
at the events of yesterday, but focusing on tomorrow. It is often
necessary to have some discussion about what has transpired. You
must remember that parties may have carried whatever they are
feeling for a while, and may need to get it out of their systems so
they can go forward. We understand this and allow time for the
process.
During conversations prior to mediation the parties often discuss
the terms of agreements. Sometimes coming to the mediation ta-
ble is just a formality and we immediately write up an agreement.
At the close of our 1999 fiscal year, the New York District Office
secured $6.7 million in monetary benefits for charging parties. This
does not take into account non-monetary settlements that resulted
in changes in working conditions, shift changes, a smooth separa-
tion, neutral job references, reasonable accommodation, or other
benefits.
Mediations are occasionally unsuccessful because parties some-
times feel that they have to prove the rectitude of their positions.
In those cases, an opportunity to bring closure to a dispute is lost.
Opportunities are also lost when mediation is offered to both par-
ties, but they take an extended period of time to make a decision,
or feel that to agree to mediation first is a sign of a weak case.
Mediation is designed to allow individuals to look at differences,
arrive at a settlement, and move forward.
The New York District Office's Mediation Program has four
components. The first is training. Training is provided to all
mediators in various forms. We provide classroom training, on-
the-job training, and co-mediation experiences. Our training is
ongoing. Through a collaborative effort with Cornell University
School of Industrial Relations here in New York City, we have de-
veloped a two-day training program that focuses on mediation
techniques, employment law, and policies and procedures enforced
by the EEOC. While training does not guarantee an expert media-
tor, we believe that standardized training fosters uniformity within
our mediation program. Our training program has proven very ef-
fective. We have had eleven classes to date, of between thirty and
1122
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
thirty-five people each. We are very proud of the work that our
graduates have done and the contributions they have made to the
EEOC. Training is very high on our list of priorities.
Second, we have an educational component. You can be the
best mediator in the world, but that does not mean you will settle
every case, because you need to educate the potential parties. The
education component allows us to go out to respondents, respon-
dents' representatives, and charging parties and educate them on
the subject of mediation. This process has increased the interest
and participation levels in our mediation program.
The third component is the actual mediation. The fourth compo-
nent is an evaluation process. Through our evaluation process, we
learn first hand from the participants whether the process is effec-
tive and what changes, if any, may enhance the program.
The EEOC is committed to increasing the number of mediations
we perform in the fiscal year 2000. We believe that through a com-
prehensive education and outreach effort, more people will learn
about our mediation program and consider utilizing it to resolve
charges filed at the EEOC. It is through forums like this one that
we are able to share with the general public the new programs and
initiatives the EEOC is commencing. With your help in sharing
this information with others, you can assist the EEOC in better
serving the public. It was a pleasure participating in this panel to-
day, and we welcome your input.
MS. MACKENZIE: It is, of course, a pleasure for me to be here
today, because for years I have been a proponent of mediation as
opposed to the litigation of employment discrimination cases.
Now, as you can see, I am not alone. Just hearing about the differ-
ences in the three programs described, the flexibility and effective-
ness of mediation is apparent. In New York, the impetus to
mediate is coming not only from the oversight agencies, but also
from court-mandated programs such as that in the Eastern District
(where mediators are required to have subject matter expertise)
and in the Southern District (where there is no subject matter ex-
pertise requirement for mediators). I will focus on some of the
distinctions between "public policy" mediation - agency or court-
sponsored - and private mediation from my perspective, and
some of the ethical and professional responsibility issues we face
when mediating statute-based claims.
Before I talk about my own practice as a private mediator, I will
say a few words about effective mediation in general. It is my firm
view that focusing on those aspects of mediation that are distinct
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from litigation promote the efficacy of the process. Mediation is
flexible, informal, and non-confrontational. It promotes active
party participation, party control over the outcome, and creative
settlements. In mediation, we also focus on party interests and
concerns rather than legal "technicalities," and on the present and
future rather than the past or on assessing or assigning blame.
I adhere to three principles that help promote effective media-
tion in employment discrimination cases. First, all employment dis-
crimination claims involve workplace disputes. The workplace
environment is the starting point of the dispute, and my starting
point as well. I think it is critical for mediators and parties not to
lose sight of non-legal workplace issues. Non-legal issues may be a
critical aspect of the case, and by addressing them we may, at
times, resolve the case. Moreover, they are frequently issues one
cannot address in litigation.
Second, employment discrimination disputes are almost always
amenable to resolution in an informal setting. Sometimes the tim-
ing of the mediation may affect the structure of the mediation pro-
cess. I am increasingly spending time with party counsel prior to
the actual mediation session, not only to identify necessary or help-
ful participants and address other procedural issues, but also to ex-
plore counsel and party expectations and concerns. It is important
to ensure that the process is structured to allow the parties to ad-
dress all of their legal and non-legal issues.
Third, an essential consideration of an effective mediation is the
tone and demeanor of those involved and the process. Advocacy in
mediation is very distinct from advocacy in litigation, and too little
attention has been paid to these distinctions in our law schools as
well as in our continuing legal education. We must integrate medi-
ation and this different approach, a kinder and gentler approach,
into our practice.
Considerations in private mediation include:
Selection: As a private mediator, most of my work is "in lieu of
litigation," that is, the parties have at some point in the process of
litigation decided that they want to attempt to resolve a matter
before trial, and at times even before a formal complaint has been
filed. The parties come to me voluntarily, so I know there is at
least some motivation to settle a case. I have never been involved
in a case where mediation has been mandated.
Parties may come to me personally, or I may be selected pursu-
ant to a program administered by such organizations as the Ameri-
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can Arbitration Association or JAMS,13 where panels of mediators
are available for party selection. The parties will be given a list of
mediators, with experience in both the process and the law. The
list of potential mediators also indicates their backgrounds and ex-
perience. The parties then select a mediator appropriate for their
particular case. We in the field recognize that one mediator may
not be the best "fit" for a particular case. Some cases require more
specialized knowledge, and I have turned down appointments and
recommended other mediators in those circumstances.
Party Contact: Once a mediation is scheduled, it is important for
a private mediator to recognize the "repeat player syndrome" that
we generally associate with arbitration, that is, the concern that the
mediator may have had more contact with one attorney than
others involved in the process. The mediator must fully disclose
any contact that could give the appearance of partiality. Imagine
the discomfort of a party who, during a mediation session, hears
the opposing party's counsel joke with the mediator about time
they have spent together in the past. I always make certain such
disclosures are made not only to counsel, but also to the clients. At
times, on the other hand, I spend pre-mediation time with one
party to develop the necessary level of trust. I always make coun-
sel aware of every contact I have with the opposing party and the
topic of the conversation, if not the specific content.
Sufficient Time: I am reluctant to set a specific time framework
for mediation. There are times when one party will say "I only
have five hours" or "we only have one day, and if there is no deal
today, we are going to court." Given the emotional content of the
plaintiff's or claimant's case in a discrimination case, as well as that
of the respondent, the one-day time framework is not necessarily
going to be sufficient. We are finding that mediations may take
more than one session - often a "one-day plus" scenario, where it is
necessary for the mediator to have follow-up contact with one or
both of the parties to reach a resolution. Or it may be that a settle-
ment proposal requires review or approval that cannot take place
at the time of the mediation.
Settlements: Creative settlement structuring is one of the clear
advantages of mediation. For example, I have had several cases
where a financial package included a contribution to a not-for-
profit organization or charity. This arrangement has helped over-
come an employer's resistance to the amount of the monetary set-
13. Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.
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tlement going directly to the plaintiff or claimant. In one case
recently, the entire settlement amount, which was substantial, went
to establish a chair at a women's college in a field that was of inter-
est to the plaintiff. Assistance in finding new employment, as op-
posed to a strictly cash settlement, can also be instrumental,
particularly where a return to the original workplace would be
difficult.
In many cases today, we find that not only are there multiple
parties on either side, but also insurance companies are increas-
ingly finding or demanding a place at the table. Certainly, from the
mediator's perspective, the case still belongs to the parties rather
than the attorneys or the insurance companies. The insurance
companies are usually holding the purse strings, however, and that
could drive the mediation in certain directions. Maintaining the
appropriate balance and focus is a challenge in such an
environment.
Non-Legal Issues: In most of the mediations with which I have
been involved, we tend to start out from a non-legal perspective. I
usually request and receive pre-mediation submissions that spell
out the factual background as well as the legal issues in the case. I
find that by focusing on the law at the beginning of the process, the
value of the mediation may be lost. While I believe it is critical for
mediators to have a real grounding in the applicable law, particu-
larly in the field of employment discrimination, the law serves only
as a background to assist in assessing all that you are hearing.
Knowledge of the Law: Once you have established general pa-
rameters and some areas of commonality, or if you are getting
close to a settlement but are unable to bridge a gap, more specific
assessment of case theories and alternatives to settling in mediation
may be necessary. At this juncture, an understanding of the law
can be critical. It may even involve a review of the law in a particu-
lar jurisdiction. While traditionally the theory has been that a me-
diator does not need subject matter expertise, it is essential in
statutory dispute mediation. From an ethical standpoint, mediators
in this field have a role in ensuring and promoting settlements that
are consistent with public policy goals.
Professional Responsibility: As private mediators, we do not
have the legal authority or degree of persuasion that a judge,
agency, or court-mandated mediator may have. Confidentiality is
clearly a key in private mediation. At times settlements are driven
by goals other than those that the law was intended to promote,
such as concern over publicity or counsel fees. The profession is
1126
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
now starting to grapple with these and other issues as mediation
becomes a more accepted alternative to litigation. The proposed
Uniform Mediation Act 14 now under consideration, as well as the
Georgetown-CPR Proposed Standards of Professional Responsi-
bility for Mediators, are two such efforts.
Another professional concern as mediation gains popularity is
the level of expertise and experience of practicing mediators.
Should mediation be considered the practice of law, as it is in some
jurisdictions? I find this trend unfortunate as many of the most
effective mediators I know are not attorneys. They have, however,
the background, understanding of the law, and skills necessary to
promote appropriate and good resolutions. We do not want to see
mediation become another "litigation look-alike."
A new and different concern is the content of agreements to me-
diate. Under some of the new internal ADR programs in particu-
lar, circumstances may arise that pose ethical issues for mediators
as well as arbitrators. I, for example, was recently selected to me-
diate a case under an agency list selection process. I later learned
that under the respondent company's unilaterally imposed ADR
Program, the claimant agreed that if he did not settle his claim in
mediation and chose to pursue the claim in court, should he lose in
court he would pay all costs and attorney's fees for the employer.
This is a rather draconian requirement, and one that the claimant
did not fully understand. I withdrew from serving in that case.
Mediation, however, is a great field. For those who may be in-
terested, I cannot commend it enough. I find particularly in em-
ployment disputes that the process addresses both individuals'
needs as well as the public policy goals of the anti-discrimination
laws. A lot of education and refocusing can take place in this non-
adversarial setting. In many instances mediation, as opposed to lit-
igation, helps to foster workplaces free of discrimination, which is a
goal we all share.
Thank you.
MS. HOWARD: I would like to entertain questions from the
audience at this point.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: I was curious about the Commission's program in
terms of the Bureau signing off on a mediated agreement. If the
14. See AMERICAN B. Ass'N SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE NA-
TIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS.
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Bureau does not approve a mediated settlement and goes forward
with a case, is it correct to say that the Bureau would have access to
or knowledge of information divulged during the mediation? I
wonder whether that is an impediment to the process at your
agency.
MS. HOWARD: You have raised an interesting issue, one with
which we have been grappling. We mediators debate whether the
Bureau's involvement in the process is appropriate. We do not
have any evidence that the involvement is an impediment. Re-
cently, I was part of a Symposium at New York University the topic
of which was law and social justice, and it caused me to think more
about the benefits and drawbacks of the Bureau's participation in
mediations. The Bureau does approach mediation as a neutral
party, especially in pre-investigation cases. As no investigation has
been done, the Bureau does not have a stake in a certain position
at that point, and that mitigates the problem.
There is a lot of concern among academics in the field of media-
tion that complainants may be at a disadvantage due to a disparity
in resources and knowledge. As a mediator is neutral, he or she
cannot also make a judgement about whether or not an agreement
is fair. The Bureau plays that role in our mediations. The Bureau
is the social justice element; the ones who say, "No, this is not fair.
More needs to be done in this situation."
I believe that their role of upholding the law and assessing the
basic fairness of an agreement is more a benefit than an impedi-
ment. The debate, however, is ongoing, and the problem is a very
interesting one.
AUDIENCE: Are there time limits at the Commission within
which a case must be mediated?
MS. HOWARD: No, there are no time limits.
AUDIENCE: If a party is dissatisfied with one agency, can he
transfer his case to another for mediation?
MS. HOWARD: No, not ordinarily. Once a case is filed in one
agency is stays there unless, due to special circumstances, the case
is administratively dismissed. The complainant chooses his forum,
and it then is then bound by that choice.
If you have a case that is appropriate for mediation, and you
would like to mediate it, you can call the Office of Mediation and
Conflict Resolution at the Commission. If you would like one of
our brochures, you may use the brochure to send in your request
and the Bureau will follow-up with you.
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AUDIENCE: What role do you expect the State Division will
play as the State Commission reorganizes itself in response to the
judge's order in the NOW lawsuit? 15
MS. LOPEZ: The judge's order is on appeal, so I cannot address
any plans the State Division may have in terms of responding to
that order. I can say that mediation is being looked at, and I have
to end my comment there.
AUDIENCE: If, at the Commission, a mediation takes place,
are there ever circumstances in which an agreement between the
parties is not approved by the Bureau? Additionally, either post-
or pre-investigation, are there any circumstances in which parties,
both represented by counsel, reach an agreement, but the Bureau
does not approve the agreement?
MS. HOWARD: In answer to your second question, when both
parties are represented by counsel, there is usually no problem
with Bureau approval of an agreement. Counsel are ordinarily
very knowledgeable, they know the law and its parameters. The
Bureau, however, does have an independent stake in enforcing the
Human Rights Law. 16 Where the Bureau finds that the agreement
undermines its ability to enforce the law, it has the option of with-
holding its approval. It is very rare, however, that the Bureau exer-
cises that option. I think our Deputy Commissioner for Law
Enforcement, Randy Wills would be able to add to our discussion.
MR. WILLS: It is possible for the Bureau to refuse to sign-off
on an agreement reached between a complainant and a respon-
dent. If the parties are represented by counsel, however, that
would be a very, very rare occurrence. I cannot think of a case in
which we have done that in the past six or seven years.
Until the Bureau has enough information as a result of our in-
vestigations to conclude otherwise, parties are, of course, free to
settle on their own. If, however, the Bureau has enough informa-
tion about a case to determine that some form of permanent, af-
firmative relief, such as changing hiring policies, promotional
policies, or sexual harassment policies, is called for, the Bureau will
encourage the parties to include it in their settlement agreement.
If the parties do not, the Bureau may file an independent suit
based to obtain affirmative relief.
15. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 189 F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
16. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1999).
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I have not seen that happen, certainly not since I have been Dep-
uty Commissioner, and I was a managing attorney for quite a while
before that.
MS. HOWARD: Generally the parties come to an agreement
and the Bureau then discusses any affirmative relief it deems nec-
essary. We must stress how rare this is. This discussion is theoreti-
cal. Usually the parties come before the mediator, settle the
dispute, draft an agreement, and walk away. That is 99.9% of the
agreements.
I would like to thank you all for your attention and our panelists
for participating.
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
MS. VARELA: This is the panel for policy works, because we
are actually going to talk about legislation, advocacy and the law.
The problem of domestic violence, a term that has come to de-
scribe violence directed at women perpetrated by their intimate
partners, is a vexing one for the legal system, whether under a
criminal or civil law framework.
Until recently, most states did not convey to police officers
called to the scene of a domestic dispute the authority to take the
perpetrator into custody unless the police officers had direct evi-
dence of "wife battering," as the behavior is also known. Only af-
ter an active, concerted campaign by feminists, was legislation
enacted in Minneapolis, Minnesota, which gave police officers the
authority to take a batterer into custody on the strength of circum-
stantial evidence of domestic violence.17
Domestic violence was not traditionally regarded as a crime, due
to the historic status of women as chattel in many countries, includ-
ing many modern ones. Domestic violence is a crime against wo-
men that is not committed by a stranger, rather, by its very
definition, is perpetrated by a person with whom the victim is on
intimate terms. Like sexual harassment, domestic violence is a
manifestation of one person's desire to dominate and control the
other, rather than the outgrowth of strictly sexual phenomena be-
tween two persons.
Traditionally viewed as a problem affecting primarily the poor,
domestic violence has been redefined as a problem affecting wo-
men from all strata of the socio-economic ladder. Due in part to
the redefinition, domestic violence is the object of new scrutiny by
lawmakers who are wrestling with the problem of whether the pro-
visions of the criminal law which currently apply to domestic vio-
lence perpetrators, go far enough in addressing societal attitudes
which may contribute to its spread.
Members of the City Council of the City of New York, prompted
by advocates for domestic violence victims, have introduced legis-
lation, Introduction Number 400 ("Int. No. 400"),18 to amend New
17. See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 23.
18. Draft of Introduction No. 400 (introduced Aug. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Int. No.
400] (proposing an amendment to section 8-107 of the New York City Administration
Code introduced by the Public Advocate, Mr. Green, and Council Members Eldridge,
DiBrienza, Leffler, Cruz, Boyland, Marshall, Duane, Robinson, Freed, Henry, Lina-
res, Lopez, Perkins, Pinkett and Reed, as well as Council Members Carrion, Clarke,
Eisland, Fisher, Foster, Koslowitz, Michels, Miller, Quinn, Rivera and Sabini, which
was referred to the Committee on General Welfare).
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York City's Human Rights Law (the "Human Rights Law") 19 to
add domestic violence victims to the City's list of thirteen pro-
tected classes.
This panel proposes to: (1) set out and analyze the terms and
implications of Int. No. 400; (2) review in a general way current
thinking about domestic violence in the context of New York
State's Penal Code; (3) examine what extra-legal protections are
afforded domestic violence victims by both social service providers
and law enforcement; and (4) finally, evaluate the potential for fur-
ther innovation in the field of domestic violence victim advocacy.
We begin our discussion with consideration of domestic violence
in the context of the criminal law, with remarks by Ms. Lucia Da-
vis-Raiford. Lucia is the civilian member of the New York Police
Department's ("NYPD" or "Police Department") Domestic Vio-
lence Unit, a relatively new unit within the NYPD. Lucia is the
Director of the Domestic Violence Unit there, and in that capacity
develops domestic violence policy, advises the Chief of the Depart-
ment on emerging domestic violence issues, and develops training
and procedure for field operations. She was formerly Director of
the Legal Bureau for the New York City Transit Police.
Following remarks by Lucia, we will have the opportunity to
hear from Julie Goldscheid, a distinguished lawyer on the staff of
the National Organization of Women's Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund ("NOW LDEF"). Julie is the Co-Chair of the Violence
Against Women Task Force of NOW LDEF, spearheading legisla-
tive and litigation efforts on matters relating to violence against
women. Julie practiced law privately, was a clerk of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, and is a graduate of New York University
School of Law. She was a social worker prior to entering law
school and holds a MSW degree from Hunter College. She earned
her undergraduate degree at Cornell University.
Following our speakers' remarks, we will have time for ques-
tions. Let us begin with Lucia.
MS. DAVIS-RAIFORD: Good morning. I am Lucia Davis-Rai-
ford and I am the Director of the NYPD's Domestic Violence
Unit. I was in a unique position, as a civilian, being asked to create
a unit within a para-military organization with one hundred years
of history. Part of the challenge, structurally, was to facilitate
change. It is like turning a supertanker around, in terms of devel-
oping and improving the response of the Police Department to Do-
19. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1999).
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mestic Violence and other issues. The Police Department, as you
know, is absolutely huge.
There was, however, an institutional commitment to change. In
1994, the Police Department developed seven major crime-fighting
strategies to help bring crime under control in New York City. I
am proud to say that Police Strategy Number Four ("Strategy
Four") was "Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence." Strategy
Four set forth the Police Department's policy and commitment to
improve its response to domestic violence. It details how the re-
sponse will be improved in terms of policy and procedure. In-
cluded are steps such as improving the monitoring and tracking of
domestic violence cases and ensuring appropriate follow-up on
those cases that require law-enforcement intervention. Where ac-
tions are not necessarily criminal, we are moving from a law en-
forcement venue to more support, intervention, and social service
referrals. Strategy Four also set forth the Department's mandatory
arrest policy, which requires an arrest in certain domestic cases.
The circumstances under which arrest is mandatory are as follows:
First, there must be an arrest if there is probable cause to believe
that a felony has been committed. Neither the victim/complainant
nor the police officer has discretion.
Second, there must be an arrest if there has been a violation of
an order of protection. There is no discretion in those cases.
Third, there is a mandatory arrest requirement in misdemeanor
cases when the victim requests that an arrest be made. If the vic-
tim/complainant does not request that the alleged perpetrator be
arrested, the officer will make a discretionary determination based
on various factors (i.e. likelihood of further violence, past history,
survey of the scene). He/she may or may not affect an arrest in this
scenario. The officer, however, may not ask the victim if he/she
wants to have the offender arrested or inform him/her of the
choice. Under CPL 140.10, this is known as the "don't ask, don't
tell" rule. ° There is no discretion for these circumstances under
the Mandatory Arrest Law.2 As New York State enacted the
Mandatory Arrest Law in 1996, I am proud to say our policy far
predated that statute.
Strategy Four represents a major strategy change in how the
NYPD does business. We had a mandatory arrest policy before,
but it was not applicable to crimes that occurred behind closed
doors. Strategy Four was a statement that the Police Department
20. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1998).
21. See id.
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would take seriously and criminalize behavior that previously
might have been brushed off or not taken as seriously as another
type of crime. It also mandates that we have in each precinct a
domestic violence prevention officer and a domestic violence inves-
tigator. All precincts have at least one domestic violence preven-
tion officer. Most have two to three. In some precincts where the
incidence of domestic violence crime is very high, there are as
many as nine or ten.
We are also required, in circumstances of misdemeanor cross-
complaints, to determine, if possible, the primary physical aggres-
sor. We have to look at the past histories of the parties and assess
the comparative extent of the injuries to see whether parties have
offensive or defensive wounds (for instance whether we have a wo-
man with one black eye and the other eye hanging out and a guy
with scratches on his arm). It is also very important that we take
into account threats of harm or threats of future harm. The deter-
mination is not solely based on who initiated the physical attack.
Prior to the advent of the "primary physical aggressor" analysis,
in cases of misdemeanor cross-complaints, both parties were ar-
rested. Often this meant that the victim was arrested with the of-
fender. The challenge in the cross-complaint scenario is for the
officer to make the proper determination regarding which party
gets arrested for that particular incident.
Police respond to domestic calls whether or not the call has come
from the victim. If a child calls, the police respond. If a friend
calls, the police respond. If a neighbor calls, the police respond. If
a stranger calls, the police respond. A domestic incident report is
recorded and given to the victim. A complaint report is prepared
in cases where there is criminal behavior. An arrest may be made
if the perpetrator is still present, particularly in cases involving a
felony, a misdemeanor where the victim says "lock him up," or a
violation of an order of protection, as required by the Mandatory
Arrest Law.
We also have to consider how we prosecute and investigate
cases, particularly regarding working women and women with chil-
dren. The NYPD tries to avoid having large numbers of investiga-
tors going in and out of a woman's workplace, as this could cause
her to become less desirable as an employee. Investigators should
also be mindful of the possible negative impact of an ongoing in-
vestigation on children and schedule visits and appointments
accordingly.
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One of the challenges that we face now is how to become more
sophisticated about investigating what we call "twilight" domestic
violence, rather than the physical abuse that occurs in the home.
Examples of twilight domestic violence include: being called and
harassed at work, as well as being sent letters or e-mail. These
things are more difficult to investigate and prosecute particularly
when the victim prefers to maintain some level of privacy.
One of the things we have to think about as we develop policy is
the impact on the victim, are we helping her or are we hurting her?
Thank you.
MS. GOLDSCHEID:2 z Good morning. On behalf of NOW
LDEF, I want to start by thanking the organizers and the New
York City Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission") for
inviting us to participate in this forum, and particularly, for ad-
dressing the very important issue of why domestic violence victims
should be protected by the Human Rights Law.
The impact of domestic violence on the workplace has come into
particularly sharp focus for us as a result of NOW LDEF's Bat-
tered Women Employed project. This is a pilot bi-coastal project
that we began last year with the Employment Law Center of the
Legal Aid Society of San Francisco. It is funded by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice,23 and is geared toward helping battered wo-
men keep their jobs. Toward that end we offer technical assistance
and training for advocates and provide direct services for battered
women - of course we support them in leaving violent relation-
ships, but our project focuses on helping them negotiate issues re-
lated to their jobs, some of which were just alluded to and of which
I will discuss in more detail.
One of the things that we are learning is that battered women
are often discriminated against in the workplace, in circumstances
suggesting that the discrimination occurs simply because of their
actual or perceived status as a victim of domestic violence. You
can imagine how difficult it is for a woman, particularly if she is
trying to negotiate leaving a violent relationship, to come to work
and then to be penalized again as a result of the violence. This
22. I would like to thank Mary McGowan Davis, Visiting Attorney, and Marcel-
lene Hearn, Staff Attorney, NOW LDEF, who edited these remarks and provided
accompanying citations.
23. The Battered Women Employed Project is supported by Grant No. 98-WL-
UX-0007, awarded by the Violence Against Women Grants Office, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
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creates a Catch 22, because a woman's job is frequently the key
factor that will enable her to leave a violent relationship and move
into safety.
In many cases a battered woman may be afraid that her batterer
will come find her at work. She may simply want her employer to
figure out how the company can make the workplace more safe by
taking simple, low-cost steps such as changing her phone number
or desk location or registering her protective order with security.24
What makes sense in any particular workplace and what an em-
ployer may be able to do to help varies in each situation. The bot-
tom line, however, is that a battered woman should be able to talk
to her boss about the feasibility of taking such steps without fear of
reprisal. Yet, when a woman comes to us and tells us she is afraid
she will be retaliated against if she asks her employer to help, we
cannot assure her that no one can take an adverse job action
against her just for asking.
Int. No. 400, which has been introduced in the City Council, ad-
dresses the problem of retaliation head-on; it would prohibit em-
ployers from discriminating against battered women in the terms
and conditions of their employment. In essence, it would give
battered women the assurance they need to be able to approach
their employers about developing workplace safety plans. In the
few minutes I have, I will provide some background on what hap-
pens to battered women at work; address the extent of coverage
under existing laws;2 6 and discuss Int. No. 400.
As you know, domestic violence is rampant. We have seen
changes over the last twenty-some-odd years in increased public
awareness about the prevalence of domestic violence. Many statis-
tics, including government statistics, show that approximately one
24. For information about the types of common sense steps that women can take
to address violence in the workplace, see Robin R. Runge & Marcellene E. Hearn,
Employment Rights Advocacy for Battered Women, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 17,
18, 26 (2000). See also NOW LDEF, Battered Women Employed, Safety Planning in
the Workplace (1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter "NOW LDEF Workplace
Safety Manual"].
25. After this Symposium, Introduction No. 400-A was introduced replacing Int.
No. 400. While the concept is largely the same, the precise language has changed.
Compare Int. No. 400 (N.Y. City Council 1998), with Introduction No. 400-A (N.Y.
City Council 1999).
26. For information concerning battered women's employment rights, including
victim protection laws, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, sex discrimination laws, unemployment insurance and welfare to work
programs, see Runge & Hearn, supra note 24, at 26-29.
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in four women will be abused in her lifetime. 27 In a workplace em-
ploying more than four women, one of them is likely to have a
problem at some point. Those facts alone should give employers
reason to be attentive to, and to think about, the problem.
Domestic violence has a dramatic impact on women's work lives
because of the specific way batterers interfere with and frequently
try to sabotage women's ability to go to work and do their jobs.
Studies show that batterers can be relentless in harassing women at
work, for example, through telephone calls or other abuse.28 E-
mail increases the potential for constant harassment. Batterers
may go to great lengths to keep women from getting to their jobs,
including physically abusing them to such a degree that they are
unable to go to work.29
Studies show that women are at increased risk of violence at the
hands of their batterers at the very time they try to leave an abu-
sive relationship.30 A woman leaving her abuser obviously needs
her job for economic independence, but her workplace may be the
only place her batterer knows where to find her. A woman in that
situation is frequently faced with very difficult decisions about how
to keep her job, leave the violence, and try to keep the workplace
27. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Research in Brief Prevalence, Inci-
dence and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings from the National Vio-
lence Against Women Survey, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Nov. 1998, at 7.
28. In one study, 70% of employed battered women reported that their abusers
harassed them at work by telephone. See Connie Stanley, Domestic Violence: An
Occupational Impact Study 17 (1992) (study on file with author). Another study
showed that between 35 to 56% of employed battered women were harassed at work
by their batterers; between 55 to 85% missed work due to the abuse; and between 24
to 52% of employed battered women have lost a job due at least in part to domestic
violence. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RE-
CIPIENTS 18 (GAO Rep. to Congressional Committees Nov. 1998) (summarizing four
studies of employed battered women and one study of battered women participating
in a job training program).
29. See THOMAS MOORE & VICKY SELKOW, THE INSTITUTE FOR WISCONSIN'S FU-
TURE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICrIMS IN TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK:
BARRIERS TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND THE W-2 RESPONSE 5-6 (1999) (More than half
of women surveyed reported that their batterer threatened them to the point that
they were afraid to go to school or to work).
30. See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72-75 (1991) (detailing cases of murder that oc-
curred after women left their abusers); LAURENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS AND GIRLFRIENDS V (1998);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTI-
MATES (1994).
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as safe as possible for herself and her co-workers. This applies to
women in work-training programs as well as to those in private and
public sector jobs.31 The approach that makes the most sense is for
battered women to be able to go to their bosses and tell them
about the problem, suggest ways to reduce the risk of violence at
work, and work together to create what we call a safety plan. 32
Many employers have begun to address the issue by learning
about domestic violence and taking important steps to help women
in their work forces. One study showed that approximately one-
third of business executives think that domestic violence affects
their balance sheets; about half of these business executives believe
that domestic violence harms productivity; and two-thirds agree
that their companies' financial health would improve if the com-
pany addressed domestic violence.33 Employers are starting to
adopt policies providing leave time or assurances against discrimi-
nation to battered women.34 Many are training employees about
the problem and how to respond to it, and are supporting local
domestic violence service providers.
Government initiatives are addressing the problem as well. For
example, pursuant to New York State law, Governor Pataki com-
missioned the New York State Office for the Prevention of Domes-
tic Violence to develop model policies addressing domestic
violence in the workplace for county employers, public employers,
and private employers. The state has already issued the Model
31. See CATHERINE T. KENNEY & KAREN R. BROWN, NOW LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATION FUND, REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES: THE IMPACT OF VIO-
LENCE ON POOR WOMEN 7 (1996) (reporting that job training providers interviewed
concerning the prevalence of domestic violence among the participants in their pro-
grams estimated that from 30 to 75% of the participants were currently being abused
by a partner). Providers reported that batterers would withhold child care, and abuse
their partners or keep them up all night at critical junctures in the job training pro-
gram or before a job interview. See id. at 14-16.
32. For more information on work safety plans, see NOW LDEF Workplace
Safety Manual, supra note 24 (describing the process for creating a work safety plan).
33. See ROPER STARCH, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CORPORATE RE-
SPONSE 8-11 (1994) (survey conducted for Liz Claiborne, Inc.); see also Charlene Solo-
mon, Talking Frankly About Domestic Violence, PERSONNEL JOURNAL, Apr. 1995, at
63, 65 (reporting that three-fourths of human resources professionals surveyed saw
domestic violence as a workplace issue).
34. See e.g., POLAROID EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, reprinted in NOW
LDEF, THE IMPACT IN THE LIVES OF WORKING WOMEN: CREATING SOLUTIONS-
CREATING CHANGE (1st ed. 1996).
35. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 575(7) (Consol. 1999).
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Domestic Violence Policy for Counties.36 Notably, the draft version
of the model policy for private employers prohibits discrimination
against victims of domestic violence in the terms and conditions of
employment.37 Not all employers, however, have taken those
steps, leaving women to face these difficulties alone.
A few examples may clarify the need for laws like Int. No. 400
and policies prohibiting employment discrimination against bat-
tered women. For example, NOW LDEF, along with Oregon
Legal Services and a private attorney, represented a woman in Or-
egon who worked at the same job site as her batterer. He drove a
truck that delivered trusses, part of the roofs of houses, and she
drove a car that followed behind and announced that the truck was
carrying a wide load. Their employer knew the man was abusive,
because he was violent toward her in the workplace. He eventually
confronted the office manager at work, threatening that if the com-
pany allowed the woman to continue to work there, he would kill
her. In response, the company fired our client, leaving her with
five children, and without a job. No disciplinary action was taken
against the batterer.
We represented her in a case claiming that the employer discrim-
inated against her on the basis of sex by firing her and not taking
any meaningful disciplinary action against the batterer .3 In our
view, it was sex discrimination because of the disparate treatment
of the two employees; one a man, the other a woman. He was
violent in the workplace, yet she was penalized.
In another case in New York, we assisted a woman who worked
for the business department of a small clothing manufacturer. On
the day she left her batterer she was worried that he was going to
come find her at work, as he had previously worked there as well.
She asked the office manager if the office could simply lock the
door. That way she would know if her batterer had come to find
her. As it was not a retail establishment, locking the door would
not interrupt the business. The manager agreed to lock the door,
36. See OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MODEL DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE POLICY FOR COUNTIES 25-31 (Jan. 1998) (setting forth a model domes-
tic violence policy for county employers).
37. See OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MODEL DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE EMPLOYEE AWARENESS AND ASSISTANCE POLICY FOR PRIVATE BUSI-
NESSES (Draft Sept. 1999) (on file with author). ("[Employer x] will not discriminate
against a victim of domestic violence in hiring, staffing, or other terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.").
38. See Complaint at 1-4, Valdez v. Truss Components, Inc., No. CV 98-1310 (D.
Or. filed Oct. 23, 1998).
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and the day proceeded without incident. The woman went home
and, luckily, the evening proceeded without incident as well. At
about 9:00 that night, however, she got a phone call from the com-
pany president saying that she was going to be fired because the
company could not tolerate having her in the workplace.39
While much progress has been made in establishing legal protec-
tion for victims of domestic violence, certain problems affecting
battered women in the workplace have not yet been addressed.
For example, many states have enacted victim protection laws. As
of July, 1999, approximately twenty-five states prohibit an em-
ployer from firing or discriminating against a crime victim who
takes time off to testify in a criminal proceeding.40 New York has a
similar law, New York Penal Law Section 215.14, which makes it a
misdemeanor for an employer to fire or penalize an employee who
is a crime victim because that employee took time off to appear in
criminal court.41 This law also covers employees who appear in
court to "exercise [their] rights... under the Family Court Act. .."
so it also applies to domestic violence victims who are petitioning
for civil orders of protection.42 California and Rhode Island have
similar statutes, which prohibit employers from discriminating
against employees who have sought to obtain or have obtained or-
ders of protection.43 These statutes, however, do not help a woman
39. See Complaint at 1-2, Oliver v. Craig Taylor, Craig Taylor Shirts, State Divi-
sion of Human Rights No. 1A-EOC MS-98-2305980 (filed June t6, 1998).
40. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.017 (Michie 1999); ALA. STAT. § 15-23-81 (Michie
1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-90-1105 (Michie 1997); CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(b) (West
1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-303(8); CONN. GEN. STATE. ANN. § 54-203(b)
(West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, ch. 94 § 9409 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 11A.036
(1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 621-10.5(b) (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.23 (West
1998); IND. CODE § 35-44-311.1 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B § 3k (West
1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.036 (West 1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-43-45
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 595.209 (Michie 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-24-205
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT § 50.070 (1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14 (McKinney 1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.18 (Anderson 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4957
(West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-
4-122(1998) (applies to state employees only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5313 (1998);
VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-11.01 (Michie 1999); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 34 § 203 (1999); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-40-203 (Michie 1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. §1-40-209 (Michie 1999).
41. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14.
42. Id.
43. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-11 (1998). See also Maine
Act to Protect Victims of Crime in the Workplace, 1999 ME. LAWS 435 (providing job
protected leave to testify in court and prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees who took the leave); MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA. CODE, art VII,
ch. 11A (1999).
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who is afraid of simply talking to her boss about how she might
safely get to the subway from work.
Some circumstances in which domestic violence impacts the
workplace may result in violations of sex discrimination laws. For
example, some cases involve sexual harassment. Domestic vio-
lence between co-workers, whether between a supervisor who sex-
ually harasses a subordinate or two co-workers, as in the cases that
I mentioned before, may constitute either quid pro quo or hostile
environment sexual harassment.44 Other circumstances might
present claims of disparate treatment in cases where, for example,
an employer treats a female employee who is battered differently
from a male batterer.45
As we have heard, battered women who have become disabled
as a result of the abuse may have recourse under disability discrim-
ination laws. Certainly, anti-discrimination provisions based on
disability should apply to battered women just as they would in any
other case of disability.46 However, not all battered women are
disabled, and a woman should not have to get to the point where
44. See, e.g., Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming hostile
environment claim when plaintiff's ex-husband sexually harassed plaintiff at work);
Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F. 3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding sexual harassment
claim where male police officer committed violent acts against female coworker after
they ended an intimate relationship). But see Galloway v. General Motors Svc. Parts,
78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that it was not sexual harassment when verbal
conduct arose from a "failed relationship" and not from a belief that women do not
belong in the workplace).
45. See, e.g., Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, 649 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1981) (up-
holding a disparate treatment claim where the employer fired a female employee and
retained a male employee after the male employee assaulted the female employee at
home and at work); see Battered Women Employed, Domestic Violence and Work:
Workplace Discrimination Against Battered Women (fact sheet Feb. 1999) (on file
with the author).
46. An employer may not discriminate in employment against a domestic violence
victim who has a qualifying disability caused by the violence under the Human Rights
Law. Under the Human Rights Law, a disability is defined as "any physical, medical,
mental or psychological impairment, or a history or record of such impairment."
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (16). In addition, an employer must provide a reason-
able accommodation to enable a disabled individual to work. See N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 8-102 (18), 8-107(1)(a). For example, if a woman has a back injury due to
the violence, her employer may not fire her simply because she has a back injury. In
addition, domestic violence victims who have disabilities caused by domestic violence
may qualify for protection from discrimination in employment and reasonable accom-
modations in the workplace under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(a) (1994). However, the ADA's definition of disability
is quite narrow: the domestic violence victim must have a physical or mental impair-
ment that "substantially limits a major life activity," or "must [be] regarded as having
such impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994). See also NOW LDEF Work-
place Safety Manual, supra note 24.
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she becomes disabled before she is free from discrimination in the
workplace.47 That is why the disability provisions of the Human
Rights Law do not sufficiently help battered women.
Int. No. 400 would amend the Human Rights Law by prohibiting
employment discrimination against battered women because of
their actual or perceived status as victims of domestic violence. It
was introduced last year in the City Council. It has the support of a
good number of Council members, and we have heard that there
may be public hearings scheduled regarding the proposed amend-
ment in the near future.48 Int. No. 400 gives women redress if they
are subject to an adverse job action because of their status as do-
mestic violence victims, and offers them the assurance that they can
come forward and negotiate a safety plan with their employers
without fear of retaliation.
The following is a summary of where this proposal stands rela-
tive to the rest of the country. In Maryland, the Governor issued
an Executive Order prohibiting unfair treatment of state employ-
ees based on their status as domestic violence victims. 49 Texas has
enacted a law prohibiting discrimination against victims of family
violence who are participating in Welfare-to-Work programs .5
California, Maine, and the City of Miami prohibit discrimination
against people who are taking domestic violence-related leave.51
Those jurisdictions have leave provisions under which battered wo-
men can get employment-related leave to deal with domestic vio-
lence in their lives.
There are also provisions pending in Congress. The 1999 Vio-
lence Against Women Act ("VAWA II")51 introduced in the House
47. See generally MARY ANN DuTroN, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BAT-
TERED WOMAN 10, 76-86 (1997) (explaining that abuse impacts each victim
differently).
48. A hearing was held on Int. No. 400-A before the Joint General Welfare and
Women's Issues Committees on January 26, 2000.
49. See MD. EXEC. ORDER No. 01.01.1998.25 (1998).
50. See Tx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 31.0321 (West 1999).
51. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1999) (prohibiting an employer from dis-
charging or discriminating in employment against a domestic violence victim who has
taken time off to appear in court to obtain protective orders or other civil relief);
Maine Act to Protect Victims of Crime in the Workplace, 1999 ME. LAWS 435 (provid-
ing job protected leave to domestic violence victims to testify in court, receive medical
treatment or obtain services and prohibiting employers from discriminating against
employees who took the leave); MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA. CODE, art VII, ch. 11A
(1999) (same); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-11 (1998) (prohibiting an employer
from discriminating in employment against an employee who has obtained or sought
to obtain an order of protection).
52. Violence Against Women Act of 1999, H.R. 357 §§ 722-726 (1999).
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contains a Title addressing the workplace. One of its provisions,
called the Victims' Employment Rights Act ("VERA"),53 would
accomplish what Int. No. 400 is designed to do, and would prohibit
discrimination against battered women in the terms and conditions
of their employment.54
MS. VARELA: I am going to respond to Julie's presentation,
and then I will take some questions.
I just want to underline for everybody here that the Giuliani Ad-
ministration has not taken a position on Int. No. 400 as yet. I have
my own opinions about the draft bill, which I will share with you
today, but those are my personal opinions and are not to be con-
strued as my speaking for the Administration.
Let me first specify the points on which I agree with Lucia and
Julie. I agree that attention definitely needs to be paid to the
problem of domestic violence at all levels, and I am very gratified
by the fact that Lucia is a civilian working at the NYPD working on
how the Police Department can become more responsive to a
problem that it has frequently not had enough time for. That is a
very positive development.
Comparisons between Int. No. 400 and what other states are do-
ing and what Congress is considering are helpful in providing back-
ground, but they do not really address the specific question of
whether there should be another protected class under the Human
Rights Law specifically for domestic violence victims.
In order to understand what the City would be doing if this legis-
lation were enacted, it would be helpful to talk a little bit about
New York City's Disability Law (the "Disability Law"), 55 which is
really sui generis. It is very unusual for Disability Laws around the
country and does not closely resemble the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act,56 because the definition of "disability" under the Human
Rights Law does not require a "substantial life impairment."
Rather, the language is specifically "any physical or psychological
disability," which means that the threshold for establishing a disa-
bility is about as low as it can be.
The Disability Law permits a domestic violence victim who is
experiencing any form of consequence as a result of domestic vio-
53. Battered Women's Economic Safety and Security Act of 1999, S. 1069 §§ 2021-
2026 (1999).
54. See id.
55. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102 (1999).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1999).
57. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.
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lence to ask an employer for reasonable accommodations on the
basis of mental suffering, anxiety, shortness of breath, headaches,
and/or any type of stress-related syndrome that is a consequence of
domestic violence. The Disability Law is superior to Int. No. 400 in
that, like all disability laws, it is imperative that the employer re-
spect the confidentiality of the person requesting the accommoda-
tion, which gives the domestic violence victim something that Int.
No. 400 does not.58
Int. No. 400 requires that the domestic violence victim self-iden-
tify to the employer as a domestic violence victim. 59 I think that
can be a disadvantage for the domestic violence victim. I admit
that my presumption is that there is no domestic violence victim
that does not have some psychological or physical symptom, who
does not feel at some level, physically or psychologically, the effect
of domestic violence. The Disability Law permits the domestic vio-
lence victim to ask for accommodation under the without having to
disclose anything about the history of the domestic violence. I
view that as positive in terms of the recovery of the domestic vio-
lence victim. That is what makes the Disability Law unique and
not comparable to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and proba-
bly many of the statutes cited by Julie.
There is a very powerful incentive under the Disability Laws to
educate employers. There are corporations, like Polaroid, which in
their employee assistance plan has a specific component that ad-
dresses domestic violence victims' issues.6 ° Creating a protected
class within an adversarial framework to protect domestic violence
victims can create unintended negative consequences for that do-
mestic violence victim by thrusting the employer into an adver-
sarial relationship with the employee, whereas most employers are
already familiar with their obligations to accommodate under the
Disability Law.
In our experience, more employers are receptive to incorporat-
ing into their workplace policies accommodation provisions for
employees across a wide range of disabilities under the City's in-
credibly expansive law. This is a more positive approach that, in
the long run, benefits domestic violence victims more than does the
ability to file a complaint at the Commission as a domestic violence
victim.
58. Compare Int. No. 400, supra note 18, with N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.
59. See Int. No. 400, supra note 18.
60. See MARIAN BETANCOURT, WHAT To Do WHEN LOVE TURNS VIOLENT: A
PRACTICAL RESOURCE GUIDE FOR WOMEN IN ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 157 (1997).
1144
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
There are other issues relating to the draftsmanship of the ordi-
nance itself. It does not resemble the Disability Law, in that there
is no language associated with "reasonable accommodation" that I
have been able to make out.61 The courts might find themselves in
a quandary, since surely we will find ourselves receiving both disa-
bility and domestic violence victims. We will have complaints that
will cite both protected classes without any appreciable distinction
between the remedies that are sought. Those, however, are largely
technical, "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin" argu-
ments. Although I should mention that if Int. No. 400 is enacted,
District Attorney's offices in the five boroughs will have the au-
thority to determine whether a breach of the penal code has been
committed.62
The goal is to help domestic violence victims. The question is
whether Int. No. 400 the right remedy.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: Just a quick question in reference to the scenario
where the woman requested that her employer lock the door. Is
the gist that the employer is going to be required to make a reason-
able accommodation in the situation where there is a direct threat
to fellow employees? What is the employer's responsibility to pro-
vide reasonable accommodation?
MS. GOLDSCHEID: These are difficult situations. I am glad
you asked the question, because Int. No. 400 does not impose a
duty on an employer to make reasonable accommodations when an
employee has been threatened. I think we agree that Int. No. 400
accomplishes less than what many advocates urge is a desirable
goal - and may well be a good policy solution - which is to re-
quire an employer to provide reasonable accommodations to bat-
tered women.
What Int. No. 400 does say is that a woman should not be penal-
ized for asking for a reasonable accommodation. We work with
women and employers to develop policies and responses to partic-
ular circumstances. These situations are complex, difficult and very
fact-specific. We certainly respect employers who want to take rea-
sonable steps, both to try to help victims of domestic violence, and
to try to safeguard the entire workplace. It is a very tough balanc-
ing judgment that plays out differently in each situation.
61. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.
62. See Int. No. 400, supra note 18.
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The specific assurance that Int. No. 400 provides is that a woman
could talk to her employer about domestic violence or safety in the
workplace, without fearing retaliation just for asking. Each indi-
vidual employer determines what makes sense and what is possible
under the circumstances. It does not impose a duty on the em-
ployer to make any particular accommodation.
I am interested in hearing how the Commission would respond
to the reasonable accommodation point.
MS. VARELA: Well, the circumstance that the gentleman re-
ferred to raises a superseding issue, which is the safety of everyone
in the workplace. That tends to supersede the issue at hand, since
you have offered an example in which an employer who might not
otherwise be sensitive to the fact that a perpetrator of violence may
enter the workplace would face liability for all the employer's af-
fected employees. Even with Int. No. 400, the employer would
face liability for having inadequately protected his workplace.
I do not agree with Julie that we need Int. No. 400 to do this,
because I think the Disability Law already provides this protection.
As she indicated, this is a conversation that the employer needs to
have with the managers in the workplace in terms of devising a
solution. Maybe the accommodation that is requested by the em-
ployee is not the best one in the circumstances, but an accommoda-
tion that an employer could come up with can be one that would be
considered reasonable by an independent third party reviewing
what the employer had done under the City's law.
MS. GOLDSCHEID: In our experience in working with women
and employers, in the vast majority of cases employers who have
the good will to act can work something out that helps a woman
feel safer. There may well be circumstances in which people disa-
gree about what accommodations an employer can make, but in
most situations something can be done to help a woman keep her
job while taking steps to safeguard the workplace. Usually, there is
no need to demote, fire or put the woman on probation, which,
unfortunately, is what we often see. The reality is that what fre-
quently happens to women when they do come forward and ask for
some kind of modification at work is out of proportion with what
would be necessary to ensure safety.
MS. VARELA: Although it would be clearly illegal under the
City's law to retaliate against someone requesting that kind of ac-
commodation by taking any type of adverse employment action
against them.
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MS. GOLDSCHEID: If a woman tells her employer that she
needs to file for an order of protection and does not make a state-
ment about her mental or physical state, but is subjected to an ad-
verse job action as a result, would you still see her as covered
under the Disability Law?
MS. VARELA: No, but the employer's obligation would be trig-
gered under the order for protection. What the domestic violence
victim who wants to supplement her coverage under the protective
order with the Disability Law would do would be provide her em-
ployer with the request for reasonable accommodations along with
a doctor's note underpinning the request.
MS. GOLDSCHEID: Sometimes, though, women have not
gone to the doctor, and they may not see themselves as disabled.
What they want is to be able to ask their employer about such
things as registering a protective order with the people who sit at
the security desk. In other words, domestic violence may impact
the workplace in ways that have nothing to do with a disability.
That is why the Disability Law may not always be appropriate.
MS. VARELA: Yes, but the nature of domestic violence is such
a complex problem. We have not, for example, talked about the
circumstance where the victim returns to the batterer, which is a
phenomenon that takes place within the broader rubric of domestic
violence.
To some extent, are money damages the wrong remedy for the
problem under these circumstances? I think that allowing money
damages for the victim does not do anything to enhance the protec-
tion that that victim needs right now.
MS. GOLDSCHEID: I agree that domestic violence is complex.
Int. No. 400 addresses one aspect of the problem. The availability
of legal recourse in the event that she faces discrimination may
help her keep her job, which often can help her leave an abusive
relationship.
MS. VARELA: I find that if we would expect someone who is
making a claim under the Disability Law to visit a doctor as a re-
quirement of that accommodation, you are saying to me that it
makes sense to you that an employee should be able to come to an
employer and simply, without providing anything further, impose
upon the employer a requirement that that employer do what that
employee wants for fear of being sued for discrimination.
MS. GOLDSCHEID: First, as I said before, women may not go
to the doctor. In many situations they may, but it might not be a
precipitating event. There may be circumstances in which a woman
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does not see herself as disabled and, therefore, does not seek inter-
vention at the workplace based upon a disability; she may really
just be seeking to register her protective order, or change her desk
location, or have a morning off, or something like that, which has
nothing to do with a physical or emotional condition that would be
covered by the Disability Law. Some women may be disabled as a
result of the abuse, but many are not. And all victims of domestic
violence should be able to talk to their employers about their situa-
tions without fear of reprisal.
A woman may not even be asking for a reasonable accommoda-
tion. Prohibiting discrimination and requiring employers to make
reasonable accommodations are two separate issues. Some advo-
cates might want to see a reasonable accommodation provision
built in to new legislative proposals. As a policy matter, it is a very
good idea. Int. No. 400 provides a lesser, but nonetheless impor-
tant, protection.
MS. VARELA: We need to do a better job educating domestic
violence victims about the protections that are afforded them
under the Disability Law. I think that that should be the Commis-
sion's role in terms of encouraging employers to help domestic vio-
lence victims.
MS. GOLDSCHEID: So that a woman who is not suffering
from some pressing physical or emotional impairment would still
make a claim under the Disability Law?
MS. VARELA: You believe that that is possible. I think that is
where our assumptions are different. I find it difficult to believe
that, under the City's broad provisions under the Disability Law,
that there is anyone who is a domestic violence victim who is not
captured under the definition of "disabled."
AUDIENCE: In a case like that in Oregon, where there is do-
mestic violence between two co-workers but no physical or mental
disability, had that case occurred in New York City, could that wo-
man, without a doctor's note or any physical manifestations, have
filed a complaint with the Commission?
MS. VARELA: Yes. We would have to take that complaint.
AUDIENCE: On what basis?
MS. VARELA: We are required to take any complaint that
comes to us that states a cause of action for employment discrimi-
nation that has taken place within the five boroughs. We are not
like an advocacy organization, like the NOW LDEF, where there is
discretion as to which cases to add to the case load. We must take
all complaints that come in and add them to the docket.
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AUDIENCE: Would you have considered that situation to be
covered by the Disability Law? The woman says, "I was fired be-
cause my co-worker was threatening me. I do not have any medi-
cal situation, but that is why I was fired by my private employer"
putting aside that it is covered by sex discrimination, would you
consider that to be covered by the disability language in the
Human Rights Law?
MS. VARELA: Not unless she articulates a specific disability-
related manifestation.
AUDIENCE: Well, is that not the problem that Int. No. 400
attempts to address? That gap, where a woman who is being
stalked but not abused, not touched, is going neither to a therapist
nor a doctor, a woman whose phone is ringing all the time at work
and is getting a lot of e-mails at work, and needs to talk to her
employer about it but fears she will be fired?
MS. VARELA: I understand your question. My reservation is
whether under our framework, we are the best equipped to address
that issue inasmuch as there are a host of related issues, which we
unfortunately we do not have time to go into it now. The situation
that you are asking about is not specifically covered, but I am not
sure that legislating Int. No. 400 is going to provide the benefits
that its advocates believe it will.
As I say, that is based on my perception that there is nothing
wrong with domestic violence victims making claims under the Dis-
ability Law.63 It is specious to suggest that domestic violence vic-
tims have no psychological or physical symptoms.
MS. DAVIS-RAIFORD: I want to weigh in very, very carefully,
because I have been very careful not to take a position on either
side of this debate. I have to say in our involvement with domestic
violence victims, one of the things that we see is that most victims,
especially female victims, do not see themselves as disabled. They
refuse medical attention most of the time, regardless of the extent
of their injuries, unless they just cannot avoid it.
The difficulty in dealing with domestic violence victims is that
they do not assume victim status, so it is very difficult for us to
negotiate under the penal codes and criminal law. Having been a
victim of domestic violence myself, I speak from personal experi-
ence. It is very rare that you find a victim who is ready to say,
"Yes, I am a victim" and accept that status, even accept temporary
medical assistance, much less view herself as disabled.
63. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.
2000] 1149
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
DEVELOPMENTS IN DISABILITY LAW
MS. VARELA: It is a supreme, and to employers by no means
welcome, irony that the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA"),64 enacted by Congress in 1991 to bring the most disabled
Americans into the mainstream workplace, has, in consequence of
broad judicial interpretations of the definition of "disabled," be-
come more than an act to help those with impairments, such as
deafness, blindness, paralysis, et cetera. The legislation imposes a
powerful requirement on employers to accommodate that has
changed the workplace, albeit it not without attendant controversy.
This panel seeks to concentrate on developments and interpreta-
tion of the ADA alongside parallel trends in interpretation of the
much more broadly defined meaning of disability under New York
State and New York City laws.
To lay the groundwork, we will hear first from Lou Graziano of
the New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ("EEOC"), followed by Al Kostelny of the New
York State Division of Human Rights (the "State Division") and
John Herrion of the Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association (the
"EPVA").
Lou has been a litigator with the New York Office of the EEOC
for the last twelve years. He previously worked as an investigator
with the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division. He
received his undergraduate and law degrees from St. John's Uni-
versity and is a contributing editor to the New York State Bar As-
sociation's journal, Public Sector Labor and Employment Law.
Al Kostelny is a litigator at the State Division and has been with
the agency since 1979, when he graduated from Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law. He is a graduate of the University of Penn-
sylvania, having earned both an undergraduate degree and a
Masters degree in international relations there. He is advisor to
and member of the editorial board of New York Law and Practice
Monthly.
Last but not least, we will hear an advocate for the disabled,
John Herrion of the EPVA. John is Assistant Program Counsel of
the EPVA. He is secretary to the New York State Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Legal Issues Affecting Persons with Disabili-
ties and is a graduate of Pace University School of Law.
I should note that, as counsel to the EPVA, John has repre-
sented, among others, Ronnie Ellen Raymond, in her suit to obtain
64. 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1999).
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an accommodation to permit her to safely enter her cooperative
apartment at 325 Central Park West. That suit, which was jointly
litigated with attorneys from the Law Enforcement Bureau of the
New York City Commission on Human Rights (the "Commis-
sion"), was characterized by The New York Times as a wake-up call
to housing providers that the New York City Human Rights Law
(the "Human Rights Law") 65 prohibits discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities, and we mean it.66
We will start with Lou.
MR. GRAZIANO:67 Sir Isaac Newton once said that he could
see further since he stood on the shoulders of giants. Next year, the
EEOC will celebrate its thirty-fifth anniversary as the federal
agency that enforces federal anti-discrimination laws.68 The EEOC
and the federal anti-discrimination laws have benefited from the
experience and efforts of Fair Employment Practice Agencies, such
as the Commission. It is appropriate to remember on this, the
forty-fifth anniversary of the Commission's successful education of
the public on the value of equal employment opportunity for all,
that it is the efforts of those who have preceded EEOC that have
permitted the federal government to go farther. As with Newton,
EEOC has succeeded because it has followed giants.
Baseball, for some, is a metaphor. Some of the advice and ad-
ages extend beyond the baseball field and have application in other
areas. There are two sayings that I believe have particular applica-
tion in the discrimination law setting, especially the ADA. In base-
ball you are taught "see the ball, hit the ball" and "if you think
long, you think wrong." These sayings have some value in viewing
the appropriate way to approach the ADA. All too often, lawyers
and judges make claims more complex and fail to focus on the fact
that the ADA is meant to prevent discrimination based upon disa-
bility.69 In truth, keeping it simple is the best way to approach
claims of discrimination.
65. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1999).
66. See Jay Romano, A Ruling on Co-ops and Disability, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1999, at 1.
67. The views expressed in these remarks are held by Louis Graziano in his pri-
vate capacity. No official support or endorsement by the United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission or any other agency of the United States
Government is intended or should be inferred.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1999) (creating the EEOC).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (stating "It is the purpose of this chapter - (1) to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities").
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The goal in determining whether there is a violation of the stat-
ute should first and foremost be whether there has been discrimi-
nation. U.S. District Court Judge Denny Chin appropriately places
the examination focus on whether there was discrimination,
although his analysis concerns a related issue, on the burden of
proof. He re-examines the basic framework used by the courts to
determine whether there is liability - the McDonnell Douglas7"
burden of proof allocution.
Judge Chin concludes that it makes more sense for the courts,
and, I would add, lawyers litigating in this area, to recognize that
discrimination is what matters. "[C]ourts instead should focus on
the 'ultimate issue'- whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more
likely than not that an employer's decision was motivated, at least
in part, by an 'impermissible' or discriminatory reason. "71 This
streamlined approach would strip away tangential and distracting
questions concerning the minutiae of the test's inner workings and
reaffirm the purpose of Title VII: remedying discrimination, "sub-
tle or otherwise. 7
2
The same logic that drives the inquiry should be present in deter-
mining whether a violation of the ADA has occurred. The ADA
was passed to prevent people from discriminating based upon disa-
bility, and I think that is where the focus should be when you start
to examine a claim under this law. In large measure, that is what I
do when I start to look at a charge, because it is my view that if you
can establish that the person is being discriminated against because
of disability, and I am very careful in how I say that because there
are different prongs as to establishing whether a person has a disa-
bility, generally speaking, a lot of the other issues are going to fall
into place. I think you have to look at what the law was meant to
do and how it makes sense.
Keeping the focus on the ultimate issue is important in ADA
claims. In fact, the ADA creates more distractions when evaluat-
ing the ultimate issue than any other anti-discrimination law. I am
not saying that you should ignore the statutory definition of "disa-
bility, '73 "major life activity '74 or "essential function. '75 Under-
standing their relevance to a lawsuit is important because they are
70. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
71. Evans v. Golub Corp., 29 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Denny
Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659 (1999).
72. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 801.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1.2102(2) (1.999) (defining "disability" to mean "with respect to
an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
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often jurisdictional. They should not, however, become the over-
riding concern. Indeed if there is direct evidence that an employer
denied someone a job because of a disability, issues such as
whether that person had a disability may be less crucial because
jurisdiction will likely also attach under one of the other prongs of
disability. There may be no need to pursue questions of what ma-
jor life activity is affected because the employer admits to consider-
ing the person as having a disability. In this scenario, there is no
need to establish the essential functions of the job since the em-
ployer considers the individual unfit. By attacking the litigation
from the direction of whether there was discrimination you are be-
ing faithful to the law's purpose while finding a solution to many of
the problems that distract from the question of discrimination.
The Supreme Court demonstrates this view in several cases it
recently decided. One case is Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys-
tems Corp.7 6 This was a case where, once again, we found the ever-
imaginative respondents' bar developing another theory to quickly
resolve discrimination cases, in this particular case, disability
claims.
Several years before, the respondents' bar brought us a new legal
theory that became known as "after acquired evidence" as a great
way of eliminating discrimination cases. That theory was based
upon the discovery of adverse evidence against the employee after
the discriminatory act had taken place. The theory was that ad-
verse evidence, such as lying on a resume, would excuse any illegal
acts of the employer - essentially creating a case of two wrongs do
make a right. After causing a split in the circuits, this theory ap-
peared before the U.S. Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co.77 While the Court agreed that it was a very
interesting and innovative policy, and that it did have a limited role
in the issue of damages, it would not be the magic bullet that would
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impair-
ment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment").
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1230.2(i) (1999) (defining "major life activity" as "[a] function
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning and working").
75. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1999) (defining "essential function" as "the funda-
mental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or
desires[;] "essential function" does not include the marginal functions of the
position").
76. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
77. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
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deny a plaintiff from proving discrimination by the employer.78
The Supreme Court was keeping an eye on the discrimination ball.
Respondents' bar tried again, this time under a concept that was
a little bit more tried and true, called judicial estoppel. Under this
theory, a plaintiff who brought an ADA claim of discrimination
against an employer could lose the case before the issue of discrim-
ination was ever decided. An employee with a disability who was
fired might apply to Social Security or similar agencies to receive
disability payments because of an inability to work. Under these
circumstances, the claimant had to make a sworn statement that he
had a disability that prevented him from working. Armed with this
statement, the respondents' bar took the position that under those
circumstances, you have admitted that you cannot work; therefore,
you cannot be a qualified individual with a disability. You do not
have a lawsuit; you lose.
Once again the Federal Circuit Courts were split on this issue,
some agreeing that the plaintiff was estopped,79 some did not find
that the plaintiff was estopped. 80 In Cleveland, the Supreme Court
again would find that judicial estoppel was not a magic bullet that
threw a plaintiff out of court without any thought to whether there
was discrimination." The Court stated that this too was another
very innovative and interesting argument, and that, while it did
have a place in litigation, it would not be an automatic bar in all
cases."2 There is a good reason for such a conclusion. The Court
reasoned that while a claim of disability by an employee may be
evidence of whether that person can work, you have to look at the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Indeed the Court recog-
nized it may have been the employer's failure to provide an accom-
modation that forced an employee to claim that he could no longer
work.83
Slowly but surely, as the courts, respondents and plaintiffs all
start to realize that the ADA is just not a law where one size fits all,
78. See id. at 360-61.
79. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
that judicial estoppel bars a plaintiff from bringing an ADA suit); Kennedy v. Ap-
plause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996) (same).
80. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
that application for and receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance does not estop
a plaintiff from bringing an ADA suit); Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,
143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same).
81. See Policy Management Systems, 119 S. Ct. at 1602.
82. See id. at 1603.
83. See id. at 1602.
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but that each case has to be judged upon its own merits, maybe we
can get down to what the law is really meant to do. As in baseball,
if you think too long you think wrong.
The Supreme Court case I want to talk about for a few moments
is a case that has probably received a lot more attention. Sutton v.
United Airlines84 was the lead case of three that were decided in
1999 where the Court examined the issue of who is disabled. In
Sutton, the Supreme Court concluded that people who have eye-
glasses do not have disabilities in circumstances where, with eye-
glasses, the individual can adequately see.86 This was not a very
neutral fact pattern, as the case concerned a couple of applicants
who wanted to become global airline pilots. Whenever you start
talking about safety affecting circumstances, especially with airline
pilots, you are already skewing the analysis. Decisions are not
made in a vacuum.
The Court concluded that defining whether or not a person has a
disability must include any corrective medication or devices.87
Therefore, if by wearing eyeglasses you no longer were disabled,
you no longer fit within the first prong of the disability definition.
While most news from this decision has focused upon the Court's
narrowing of the disability definition, disagreeing with the position
taken by EEOC and many plaintiffs,88 there was more to this opin-
ion. While on the one hand, the Court narrowed the window for
individuals with impairments to argue that they have been discrimi-
nated against under the ADA, another window under the "re-
garded as" prong is given greater vitality. This gets to the heart of
what I have been talking about, which is: is the employer discrimi-
nating? Under these circumstances, we start to not just look at
what is or is not wrong with the employee, but we start to look at
what is or is not wrong with the employer. In many cases the per-
son suffering from a impairment is the employer who thinks that
someone with a disability cannot work. That impairment is fear
and ignorance on the part of the employer.
Along those lines, let me just cite what the Supreme Court said
concerning the definition of the "regarded as" prong of disability.
There are two ways in which an individual may fall within the stat-
84. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
85. See Alberstons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
86. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
87. See id. at 2147.
88. See id. at 2146.
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utory definition: "[A] covered entity mistakenly believes that a
person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or [sic] a covered entity mistakenly be-
lieves that an actual non-limiting impairment substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 89
I do not know yet where this definition and where this analysis,
which the Supreme Court touches on in Sutton, is going to take us,
because I think the law is going to have to evolve in this area. I do
think, however, that the Supreme Court is opening up a very inter-
esting window. There also was some discussion during the oral ar-
gument, with the Supreme Court suggesting that maybe you do not
fit in as disabled, but we do not want to ignore the fact that the
employer may be who is creating a discriminatory environment,
and we still think that is something that needs to be actionable. I
continue to believe that the ADA will remain sufficiently expan-
sive to include discriminators if the right approach is taken, and
that approach is to view the events from what did the employer
believe.
With that in mind, let me finally cite two cases that I believe will
be useful when attacking the problem of whether there was dis-
crimination under the 'regarded as' prong. Quite often what hap-
pens under this analysis is you end up seeing working as a major
life activity. Some employers may be accommodating enough to
admit that they consider an employee disabled. Often, though, the
fall back position under the 'regarded as' prong results in claiming
that work is as the major life activity affected. A number of courts,
including the Second Circuit,90 have made it difficult to establish a
case where working is the major life activity. In denying the ADA
claim, many courts have used an expansive view of what jobs some-
one with a disability can find. There are two recent cases that I
believe offer a better analysis of working.
In Fellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,91 the Eighth Circuit
reversed a summary judgment decision for the defendant. The
court concluded that you could not just look at whether there were
any job opportunities that someone with a disability could have
undertaken, but you also had to examine the employee's particular
work history.92 In that case, the plaintiff had worked in the restau-
rant management business for twenty years. Her entire work train-
89. Id. at 2149-2150; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (C) (1999).
90. See Daly v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989).
91. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
92. See id. at 945-55.
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ing, experience and expectations were in restaurant management.
Therefore, there should be an individual assessment of whether the
employer's action resulted in discrimination.93 A similar result can
be found in Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.94 There, the
court concluded that any evaluation of whether working was sub-
stantially affected by the discrimination should include an analysis
of the plaintiff's limited job skills, education and age.95 I think
those are the cases that are leading us in the right direction because
they are typified by individualized plaintiff assessment when deter-
mining whether there has been discrimination on their behalf.
Thank you.
MS. VARELA: Thank you, Lou.
MR. KOSTELNY: I will not presume to discuss the ADA after
Mr. Graziano's presentation, so I will confine my remarks to the
New York State Human Rights Law (the "NYS Human Rights
Law").96
The NYS Human Rights Law differs in three material aspects
from the ADA:
First, the definition of disability is markedly broader under the
NYS Human Rights Law than it is under the ADA.
Second, the analysis of what constitutes discrimination under the
NYS Human Rights Law is more flexible than it is under the ADA.
Finally, the scope of activities protected by the NYS Human
Rights Law is broader than the scope of activities protected by the
ADA.
The NYS Human Rights Law defines disability as "[any] physi-
cal, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, phys-
iological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the
exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medi-
cally accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques .. .
The dependent clause is the most important part of the definition.
Just as Commissioner Varela made plain with respect to the
Human Rights Law, the NYS Human Rights Law covers all
diagnosable medical condition.
Mitigating measures, such as the eyeglasses that the Supreme
Court fixated on in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.98 are irrelevant to
93. See id. at 955.
94. 162 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1998).
95. See id. at 782.
96. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1999).
97. See id. § 292(21).
98. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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the definition of whether a person is disabled under the NYS
Human Rights Law, because the treatment of a condition does not
affect the diagnosis of it.
There is no requirement that the diagnosable medical condition
substantially limit a major life activity of the individual, as the
Supreme Court held in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,99 because
all diagnosable conditions are covered without restriction. 100 In-
deed, the NYS Human Rights Law goes on to specifically provide
that employment discrimination against individuals, simply because
of their genetic predisposition or carrier status with respect to a
physical, mental, or medical impairment, is specifically
prohibited.' 0'
Finally, the NYS Human Rights Law focuses on the impact of
the disability on the job or occupation sought or held by the dis-
abled individual,0 2 as opposed to the broad categories of types of
employment that the Supreme Court focused on in Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.'03
In analyzing when discrimination occurs under the NYS Human
Rights Law, the federal courts, the State Division and the New
York State Courts have all mandated an individualized inquiry.
What, however, constitutes an individualized inquiry is markedly
different under federal and state law. The ADA poses the follow-
ing questions with respect to the individual plaintiff: does that indi-
vidual have an impairment; is that impairment substantial; does
that substantial impairment significantly limit a major life activity;
and, if that major life activity is not working, 04 then, and only then,
does the federal court focus on the question of whether or not that
individual can reasonably perform the job duties of that position
with or without reasonable accommodation.
If, however, the major life activity impacted by a disability under
the ADA is working, then the plaintiff must jump over one further
hoop: he/she must show that he/she is disqualified from a broad
spectrum of jobs, not simply the job for which the plaintiff was ac-
tually applying, before the federal court even gets to the question
of analyzing whether or not that person can actually do the job
notwithstanding their disability.
99. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
100. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21); Albertsons, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
101. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(1).
102. See id. § 292(21).
103. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
104. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that reproduction is a
major life activity).
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Under the NYS Human Rights Law, there is a more abbreviated
inquiry. Indeed, the approach that federal district Judge Chin rec-
ommended has always been the focus of disability litigation under
the NYS Human Rights Law: 1) does the individual have a disabil-
ity; i.e., does that individual have a medically recognized and
diagnosable condition; 2) did the employer make an adverse em-
ployment decision based on that disability; 3) is the individual not
hired, denied a promotion, or fired because of that disability; and
finally, 4) does that disability impact that individual's ability to rea-
sonably perform the job duties of the position at issue? 105
I would note that, under the NYS Human Rights Law, that deci-
sion has to be made after the employer provides reasonable accom-
modation. The State Division's Interim Guidelines outline what
the employer's required reasonable accommodations are.'0 6
Finally, although the ADA is not purely a fair employment prac-
tices statute, as the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. Zimr-
ing'° 7 made quite clear, both the New York State and the New
York City Human Rights Laws are true omnibus statutes. They
mandate not only fair employment practices, but also prohibit dis-
crimination against individuals on the basis of disability in housing,
public accommodations, and credit.
In closing, I would like to note, particularly for those who are, or
may be, litigating these types of claims, that disability discrimina-
tion litigation under either federal, state, or local law is fundamen-
tally different than the classic Title VII litigation. For example, a
third of a century after the enactment of Title VII, and well over
half-a-century after the enactment of the NYS Human Rights Law,
affirmative action remains a hotly debated afterthought to those
statutes.
With respect to the disability discrimination provisions of both
the ADA and the NYS Human Rights Law, affirmative action in
the form of reasonable accommodation is the heart and soul of
these statutes. Reasonable accommodation is the essential demand
placed upon employers and the essential requirement that employ-
ers have to meet in order to stay in compliance with federal, state,
and local law in this area.
MS. VARELA: Thank you.
105. See Evans v. Golub Corp., 29 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Chin & Golinsky,
supra note 71.
106. See N.Y. COMP. CODE RULES & REGS., tit. 9, § 465.11 (2000).
107. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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MR. HERRION: I want to express my gratitude to the Commis-
sion and Commissioner Varela for the opportunity to speak at this
important anniversary commemorating forty-five years of this
Commission's service to the citizens of New York.
I was asked to speak today on disability rights and the develop-
ments that have been made thereunder. I think the word "devel-
opments" is appropriate. As I have begun to practice in this area
of law, I have learned that disability rights is very much a work in
progress, and there is a tremendous amount of education, advo-
cacy, and good legal representation that needs to be done in order
to continue to expand upon the scope of protections and rights that
are afforded to people with disabilities under the city, state, and
federal laws.
One such opportunity came my way two years ago. It was the
Raymond v. 325 Central Park West case.1 °8 The case began with
Ms. Raymond calling EPVA. She was very upset because the
Board of Directors (the "Board") denied her request for a ramp.
I went out to meet with Ms. Raymond. She lives in a beautiful
apartment that looks out on Central Park on Central Park West.
She had run a successful business in New York City and is ex-
tremely active in her community. She has lived in the building for
a number of years, and served on the Board in 1995. In 1995, the
Board realized that they needed to do some work to the facade of
the building.
The building is not uncommon, in terms of design, to that of
many buildings in New York City. It features a moat in front of the
building that is covered by two steps and a concrete platform that
leads to the lobby door. The structural beam within the moat
needed to have some work done, so they needed to demolish this
platform and reconstruct it.
Ms. Raymond was on the Board at this time, and asked them to
consider putting in a ramp. Seeing that the work needed to be
done, it was a good opportunity to have it all taken care of in one
shot. For two years, it looked like the Board was going to do the
right thing. They hired an architect who drew designs for both the
job that featured the ramp design as well as the job that featured
the steps that were going to be reconstructed. They secured bids
and made permit applications to the New York City Department of
Buildings.
108. Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Ronnie Ellen Raymond v. 325 Coopera-
tive, Inc., No. 1423/98, 1999 WL 156021 (N.Y.C. Comm. Hum. Rts. Jan. 12, 1999),
affd 1999 WL 152526.
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In September of 1997, however, the Board held a shareholders'
meeting in the cooperative lobby, and at that meeting the share-
holders raised a number of concerns with regard to the ramp de-
sign. Some concerns include: the increased cost; others included
security and liability issues; concerns that there would be
skateboarders on the ramp; and some people did not want the
building to look like a hospital.
Ms. Raymond sat through this entire meeting listening to all of
these concerns, none of which addressed her quality of life, her
access to the building, her ability to independently exit and enter
her own home. After the meeting, Ms. Raymond drafted a concise
memo that she sent to the Board president, which addressed each
and every one of these concerns and included an offer to pay for
the entire cost of the ramp.
I bring that up because the issue of who pays for the reasonable
accommodation has been distinguished in New York City within
the housing context. It has been distinguished from the federal and
state requirements, and is certainly an area that has been devel-
oped in disability rights law. I will come back to that issue, but it is
important to note that she did offer to pay for it.
The Board met, agreed with their shareholders' concerns and
voted down the request for the ramp. They were going to go ahead
with construction that would include putting the steps back in at
the platform. Ms. Raymond then filed her complaint with the
Commission. Rachel Pomerantz became involved as the Law En-
forcement Bureau's attorney; an investigation was conducted, and
probable cause was found, crediting Ms. Raymond's allegations
that the cooperative was discriminating against her, based upon
their refusing her request for reasonable accommodation.
The Board then got together a second time in January of 1998, to
discuss access for the building. They came up with the following
idea: they were going to provide Ms. Raymond with an exterior
elevator lift that would platform itself out on the bridge that goes
over the moat. She would then be lowered on the lift in her wheel-
chair into the moat, down one story, where she could gain access to
the basement door. She could then use the basement corridors,
passing the various storage bins and garbage that is down there, to
access the elevator door which would then bring her up to her
apartment. The Commission found this offer to be unreasonable,
citing safety and dignity concerns for Ms. Raymond. 10 9 I will fast-
109. See id. at *11-13.
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forward here, because we were successful in winning the case. The
Commission ordered the cooperative board to install a ramp and
automatic door openers. 110
The issue of damages is interesting, because what happened was
the administrative law judge recommended that Ms. Raymond be
compensated by the amount of $10,000 for the pain and suffering
she endured in terms of getting in and out of the building without
assistance, waiting for people to help her get in and out, over the
past couple of years.111 The Commission looked at the recommen-
dation and increased it by $5000, because they noted from the rec-
ord that Ms. Raymond truly did feel worse about the possibility of
getting in and out of her home through the basement on this lift
contraption. I remember Ms. Raymond telling me that she would
rather climb up the stairs to get in through the front door than be
left on this elevator lift to enter and exit her building. I also recall
discussing the Board's offer with my boss at EPVA, Jim Weisman.
He said he had no problem with their offer so long as they boarded
up the front door and everybody got on the elevator and went
down into the basement to get in and out.
Another issue I want to mention with regard to how the Ray-
mond case has developed disability rights is the scope of the Com-
mission's order. There is a provision in the New York City
Administrative Code that deals with the scope of a decision and
order of the Commission. 112 It says that the responding party can
be ordered to take affirmative action, and that includes extending
equal and unsegregated accommodations, services, and privileges
to the aggrieved party.1 13
I think the Commission noted that in increasing the damages and
looking at the overall case, what we are talking about is equal, un-
segregated access, not what is the best offer or what somebody
thinks is reasonable. We are really looking at all the facts and ele-
ments of the case and ensuring that an individual with a disability
has equal access that is dignified and safe, similar to the way that
everybody gets in and out of their own home.
The Raymond case bears out a number of elements concerning
disability discrimination rights.11 Mrs. Raymond had requested a
110. See id. at *1.
111. See id. at *12.
112. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120(a)(5) (stating that the Commission may or-
der a respondent to extend "full, equal and unsegregated accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities and privileges" to the other party).
113. See id.
114. See Raymond, 1999 WL 156021, at *10.
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reasonable accommodation, and offered to pay for it. Usually in
these cases, and what is established under the Human Rights Law,
is that a reasonable accommodation is such accommodation that
would permit an individual to enjoy the right or rights in question,
so long as it does not create an undue hardship.'15 An undue hard-
ship takes into consideration such things as cost, the financial im-
pact on the building or the covered entity that is involved;11 6 and
practical concerns - you could not have a hundred-yard ramp go-
ing across Central Park West and consider that a reasonable
request.
None of those elements were really addressed by the Board.
They were well off financially. There were no apparent problems
with the cost of the ramp construction. Ms. Raymond's offer to
pay for the reasonable accommodation eliminated the undue hard-
ship obstacle.
What ended up coming about - and I want to briefly touch on
this, because when you are talking about developing rights around
disability, you also need to understand what are the discriminatory
practices that are out there - what the Board ended up doing was
they raised a business judgment rule defense." 7 They said that
they had made a good faith, lawful decision to accommodate Ms.
Raymond and thus were protected from judicial review by the
business judgment rule. The Commission disregarded the respon-
dent's business judgment rule defense and ordered the accommo-
dation that Ms. Raymond requested.
I know that I am down to my last minute here, so I will close it
up with this in terms of the development of disability rights. New
York City has distinguished itself in the country with regard to ob-
ligating property owners and housing providers to pay for reason-
able accommodations. 1 8 The federal and state laws require
persons to provide reasonable accommodations at the expense of
the individual with the disability, 119 whereas the Human Rights
Law places the obligation on the housing provider. 120
115. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(18).
116. See id. § 8-102(18)(a)-(b).
117. See Raymond, 1999 WL 156021, at *10; see also Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave.
Apartment Corp., 554 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1990) (discussing the co-op board's use of the
business judgment rule as a defense).
118. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120(a)(5). See also United Veterans Mut. Hous.
No. 2 Corp. v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 616 N.Y.S.2d 84, 207
A.D.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (1999); 24 C.F.R. § 100.203; N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296(18).
120. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120(a)(5).
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In coming here today and in working on the Raymond case, I
think we have set a good foundation that puts cooperatives housing
providers and others on notice that you cannot simply offer to pro-
vide access through the back door or through the basement door;
you have to ensure that people with disabilities that are your neigh-
bors and tenants are given equal access to use and enjoy their
homes just as everybody else in the building is.
Thank you very much.
MS. VARELA: Thank you, John.
I just wanted to say, for your information, disability is the fastest-
growing area of our docket. Two other cases, which those of you
who like to play with LEXIS might be interested in, are the Torres
case,121 that involved a similar accessibility issue, and our decision
in Pathmark,122 which was recently upheld by the State Supreme
Court, that raised the issue of whether the defense of substantial
performance will be admitted. That was a case in which the court
imposed $25,000 damages and a $100-a-day fine after ninety days
for failure to comply with an order relating to supermarket cart
corrals. Hence, it is the fastest-growing area, not least because
EPVA is very, very enthusiastic and energetic in bringing those
cases and bringing them to our attention when appropriate. So
thank you.
I have two quick questions before throwing it open to the floor.
My first question is to Lou. Lou, I had recently heard Chris Kucyn-
ski of the Washington Office of the EEOC talk a little bit about the
Sutton case and the two prongs you referred to, but he talked about
an implication of the Sutton case that had to do with asserting juris-
diction on the basis of secondary effects of medication, something
that would present a new opportunity for jurisdiction under the
ADA. I was wondering whether in your office you have seen any
cases lately, any filings on substantially life-impairing secondary ef-
fects of corrective procedures or medication?
MR. GRAZIANO: Offhand, I cannot think of any that have
made it up to review by our office. Certainly one of the things we
have looked at in the past, and I think there have been some cases
121. Torres v. Prince Management Corp., NYCCHR Complaint No. M-H-D-96-
1000166 (OATH No. 301/98), Report & Recommendation (Aug. 14,1997), adopted as
modified, dec. & order (Oct. 27, 1997), affd sub nom. Commission on Human Rights
v. 351-93 Bainbridge Realty, Ltd., No. 400356/98, slip op. (Sup. Ct., NY County, 1998)
(Weissberg, J.).
122. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. Pathmark Stores, Index No.
401134/99, slip op., (Sup. Ct. NY County, 1999) (MeCooe, J.) (order enforcing settle-
ment agreement and imposing fines).
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in the past, is where someone who may have had cancer and is
taking radiation therapy. In fact, we litigated a case along this line.
The after-effects of radiation, especially when you are dealing in
areas like long-term chemotherapy, where someone may have to
continue to take certain types of medication that have in circum-
stances prevented someone, or where it is recommended that
someone not become pregnant'23 because of the type of medica-
tion you are taking, especially where you have had cervical or
breast cancer or something like that, is one of the issues where I
think Sutton actually expands the area, although we had been kind
of pursuing that even before Sutton had come down. Thus, it does
happen occasionally. The difficulty with it is being able to identify
it. A lot of times, because that is secondary, you do not always
know what you have until you start asking all the right questions
and find out: "Well, what is happening to you now? What does
that medication do?" Hence, it is usually not why the person is
coming in here to start with when they come to EEOC. They usu-
ally are coming in saying, "I have had this condition or this disabil-
ity," and they do not talk about their medication. That is
something that we have to try to get out of them.
It will have its place, but I am not quite sure how big it will be
yet.
MS. VARELA: We will stay tuned. I have a question for Al, as
well. Al, you have certainly made clear to us the implications of
the broad definition of disability under the NYS Human Rights
Law on it, as well as the Human Rights Law. Do you have any
statistics about claimants making claims on the basis of disabilities
that would not meet the ADA's definition of disability? Have you
kept track of how many filings would be actionable by the State
Division that would not be actionable by the EEOC?
MR. KOSTELNY: Because the Supreme Court has, in a trilogy
of cases only decided this year, only just highlighted these differ-
ences between the ADA and the NYS Human Rights Law, we do
not have those statistics yet, although that is certainly something
that we will be tracking in the future.
MS. VARELA: Great. Thank you.
123. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-639 (1998) (holding that reproduc-
tion is a major life activity); Berk v. Bates Advertising U.S.A, Inc., 25 F. Supp.2d 265,
269-270 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment
holding that plaintiff was disabled under the ADA during the period of her employ-
ment with defendant since her breast cancer substantially limited the major life activ-
ity of reproduction).
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: Can you talk about the question of access to com-
mercial establishments and how that differs from access issues with
regard to a condominium or an apartment building?
MR. HERRION: There is not much of a difference. It is cov-
ered under different areas of the law, but the analysis always comes
down to what is reasonable, what is readily achievable, in terms of
removing obstacles or barriers that are in front of a business: is it a
mom-and-pop operation; is it a chain store that has funds and abil-
ity to pay for this accommodation; and what creatively can be done
to remove those obstacles or to provide alternative goods and serv-
ices in terms of ensuring that somebody with a disability can access
that on as equal a basis as possible?
MS. VARELA: Other questions?
AUDIENCE: I just wanted to take your question about medica-
tions one step further. You used the example of radiation treat-
ments of cancer patients. What about persons who have illnesses
or conditions in which they are asymptotic?
In my case, I represent people who are HIV positive, and many
of them have been asymptotic for many years but still must take
medications that can create or cause a temporary illness, for exam-
ple, a two- or three-hour period where, instead of being able to go
to work at 9 o'clock in the morning, they may request an accommo-
dation to come to work at 11 o'clock in the morning so that the
effects of their medication wear off. I believe that would be cov-
ered under the NYS Human Rights Law, but I am wondering if
that is something that would be covered under the Human Rights
Law.
MS. VARELA: The Human Rights Law, yes. Any comments on
that?
MR. GRAZIANO: I think it's the same thing under federal law.
It is EEOC's view that someone who is HIV, and I think Brag-
don124 kind of upholds this, automatically has a disability, so under
those circumstances, the medication, we would not need to have
that trigger the disability claim. That would probably trigger issues
of accommodation, circumstances where someone might have to
alter the work schedule, which is quite often the most difficult thing
to have happen, because employers do not mind spending some
money to do something, but they really get upset where they lose
124. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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control. They just need more education in this area, and we are
prepared to try to help them out.
MS. VARELA: Great. Thank you. Lou, Al, John, thank you
very much.
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DIALOGUE ON HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Good afternoon, everybody.
I am pleased to serve as the moderator for this dialogue. I am a
Professor of Law at New York Law School and also president of
the American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU"). The ACLU is
usually not described as being moderate on any issue, but on this
one I think our position actually could fairly be described as mod-
erate. 25 I am just going to tell you briefly what that is, before in-
troducing the panelists.
A distinction must be drawn between so-called "hate crimes"
and "hate speech." The ACLU has taken the lead in absolutely
opposing laws that restrict hate speech - or speech that expresses
hatred or bias on the basis of race, religion, gender, and other soci-
etal categories - all around the country. 126 In contrast, after long
debates, the ACLU National Board decided that we could not ab-
solutely oppose enhanced penalty laws, which are usually described
as "hate crime" laws, and that impose a more severe penalty on an
act that is already a crime when the victim is intentionally selected
on the basis of discrimination. In our view, when these laws are
written and enforced appropriately, to focus on intentional discrim-
ination in committing a crime, they are a species of civil rights laws,
which we have always supported.
I do not like the term "hate crime," because it suggests that what
is being punished is an idea, attitude, or expression, which would
be unconstitutional. What is actually being punished, though, is a
violent or other criminal act, which our legal system already has
deemed a crime. By enhancing the penalty for an extant crime
when the victim is intentionally singled out because of racial or
other invidious discrimination, government officials are reflecting
society's judgment that the crime is more serious, and does more
harm both to its individual victim and to society as a whole, than
when the victim is targeted randomly or for non-discriminatory
reasons. Accordingly, a more accurate label than "hate crimes"
would be "discriminatory crimes."
Although the ACLU national leadership concluded that en-
hanced penalty laws do not inherently, inevitably create thought
crimes - which would be unconstitutional - we do recognize that
these laws can well be written or enforced in overbroad ways,
125. See ACLU, POLICY GUIDE No. 332, HATE CRIMES LEGISLATION GENERAL
POLICY 497 (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal).
126. See ACLU, POLICY GUIDE No. 7 2 A, FREE SPEECH AND BIAS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES 159 (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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which would violate First Amendment freedoms of expression or
association. This would be the case, for example, if someone were
subjected to an enhanced penalty just because of something he had
said, even if there was no close, direct causal connection between
the statement and the selection of the victim in committing the
crime. Therefore, we take a very hard look at each particular stat-
ute and each particular enforcement of it.
Just as we do not absolutely oppose any and all enhanced pen-
alty laws or prosecutions, we certainly do not unqualifiedly endorse
all of them either. A case-by-case examination is required. We
have opposed both particular laws and particular prosecutions.
For example, with respect to the proposed new federal hate crimes
legislation, the ACLU supports the law's general thrust, but we are
concerned that it is written too broadly, and therefore could well
be enforced in ways that would violate First Amendment rights.
We support the legislation's extension of enhanced penalties to
crimes where the victim is intentionally selected on the basis of
gender, disability, or sexual orientation, which are not now in-
cluded in the federal law. We, however, also are calling for an
amendment that would make it clear that no prosecution could be
based on a mere abstract belief, expression or association, but that
there would have to be a tight and direct causal link between the
evidence showing discrimination and the crime being
prosecuted. 27
We have two excellent speakers, one who is much more opposed
to the concept of hate crimes laws than the ACLU is, and the other
who is much more tolerant of these laws. They have written two
leading and respected books espousing those positions, order forms
for which are out on the table. I highly commend these books to
you. I will now introduce both speakers in the order in which they
will make their opening remarks, by prior agreement.
Our first speaker is Professor Frederick Lawrence. Fred, if I
may be so informal, is a law professor at Boston University School
of Law, having received distinguished degrees from Williams Col-
lege and Yale Law School. After law school, Fred was a law clerk
for Judge Amalya Kearse on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
here in New York. Following his clerkship, Fred was associated
127. See Hate Crimes Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 1082 Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Christopher E. Anders,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (transcript available on the
ACLU Web site) (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/congress/
1080499a.html>.
2000] 1169
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
with the Kramer, Levin law firm, and then became an Assistant
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, where he
ultimately became Chief of the Civil Rights Unit in that office.
Fred has had a distinguished academic career as both a teacher and
a scholar, winning outstanding teaching awards and also fellow-
ships for advanced studies, including the Inns of Court Fellowship
and a Ford Foundation grant.
Fred's book on the topic of this panel, which was just published
by Harvard University Press, is called Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes
Under American Law.128 I also have to add that Fred has worked
for the New York Civil Liberties Union.
James Jacobs is a Professor of Law at New York University
School of Law, where he is the Director of the Center for Research
in Crime and Justice, an outstanding program with which many of
you have had some contact. Jim is a prolific author in the areas of
criminology and law and sociology. He has a Ph.D. in sociology as
well as a law degree, both of which he earned with distinction from
the University of Chicago, having done his undergraduate studies
at Johns Hopkins University. Before Jim joined the NYU faculty,
he was on the faculty at Cornell, where he taught both law and
sociology. He has also been a visiting professor at Columbia Law
School and a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Capetown,
South Africa.
As I said, Jim is extremely prolific, having written countless arti-
cles and books. One of his articles I find particularly noteworthy
because I happen to have been its co-author!12 9 It was the ump-
teenth article Jim had written, as he got into academia much earlier
than I did, but it was my very first law journal publication after I
started teaching. Right after I began my career as a law professor,
Jim honored me by inviting me to join him as co-author of this
article, which a fine law review had already agreed to publish. So
Jim was my first mentor in my academic career, and I will always
remain very grateful to him. Jim's particular piece that is relevant
to today's discussion is a book published by Oxford University
Press last year, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics.13 °
128. FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW (1999).
129. James B. Jacobs & Nadine Strossen, Mass Investigations Without Individual-
ized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 595 (1985).
130. JAMES B. JACOBS, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS
(1998).
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It was co-authored by Kimberly Potter, a recent graduate of New
York Law School, I am proud to say.
By mutual agreement, each of our distinguished panelists will
make opening remarks of no more than fifteen minutes, then they
will have an opportunity to respond to each other quite briefly, and
then we want to open it up for some interaction with the audience.
Fred?
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: Thank you. Nadine has started
the electronic egg timer on me, so I hope I will not use up too
much time if I quickly say that it is a delight to be here. In my
former life, I was an adjunct professor at this very Law School, and
it is a delight to be back.
In Punishing Hate, I refer to the Jacobs and Potter Hate Crimes
as "the other book on hate crimes."'131 I hope Jim feels the same
way. I recommend that the interested reader buy and read both
books and make up her own mind on this subject, and hopefully,
decide that I got it right. I suspect that Jim will be concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
I use the expression "bias crimes," not "hate crimes," for the
following reason. The expression "hate crimes," is more popular,
but I think that "hate crimes" is an expression that actually obfus-
cates more than it clarifies. A "hate crime" tends to make us think
of an act of hatred of one individual for another. This may be true
some of the time with bias crimes, but not necessarily all of the
time. "Hate crimes" includes a lot of other things, such as personal
hatred of one another, which are not part of our discussion today.
A "bias crime," on the other hand, embodies an act of prejudice.
This is why I focus on the term "bias crime." It is an act of preju-
dice that involves violent behavior aimed at a person or property of
the person because of prejudice directed against the group to
which that person belongs or is perceived to belong. By "preju-
dice," I mean a false, stereotypical belief about an individual be-
cause of his or her real or perceived membership in a group.
If we are to talk about punishing bias crimes differently with en-
hanced sentencing, it requires just a very brief discussion, and that
is all we have time for, of first principles. Why do we punish at all?
We punish for a number of reasons, depending on one's theory of
punishment. One theory is that people deserve to be punished.
Another theory is that punishment will deter future behavior of
this kind by others or by that individual. A third theory is that
131. LAWRENCE, supra note 128, at 253.
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punishment expresses societal values in the starkest form when we
denounce a certain type of behavior that we as a society punish
criminally.
Nevertheless, any theory of punishment requires some measure-
ment of harm. We all know that the "punishment has to fit the
crime." Therefore, we need some measurement of how much harm
has been caused by an act. Harm, itself, is a function of both the
culpability or state of mind of the actor, as well as the actual result
of the act. Due to these dual functions, we punish intentional acts,
such as murder, more than a negligent act, such as careless driving,
even if in both cases the victim is dead and, therefore, the result of
the two acts is the same. The culpability of the actor is the reason
why one act is clearly worse than the other act and is punished
more than the other. Similarly, we look to the actual result to de-
termine the extent of the harm, even if the culpability were the
same. Hence, an intentional mugging is not punished as severely
as an intentional murder in any civilized system of criminal justice.
Sometimes, however, culpability and harm actually interact. It
was Oliver Wendell Holmes who said that even a dog knows the
difference between being tripped over and being kicked. 132 Like
most of Holmes's expressions, it has sort of a cute first take on it,
but there is a great wisdom underneath it. If we think about a
crime involving precisely the same harm without intent, such as be-
ing hit in the head with a bat such that one experiences great pain,
an enormous lump on the head, and a tremendous feeling of hav-
ing been hurt. If we say that happens as the result of an accident in
a baseball game, at least in my family, that calls for an "I'm sorry,"
which is usually met with a "say it like you mean it," followed by
"I'm sorry," and then the event is done. I do not wish to belabor it,
but obviously no one would refer to that as a criminal event.
If, however, we hit the head with the exact same velocity of the
bat and the exact same size of the lump on the head but this time
we have an intent to cause harm, it is a worse event. The actual
harm to the victim is dramatically different. Even though the phys-
iological signs are the same, the psychological harm is tremen-
dously different. Therefore, even a dog knows the difference
between being tripped over and kicked. How much more does a
human being know the difference between being tripped over and
kicked and, being kicked for no reason whatsoever, or being
kicked because of one's membership in a particular group?
132. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 6 (Mark Dewolf
Howe ed., 1963).
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This brings us to bias crimes. Bias crimes are different from
what I will call "parallel crimes," which are crimes that have the
same physical manifestation but do not have the bias motivation, in
three different ways. Let me just briefly tick them off, and perhaps
during the question time we can go into them in more detail. First,
individual victims of bias crimes respond with a greater sense of
victimization than victims of parallel crimes. That is, victims of bias
crimes respond with a greater sense of withdrawal from society, a
greater sense of depression, and a greater sense of literal disinte-
gration from society because they have been targeted, not because
of where they happen to be or who they are, but because of what
they are. Hence, in addition to the psychological and physical
damage of the parallel crime, the individual victim of a bias crime
experiences a greater damage because of the "spirit murdering," as
it has been described, that takes place with what is communicated
with the bias crime. The difference between a bias crime and a
parallel crime is fairly intuitive and is what most people think of
when they think of the difference.
There are, however, two other levels, and let me just refer to
them briefly. One is the impact on the target community. Here,
no parallel with a parallel crime really exists. The many members
of target community, meaning those who share the characteristic as
the victim of a bias crime, will respond not only with a sense of
sympathy ("that is a terrible thing that happened"), or even a sense
of empathy ("there, but for the grace of God, go I"), but also with
an actual victimization behavior set of symptoms themselves.
Thus, they react as if they themselves were the victim. For exam-
ple, studies have shown that in the aftermath of cross burnings on
the lawn of a black family, other black families in the area, and
sometimes not even in the area, respond not only with a sense of
empathy. They also respond as if they themselves were attacked,
of actual personal victimization. This is evident with other ethnic
and other groups as well. Consequently, bias crimes affect the tar-
get community in such a way that there is no equivalent with paral-
lel crimes.
Finally, bias crimes affect society at large differently from the
way parallel crimes do. The way I demonstrate this to students is
that if you see a report of a bias crime on the front page of the
paper and continue to read the rest of the paper, invariably you
will find an article of a crime where the physical harm was greater
but lacks the prejudiced intent much further in the paper. There is
a sense that the crime with the greater manifestation of physical
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harm but lacking the prejudiced intent is less of a crime than the
bias crime.
Why is that? It could just be that the racially-motivated arson on
page one appeals to our prurient interest more than the murder on
page twenty-seven, but I do not think so. What it represents is that
the bias crime has implicated a social fissure line, a line on which
society splits in a particularly dangerous and deep way. In fact,
when society enacts a bias crime law on a federal, state, or local
level, it is making a normative statement of where the fissure lines
are in that society, where crimes implicate a deeper kind of harm.
This is because those crimes violate not only the general social con-
tract that we ought not harm one another, but a specific and addi-
tional social contract in this society and in other similar societies,
that we are committed to a multiracial society and to the equality
and egalitarian ideal. We could argue late into the night as to spe-
cifically what the egalitarian ideal means, but we could not have a
meaningful argument as to whether or not in it is part of the Amer-
ican commitment to social justice.
Let me respond to questions that are often asked about enact-
ment of bias crime statutes, which are: Does recognizing a crime as
a bias crime and focusing on it that way in fact make the problem
worse? Does it exacerbate racial tension when you talk about the
James Byrd case 133 as not just a murder but a case of racially moti-
vated murder? Does it exacerbate relations between the gay com-
munity and the rest of the community when we look at the
Matthew Shepard case1 3 ' as a case of sexual orientation-motivated
murder and not just a case of murder?
My response to these questions is that it is similar to not going to
the doctor because you do not want to find out that you are sick. It
may very well be that in the short run focusing on the racial, sexual
orientation, gender, ethnic, or religious aspects of a bias crime will
cause society to focus more on those things than it otherwise
would. Rather, it is in fact realizing, recognizing, and validating a
harm that the individual victim feels and the harm that the commu-
nity feels. The absence of such recognition creates a kind of social
insanity on the part of the victim group that says, "We feel a harm,
we feel a hurt, we feel an injury, that the society is not recogniz-
ing." It is in fact the double harm experienced by the narrator in
133. See 3rd Conviction in Dragging Death, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1999, at 3.
134. See, e.g., Achy Obejas, Student's Funeral Becomes Unity Rally; Mourners
Gather To Decry Hatred, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 1.
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Invisible Man,13 5 where Ralph Ellison teaches us that the harm of
the discrimination being rendered invisible in society is even worse
than being discriminated. 136
Let me end on a somewhat smaller note. I have no illusions
about the role of what bias crime laws can achieve. I do not be-
lieve that bias crime laws will solve bigotry in society. The criminal
justice system is in fact a blunt tool and a clunky instrument for
fine social planning. It is, however, where we express our deepest
and firmest-held commitments. If in fact we can do something as
to one piece of the problem, then it is incumbent upon us to do
that. Certainly there are other aspects of society, all aspects of so-
ciety, private and public, that must be involved in the fight against
bigotry. Nevertheless, bias crime laws have a role to play, and
where there is some role to play, then there is an obligation to see
that that role is played.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Thank you very much, Fred. Jim?
PROFESSOR JACOBS: I appreciate the introduction and hav-
ing been invited to participate. I want to start out by asking what
the problem is. We are not experiencing some kind of epidemic of
hate crimes. Despite a plethora of rhetoric to the contrary, I be-
lieve that there is less virulent racism, anti-Semitism, homophob-
ism, etc., now than in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
century. In my view, the drive to pass hate crime legislation basi-
cally represents greater societal commitment towards tolerance
and diversity, rather than a deterioration of inter-group relations.
Fortunately, there are very few instances of neo-Nazi-type ideo-
logically-driven haters committing murders and atrocious crimes.
Where arrests have been made in hate crime cases, about sixty per-
cent of the arrestees are juveniles, and more than half of these
under the age of sixteen. The vast majority of reported hate crimes
are vandalism, graffiti and harassment. The people who engage in
such acts are usually confused generally and or sociopathic; they
are not committed ideologues. If anything, they are more like T.V.
sitcom character, Archie Bunker than like neo-Nazi leader, Tom
Metzger.
Our criminal justice system is more than adequate to respond to
these offenses. American society cannot seriously be accused of
having inadequate or lenient criminal laws. We clearly have ade-
quate sentencing laws to deal with biased and other criminals. The
more serious criminal justice problem today is over-criminalization
135. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1953).
136. See id.
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and excessive punitiveness. We cannot even carry out the
sentences that we now have on paper because of prison and jail
space. Prison crowding is a problem all over the country.
Are bias crimes being inadequately punished because of weak
sentencing options? I don't thing so. For the kind of atrocious
murders exemplified by the Shepard 3 7 and Byrd'38 cases, all states
already provide for life imprisonment or the death penalty. Fur-
ther, the defendants in those cases have received those sentences.
Some states, driven by the desire to do something about hate
crimes, have added bias motivation as an aggravating circumstance
that makes defendants eligible for the death penalty.139 Isn't it
ironic that in the name of tolerance, in the name of building a more
tolerant society, we are going to execute more people?
Perhaps you agree that our homicide sentencing does not need
enhancing, but that we could and should enhance criminal
sentences for otherwise minor offenses when the perpetrators are
motivated by bias. In New York State, the maximum punishment
for vandalism is already four years in the penitentiary. 140 Is that
not adequate? What about that graffiti artist who writes epithets in
the subway or on public buildings or on an abortion clinic, epithets
that might or might not trigger hate crime punishment? The maxi-
mum penalty in New York for graffiti is one year in jail.141 Do you
really think that for justice to be served, a person who writes biased
graffiti should be sent to jail for more than one year? In Hate
Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics, 42 Kimberly Potter and I
argue that re-criminalizing criminal conduct as hate crimes is un-
necessary. 143 What we have here is a solution in search of a prob-
lem. The problem, however, cannot be inadequate sentencing
power.
We also argue that hate crime laws could be counterproduc-
tive. 44 For one thing, the controversy over hate crime laws dis-
tracts attention from concern for the even-handed, non-biased
137. See Obejas, Student's Funeral, supra note 134.
138. See 3rd Conviction, supra note 133.
139. Tom Kenworthy, Slain Gay Man's Mother Tries to Show Hate's 'Real' Cost,
WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1999, at A2 ("In the wake of the Shepard murder and the
national outcry that ensued, 26 states considered legislation dealing with hate crimes
140. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00-2(e) (Gould 2000).
141. See id. § 70.15-1.
142. See JACOBS & POTrTER, HATE CRIMES, supra note 130.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 102-10.
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enforcement of the law. 145 That some offenders harbor racial bi-
ases or sexual orientation biases or religious biases, is bad; but, af-
ter all, many criminals have many anti-social values and attitudes.
We can only do so much to create bias-free, equal opportunity of-
fenders. Sending more such people to prison for longer is ironic
and counter-productive, because prisons are the most biased are-
nas in the entire society. Indeed, many biased hate organizations
in American society have been spawned in prisons.
Purging bias from the criminal justice system is so much more
important. We cannot have a viable and an effective democracy if
we have discriminatory police, prosecutors, courts, prisons and
jails. Therefore, we constantly have to scrutinize those institutions
to make sure that they are enforcing and implementing the law
even-handedly.
In addition to expanding the death penalty, bias crimes raise an-
other civil liberties issue - punishing people more for having the
wrong biases. In effect, the hate crime enhancement laws tell us
that some biases are okay, and some are not. If you hit somebody
because they are a member of a labor union or because they be-
lieve in the right to work, you are punished X amount; if you hit
them because you do not like their religion, then you will be pun-
ished 3X amount. Remember, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,14 6 the
youthful black defendant received triple the punishment for assault
because his motivation was racial bias rather than "mere" dislike of
the victim's face, the part of town where he lived or high school he
attended. 147 Isn't this, in effect, punishing people for having the
wrong views?
The First Amendment is called into question even more dramati-
cally in sentencing biased graffiti artists. 48 Consider the following:
if you splatter paint on a car, without indication of bias, the punish-
ment is a $500 fine. 149 But if you paint a swastika, a caricature of a
racial group, and perhaps a cross, you get a year in jail.'50 Is that
anything other than punishment for disfavored expression? Fur-
thermore, we need to consider two other categories of graffiti.
How about splattering paint on a church or gay rights office?
Should that get you the $500 fine, the year in jail or something in
145. See id.
146. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
147. See id. at 480.
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting freedom of speech).
149. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05-1 (McKinney 1999).
150. See id. at § 70.15-1.
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between? Finally, what should the punishment be, if instead of
paint, the perpetrator writes words or symbols on a symbolically
meaningful structure, such as writing "down with the Pope" on a
church or "queer" on the gay and lesbian rights office? Does this
warrant a double or triple enhancement, say two years in jail? Is
there no threat to the First Amendment in all of this?
My last concern is that the development of new hate crime juris-
prudence will further politicize the criminal justice system, espe-
cially along racial and ethnic lines. Multiracial and multiethnic
juries may fracture over calling defendants racists, sexists,
homophobes and so forth. Jurors may come to see criminal trials
as a form of intergroup conflict. This would be very unfortunate
indeed.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Thank you, Jim. Fred?
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: I am reminded of a comment that
my teacher and mentor, Charles Black, wrote after his good friend,
and often adversary, Alexander Bickel, passed away. He said,
"Bickel and I agreed on everything except for our opinions." So
Jacobs and I agree on everything except for our opinions. I cer-
tainly share with him the commitment to not having bias in the law
enforcement system, to having equal enforcement by police of-
ficers, by prison officials, by courts, by juries. I will quibble a little
bit when he said all our energy has to go into that.
Let me first say a word about the statistics. I certainly agree with
Jim that the line makes it very hard to know for sure if the problem
is getting worse. I think, for certain, the problem is real. The inci-
dent levels, measured by the Federal Government under the Hate
Crime Statistics Act, tell us anywhere from 8,000 to 9,000 hate
crimes per year.'51 Alabama and Mississippi each reported zero
hate crimes. Now, it could be they had a very good year in Ala-
bama and Mississippi; that is possible. I have another theory, and
that suggests that those numbers are conservative, if not low. We
need not say that the problem is overwhelming or that it is out of
control. Nevertheless it is a problem, a real problem, in search of a
solution, not a solution in search of a problem. I will come back at
the end of remarks as to another way of going about what the
problem is.
151. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
U.S. 1997: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 63 (1998). In the following year, Mississippi
reported three hate crimes. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE U.S. 1998: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 61 (1999).
152. See id.
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Are most of the incidents vandalism? Many of the incidents are
vandalism, but again, I am not sure that tells us that there is not a
problem. Racially or religiously motivated vandalism is a different
and worse crime from parallel vandalism, and in instances where it
is not bias-motivated, then it simply is not a bias crime. Hence, any
act of violence that happens to be interracial or that happens to be
interreligious or the victim happens to be a gay or a lesbian is not,
per se, a bias crime. Motivation has to be proven. Without the bias
motivation, there is, in fact, no bias crime.
Several patterns follow from that. One is the idea that bias
crimes will be very hard to prove. As a former prosecutor, that is a
concern that is near and dear to my heart. Sometimes it will be
hard to prove, and those are cases in which there ought to be an
acquittal on the bias crime charge. Better yet, it will be a case
where a rational prosecutor will say, "this is probably not one that
ought to be charged as a bias crime." More often than one would
imagine, it turns out bias motivation is not hard to prove. Matthew
Shepard would not have been hard to prove as a case of sexual
orientation-motivated murder.153 Cases of gay bashing in my own
city of Boston are often not hard to prove. Sometimes they are,
and in those cases, they ought not to be charged as a bias crime.
A word or two about the civil liberties concerns, which I think
are real ones. First of all, a bias crime is not a crime committed by a
racist. It is a crime committed with racial motivation. A racist who
commits an interracial crime has not committed a bias crime if
there is no connection with racial motivation. A perfect example
of that is a Supreme Court case upholding the use of racial animus
as a capital punishment consideration, but striking down the use in
a particular case because a member of the Aryan Brotherhood who
committed an interractial murder while in prison, there was no
proof that animus was what drove the murder.' 54 Because of that
lack of proof, the defendant can not be convicted of a bias crime.
Even if we think in our heart of hearts it is probably what did it,
that is not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor should it be considered
beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, we require not a mere holding
of beliefs, but a motivation based on those beliefs in order to be
properly convicted of a bias crime.
Secondly, if we are concerned about treating conduct differently
because of the beliefs that motivate it, let us just be clear how
much we are taking down with us. We are not just taking down
153. See Obejas, Student's Funeral, supra note 134.
154. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
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bias crime laws. We are taking down employment discrimination
laws, housing discrimination laws, and the greater part of our dis-
crimination law jurisprudence. 55 In most states, unless a collective
bargaining agreement says to the contrary, it is perfectly legitimate
to fire an at-will employee for no reason at all or a particularly bad
reason unless it happens to be one that triggers the discrimination
law. Can you fire an at-will employee because you do not happen
to like the way he looks or you do not happen to like the sport
team she supports? You bet, unless the collective bargaining
agreement or some labor regulation says to the contrary. You,
however, cannot do it on the basis of race, creed, color, national
origin, et cetera. Thus, punishing or treating motivation acts differ-
ently from other acts is not new to the law and will take all of those
down if we have the same concern.
With respect to sentences, I might agree with Jim more than he
thinks I do. The truth of the matter is, for now, I am agnostic on
the question as to whether our sentences are too high or too low.
At another time and with more time, I will probably suggest I
agree with Jim that our sentences are too high, but that is not my
argument today. My argument today is that sentences should be
higher for bias crimes to demonstrate that a worse crime has hap-
pened. If the entire structure is too high, that may perfectly well be
true, and the entire structure should be lowered.
If we are worried about how do you enhance a penalty for mur-
der, let me say two things. One is I am unalterably opposed to the
death penalty, so I may be the wrong guy to ask. Secondly,
murders, fortunately, turn out to be the tiny minority of bias crimes
in our society. They are the ones we talk about the most; they are
the ones we hear about the most; but they are the tiny minority.
Assault and vandalism are the vast bulk of bias crimes and are
where enhancement would indicate the harm is greater.
Finally, what is the problem in search of a solution? The prob-
lem is that the criminal law, by its very existence, demonstrates
what the society considers to be social harm. We punish because
something is considered a harm to the society. The fact that some-
thing is not punished differently, that it is not identified differently
in the criminal law, is also a statement of the society's values. Put
differently, there is no neutral position on bias crimes. If a state
says "we have no position on bias crimes," that is a position on bias
crimes. Further, the position is that in that state, the harm to indi-
155. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1994).
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viduals and to the group, and, I would argue, to the society, by the
violation of that fissure line, goes unrecognized if that harm is not
seen.
That is the problem in search of a solution, and a solution is care-
fully crafted laws that understand the civil liberties concern but
take into account the greater harm caused by bias-motivated
violence.
PROFESSOR JACOBS: Do the hate crime offenders deserve
greater punishment because they are more culpable? In my book,
I argue that the hate crime offender is not always more culpable. 56
Some hate crime offenders are very culpable, and so are some vi-
cious non-biased offenders. Suppose an Albanian-American
comes up and punches a Serbian-American, and there is ethnic
name-calling. Let's imagine his defense to be "I am prejudiced
against Serbs. We have a long history of conflict. The Serbs have
killed my friends and family members. I was brought up to hate
Serbs. Am I more culpable than other offenders are? Should I be
punished twice as severely for the same crime?" What about an
Arab-American charged with a bias-motivated burglary of a Jew-
ish-American home? The Arab-American says, "You know, I am
so sick of the Jews and the Israelis. Their injustice to my people
has gone on for fifty years so I always burgle Jewish homes."
Should that defendant get a double punishment?
Some hate crime defendants may say that they are less culpable
because their prejudice was not freely chosen. He might say, "I
was deeply wired to be a prejudiced person. You feel good to beat
your chest at what a righteous and unbiased person you are. But I
was raised in an environment where we were taught in Sunday
school that homosexuality was wrong, that it was linked to Satan,
and my pastor used to read me Biblical chapters. My parents also
hated homosexuals. I think I am less culpable because, in effect, I
was brainwashed."
Should hate crime offenders be punished more severely because
they do greater harm? I do not think that such offenders invariable
do greater harm either to victims or third parties. When you talk
about the most serious crimes, this claim makes little sense. If we
compare a hate crime murder and garden variety-for-the-hell-of-it,
both victims are dead; the harm is the same. Will a rape victim be
more harmed because the defendant was motivated by racial or
religious prejudice? I think not.
156. See JACOBS & POTTER, HATE CRIMES, supra note 130, at 79-81.
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The more serious the injury, the less significant the motivation.
Thus, the motivation is most significant in low level offenses. A
shove accompanied by an anti-Semitic epithet will be experienced
as more injurious than a shove unaccompanied by any comment.
This difference, however, proves no more than that expression can
be very hurtful, whether or not accompanied by shoves or other
criminal conduct. The Nazis marching in Skokie caused people a
lot of pain, but we put up with that expressive kind of pain in a
democratic society.
How about justifying greater punishments for bias offenders be-
cause of the fear and hurt their conduct causes third parties? Bias
crimes are hardly unique in sometimes affecting third parties. Per-
haps it is even a major cause of the so-called "white flight" from
the city. Car-jackings send shock waves through society. The kid-
napping/murder of Megan Konka lead to a nation wide movement
to pass Megan's Laws. 117 A heinous crime in Central Park will de-
ter some people from using the Park.
What about a judge who said to a young black defendant, "You
know, I am going to sentence you three times more seriously than I
sentence other robbers because you are robbing white people, you
are sending fear into the hearts of the white community. Those
whites are moving out to suburbs, thus harming our economy and
our tax base. Because of these indirect affects of your crime, you
are going to serve three times as much of a term in our peniten-
tiary." I think you would call that judge an active racist.. I would.
Yet it follows if we allow third parties' fear to justify enhanced
punishment
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Thank you very much for an excel-
lent dialogue. Now it is time for the audience to jump in.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: Do you have any concerns about political pres-
sure being applied on D.A.'s offices in terms of their discretion to
charge cases appropriately, where a particular act may inflame a
community to pressure the D.A.'s office to bring a hate crime pros-
ecution that might not be as advisable in another context?
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: To answer the question do I have
concern about political pressure in District Attorney's offices, yes,
I think it is a very real issue. The real question would be, is there
157. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Death Penalty is Affirmed In Megan Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at B1.
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any alternative to that; would the cure be worse than the disease?
The cure would be to say, "Let's stay away from hot button social
issues in the criminal law." I think, however, that is sizably worse.
I think the truth is that kind of pressure happens now. When you
have any kind of a crime that implicates certain communities per-
haps more than others, those communities will bring pressure to
bear on the District Attorney's office. In some ways, having the
discussion take place around the issue of a bias crime law so that
the District Attorney's Office can take head-on the question of
"was this motivated this way; was it not motivated that way?" can
have a salutary effect on the issue.
I am thinking particularly of cases in Boston involving either in-
15815terracial violence or gay bashing, 5 where tremendous pressure
was brought on the District Attorney's Office and by and large, for
the good. Sometimes, the District Attorney's Office has responded
by saying, "We do not think prejudice is what this is about and we
are not going to charge them with an interference with constitu-
tional rights.160 We are just going to charge them with simple as-
sault." As a result, they take some heat from the gay and lesbian
community on that. I think that is appropriate, too. That is what it
means to be a district attorney. I think to a certain extent what the
pressure does is it focuses a discussion that is very, very sensitive
and sometimes makes us all very uncomfortable, and, for the most
part, I think that is a good thing.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Jim, did you want to comment?
PROFESSOR JACOBS: I do think widespread use of hate
crime prosecutions would contribute to further politicizing the
criminal justice system. A Brooklyn prosecutor told me that she
158. See, e.g., Brian MacQuarie, RI Police Officer Mistakenly Slain; Racial Issue
Raised, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2000, at Al (discussing the similarities between the
death of the Black Rhode Island officer killed by friendly fire and the beating of a
Black Boston police officer by fellow officers who mistook the Boston police officer
for a suspect).
159. See, e.g., Francie Latour, Family Says Girl Still Afraid, BosToN GLOBE, Feb. 2,
2000, at B5 (discussing an attack on a high school student by classmates who thought
she was gay); Commonwealth v. LaFaille, 704 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (ad-
judicating a case where the defendant was charged with shooting the victim during a
fight started because he was part of a group of predominantly black men who ap-
proached a group of white women); Commonwealth v. Troika, 571 N.E.2d 391 (Mass.
1991) (affirming conviction of the defendant who killed the victim because the victim
was gay).
160. Under Massachusetts law, a bias crime is considered an interference with the
victim's constitutional rights, whether or not the crime is committed under color of
law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, §§ 37 (1999); see also id. § 39 (punishing assault or
battery for the purpose of bias-motivated intimidation).
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encountered a great deal of cynicism about use of hate crime laws.
Some people complained that the D.A.'s Office responded more to
some groups' demands for hate crime prosecutions than to others.
The point that I made before about the politicization of jury tri-
als cannot be emphasized too strongly. Remember the Reginald
Denny case. 16 Denny, a white driver, was pulled out of his truck
by a group of black men in the midst of the 1992 L.A. riots and
beaten over the head with a brick. What prosecutor would wish to
try this as an anti-white hate crime? Would a prosecutor prefer to
attempt to persuade a multi-racial jury that this case involved a
straightforward assault or attempted murder? Or would a prosecu-
tor like to try to make the following argument: "This was a racially
motivated crime. The victim was pulled out of that car solely be-
cause he was a white man driving through a black area during a
race riot. We, the prosecution, are going to prove that these de-
fendants are cold-blooded racists." Don't you think at least some
jurors would interpret this strategy as some kind of a political at-
tack on black people generally?
AUDIENCE: I would like to ask the panelists to speak to the
fact that the issue of bias crimes is gaining prominence throughout
the country at a time when affirmative action has been virtually
eliminated, when feminist history is being rewritten and down-
graded, and when you see the courts interpreting civil rights laws
more conservatively. Why is this something that is gaining promi-
nence and such a wide bearing?
PROFESSOR JACOBS: This is just politics. The President can
look good standing up and shaking his finger, proclaiming, "I am
against the killers of Matthew Shepard." There are no political
costs to excoriating horrendous criminal conduct, and there may be
political benefits.
AUDIENCE: But what I am asking is why is there no political
debate.
PROFESSOR JACOBS: Nobody stands up for hate-motivated
criminals.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: I would like to comment on this is-
sue. Jim, it ties into a larger pattern that you and I talked about
before this panel started, which is the over-use of the criminal jus-
tice system to criminalize every social problem in this society. The
pattern applies to any vexing, frustrating, upsetting phenomenon,
161. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Riots in Los Angeles: Moment of Terror,
Blacks Beat White Truck Driver as TV Cameras Record the Scene, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1992, at A21.
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including violence where the victim is selected on a discriminatory
basis. Yet we as a society, and our political "leaders," choose not
to address the root causes of the problems - in this case, violence
and discrimination. We, however, can show that we really oppose
discriminatory violence, and we are tough on crime, so we will turn
this social problem into a crime.
There was an article in The New York Times, I think it was yes-
terday or the day before, about how we are now starting to see
criminal prosecutions against the parents of chronically truant stu-
dents. 162 Now, we might well be dealing with dysfunctional fami-
lies here, or perhaps dysfunctional schools. The mindset of our
politicians, however, in this situation is all-too-typical: rather than
addressing these underlying problems, they want to throw the par-
ents in jail.
And why is that such a popular strategy? Number one, because
everybody is against crime, so if you use the political rhetoric of
being tough on crime, you are likely to get elected. Number two,
it's a "quick fix." No complications in terms of trying to under-
stand and influence human motivations and behavior. Number
three, it's cheap - or, at least, it seems cheap. People do not think
in terms of the increased taxes that go into criminal law enforce-
ment in the way that they would think about the increased taxes
that go into more proactive educational-type strategies to combat
the underlying causes of societal problems such as discrimination
and truancy. Obviously, a lot of our tax dollars are going into the
criminal justice system, but that seems not to be the political hot-
button issue that taxation is in other contexts.
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: I would agree with a lot of what
has been said. In response to your question, in some ways one can
build a consensus around criminal enforcement where one could
not build an equal or parallel consensus for civil enforcement. I
tell my students to keep track of a list of issues that exist through-
out society but suddenly become hard where civil rights is con-
cerned. I certainly share a concern of an over-criminalization of
society, and I certainly share a concern of using the criminal justice
system for fine social tuning. Hate crime laws are not an example
of that and are a funny lightning rod for this particular problem.
162. See Robyn Meredith, Truants' Parents Face Crackdown Across the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at Al.
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I testified in favor of the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act 163
before the Judiciary Committee. 164 There are members of the Judi-
ciary Committee who voted in favor of the federal car-jacking stat-
ute but have severe federalism problems where hate crime laws are
concerned. I certainly understand that there are people who think
that the criminal law is used too much. My guess is that both Na-
dine and Jim are examples of people who would apply this gener-
ally, and not just to hate crimes. This is really not directed at them.
Nevertheless, one ought to be careful about how that argument is
used in the hate crimes area, because we do in fact have criminal
statutes where many are doing very little work. A federal hate
crimes law would do very important work and ought not to be
tarred with that.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Yes, sir?
AUDIENCE: I just want to identify myself. I am Howard Katz
from the Anti-Defamation League. I also previously worked for
the New York City Gas and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project. I am
also the leader of the New York State Hate Crimes Coalition, so I
do have a bias on this subject. My question refers, Professor Ja-
cobs, to your arguments about how these laws will be used and who
they would be used against. Specifically, I am referring to the
young people who do not commit the crimes that rise to the level
of capital punishment, but the much smaller crimes, such as aggra-
vated harassment, graffiti. I am also referring to the people with-
out a prior criminal record that come in front of a judicial system,
or are well-connected to their community. Under today's New
York State law, if you put a daisy on a house of worship or a swas-
tika on a house of worship, these acts would be considered the ex-
act same crime. If there was no hate crimes law, someone who put
the swastika on the house of worship would not be treated differ-
ently than someone who put the daisy on the house of worship.
Do you feel that the laws are adequate? Do you believe that the
impact on the victim, meaning the house of worship and the com-
munity, is the same if they see a daisy or a swastika, or do you
think the fact that these laws are not in place sends a message to
communities that have always felt victimized that the law is not
there to protect them?
163. S. 618, 106th Cong. (1999).
164. See Hate Crimes Violence: Oversight Hearing on H.R. 1082 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (visited Feb. 25, 2000) <http://house.gov/judici-
ary/i.htm> (statement of Frederick M. Lawrence, Professor of Law at Boston Univer-
sity School of Law).
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PROFESSOR JACOBS: Our real debate is over low-level of-
fenses because it makes no sense to talk about enhancing sentences
for murder and the other most serious crimes. There is room to
enhance sentences for bias-motivated vandalism and graffiti.
Nonetheless, ordinary sentencing law provides more than enough
punishment for such conduct.
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: There is another solution. The so-
lution is to focus on the mental state of the actor, the mens rea of
the actor, which we do in criminal law all the time, and not just on
the result. I do not care whether the graffiti is a daisy or "bitch" or
a swastika, except that those will probably help me prove what the
state of mind of the actor was. If the act was religiously or racially
motivated, then it is different. That is what the question is probing
for when it looks for a distinction between the daisy and the
swastika.
Let us take the bigger example, which makes the point really in
an unassailable way. To describe Kristallnacht merely as a case of
arson is not to describe the crime at all; it is to miss completely
what happened. It was not just about arson; it was arson in a par-
ticular social context. That is why it caused a greater harm than
merely burning down a whole series of buildings and shops.
AUDIENCE: There has been significant increases in hate
crimes, not in terms of numbers but to the extent of the damage
that is inflicted on the civilians, such as the recent killing in Los
Angeles by a former member of the National Alliance.165 Do you
believe that the current federal laws are adequate to deal with
these kinds of crimes, or do you believe that we should enhance the
federal statute on hate crimes so that the establishment can better
deal with these national racist groups, which are operating in sev-
eral different states?
PROFESSOR JACOBS: I do not believe that there has been an
increase in the number of hate crime incidents, nor do I believe
that there has been an increase in the virulence of bias crimes. I
am an agnostic on the numbers. We have no real way of determin-
ing how many hate crimes there are because the definition is weak,
and we do not know the motivation of most offenders. Consider
the 1992 south central Los Angeles riots. There were forty-seven
people killed, and $1 billion of property damage. There were
scores of assaults, thousands of vandalisms. How many of those
were hate crimes? How many intergroup muggings in New York
165. See, e.g., Troy Anderson & David Baker, Suspect "Hard-core" Supremacist
With Aryan Nations Ties, DENy. POST, Aug. 12, 1999, at Al.
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City are hate crimes? We rarely have the opportunities for long
interviews with the people, to determine their prejudice against
whites, blacks, Asians, and homosexuals.
Do we want that information? Do we want to tease out the
maximum amount of prejudice in every one of our criminals to
prove to ourselves what a prejudiced society we are? Some people
do. They think that exposing the prejudice of our criminals would
make us a better society. I disagree. We should focus instead on
purging bias and discrimination from our government, major cor-
porations, universities, and so forth.
I am opposed to a federal hate crimes law. I think that there is
enough police power and sentencing power in the states to deal
with hate crimes. In the worst crimes, the Shepard case, 66 the
Byrd case,167 local law enforcement showed itself quite capable of
apprehending, convicting, and perhaps even executing the
offenders.
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE: Briefly, I agree with Jim on the
issue of numbers. I think it is very hard to know whether the num-
bers are more than they were or less than they were. Are we mea-
suring accurately? Perhaps we understand things to be hate crimes
now that we did not understand to be hate crimes before. As a
result, it is hard to know whether the problem is worsening or ame-
liorating. It is not hard for me to know there is a problem, thus I
take the numbers at least to mean that.
With regards to the virulence of recent hate crimes, if I were to
have given this talk here a year ago, I would have said one of the
ways we describe bias crimes is that typically they are committed
up close and personal. That is what the perpetrator is trying to
achieve, which is why assault and vandalism were the two prime
ways in which bias crimes were committed. It was very unusual for
bias crimes to be committed with guns. That is not so true today.
It is too early to know whether that is a trend or just a couple of
blips on the screen. If it is a trend, it is a very scary one, because
we also know that bias crimes have a history of copy-cat crimes
thereafter. Hence, if suddenly bias crimes are combined with use
of firearms, then the potential for more serious harm is certainly
there. In terms of federal law enforcement, I do think there ought
to be a federal bias crime statute, but primarily to fill gaps for the
states that do not have such a statute. Federal hate crimes legisla-
tion would also demonstrate a national commitment to these is-
166. See Obejas, Student's Funeral, supra note 134.
167. See 3rd Conviction, supra note 133.
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sues, that it is not just a regional issue, certainly with respect to
race, creed, color, national origin, religion, and probably sexual ori-
entation and gender as well.
One last thing to point out is that the Byrd case,168 which is often
used as an example of why we do not need a federal bias crime
statute, is in fact a very good example of why we do. The James
Byrd169 case was in fact handled by Texas state authorities. The
perpetrators were in fact found, apprehended, and convicted under
Texas state law, but with substantial help from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation operating without any real authority to do so. The
FBI had no real reason to believe a federal statute had been vio-
lated there. Nonetheless, a federal investigation went forward
under very, very murky circumstances. I could tell you the federal
predicate they used. Take my word for it that it is a stretch to say
that was a federal crime. They did that in order to be able to coop-
erate with state authorities, to give them the backup that they
needed.
I am enough of a civil libertarian to prefer federal law enforce-
ment agents to operate under federal statutes and not where they
think it might be a good idea in the absence of a federal statute. I
would rather have a narrowly tailored federal statute that gives
federal authority to federal law enforcement to fill gaps where
necessary.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: This very provocative discussion is
bringing back for me memories of the ACLU National Board de-
bates on this topic, which were among the longest and hardest we
have ever had. We ended up with a policy statement that is in
some sense middle-of-the-road, as I explained earlier - neither
condemning all hate crimes laws or prosecutions nor championing
all of them. Moreover, the policy is tentative, in the sense that it
expressly calls for re-examination in light of actual enforcement ex-
perience with enhanced penalty laws, recognizing the laws' poten-
tial pitfalls.
I think a good way to end this session is with the last cautionary
note in the ACLU's policy statement, raising a potential concern
that was not expressly discussed by our panelists:
We are aware that the discrimination that infuses our criminal
justice system ... may well result ... in enforcement patterns
that discriminate against minorities. Therefore, [and for the
First Amendment reasons cited above], we will continue to
168. See id.
169. See id.
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monitor the actual implementation of enhancement statutes and
review our position if experience warrants.170
As Jim mentioned, in the very first enhanced penalty case that
went to the Supreme Court, it was yet another young African-
American man who was the target of the prosecution. So, for all of
us who are committed to free speech and to ending discrimination,
there are, alas, no easy solutions.
I want to thank both of our outstanding speakers and the mem-
bers of the audience for helping to highlight the complexities of
this important issue.
170. ACLU, POLICY GUIDE No. 332, supra note 125, at 499.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: AFTER ELLERTI' 7 1 AND
FA RA GHER
17 2
MR. WILLS: Good afternoon. I am here with my colleagues,
Wayne Outten and Al Feliu, two of the most distinguished em-
ployment attorneys in New York. We are going to be discussing
sexual harassment law and employer liability after last year's
Supreme Court cases.
Wayne Outten is a member of the law firm of Outten & Golden,
where he represents employees in employment law matters and
civil litigation. In addition, Mr. Outten has co-founded and contin-
ues to serve on the boards of numerous professional organizations,
including the National Employment Lawyers Association, known
to most of us as NELA, the National Employment Lawyers Associ-
ation of New York, the National Employment Lawyers Association
Referral Service, and National Employees Rights Institute. Mr.
Outten's other professional affiliations include the American Bar
Association's Section on Labor and Employment Law, where he is
a member of the Committee on Employee Rights and Responsibil-
ities; he also serves as Co-Chair of its subcommittees on Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution and on Drug Use in the Workplace. He is
also a member of the New York State Bar Association Committee
on Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Workplace Ad
Hoc Committee on Long-Range Planning and Future Directions.
He has been a member of the Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment Law at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York;
the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fair-
ness in the Courts; and the Center for Public Resources. Mr. Out-
ten's published works include The Rights of Employees, 73
published in 1994, and Privacy in the Employment Relationship,174
which was published in Privacy Law and Practice, a Matthew
Bender publication.
Al Feliu is a member of Vandenberg & Feliu, where he princi-
pally represents management in all aspects of labor and employ-
ment law, including equal employment opportunity litigation and
administrative proceedings, National Labor Relations Board pro-
ceedings, labor negotiations, and arbitrations. Prior to becoming a
171. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
172. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
173. W. OUT'TEN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND UNION MEMBERS
(ACLU SERIES) (1994).
174. Alfred G. Feliu & Wayne N. Outten, Privacy in the Employment Relationship,
in 2 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 9.02[3][d] (George B. Trubow ed., 1991).
2000] 1191
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
member of Vandenberg & Feliu, Al was a partner at Paul, Has-
tings, Janofsky & Walker. Mr. Feliu's publications include the Pri-
mer on Individual Employee Rights175 and Resolving Employment
Disputes Without Litigation,176 which he co-authored with Dr. Alan
F. Weston. Al is the Editor-in-Chief of the New York Employment
Law and Practice Bulletin, and has also written numerous articles
and spoken widely on such current workplace issues as violence in
the workplace, sexual harassment, employee privacy, litigation
strategy, and alternative dispute resolution. 177
I am Randy Wills, the Deputy Commissioner of the Law En-
forcement Bureau of the New York City Commission on Human
Rights (the "Commission").
In June of 1998, at the close of its term, the Supreme Court
handed a joint holding in two cases concerning hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment. It set out new rules for employer lia-
bility for supervisory employees' sexual harassment of their
subordinates. In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth 78 and Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton,79 the Court revisited employer liability for a
discriminatory environment for the first time since its 1986 decision
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 8°
You may recall that in Meritor, the Court held that traditional
agency principles were relevant for determining employer liabil-
ity.181 Although the Court cited the restatement of agency with
general approval, the Meritor Court also cautioned that common
law agency principles might not be transferable in all of their par-
ticulars to the Title VII context. 8 z
Heeding its earlier caution with regard to the applicability of
agency principles, the Faragher/Ellerth Court crafted, not without
175. ALFRED G. FELIU, PRIMER ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS (2d ed. 1996).
176. ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
WITHOUT LITIGATION (1988).
177. See generally Alfred G. Feliu, Contracts of Employment. The Scope of FAA's
Exclusion, 2 ADR CURRENTS 1 (Winter 1996/1997); Alfred G. Feliu & Elizabeth A.
Fealy, The Role of "Sex" in Same-Sex Harassment Claims, 21 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
L.J. 39 (1996); Feliu, The Greater Good: Broad Remedies for the Chosen Few, or
More Limited, But Accessible, Remedies For the Masses?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1171
(1996); Feliu, Workplace Violence and the Duty of Care: The Scope of an Employer's
Obligation to Protect Against the Violent Employee, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 381
(1994); Feliu, Legal Consequences of Nonunion Dispute-Resolution Systems, 13 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 83 (1987).
178. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
179. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
180. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
181. See id. at 72.
182. See id.
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some difficulty, an agency-based rule for determining employer lia-
bility for the actionable hostile environment created by a supervi-
sor.183 In doing so, the Court also acknowledged the aversion
expressed in the Meritor decision to strict liability imposition, by
creating, ironically, as some have observed, a two-pronged negli-
gence-based affirmative defense to liability or damages. 84
Thus, here we have the Faragher/Ellerth Court relying on its ear-
lier analysis in Meritor to say, "yes, we can use these agency princi-
ples to determine employer liability, but we must be cautious; we
cannot have strict liability in all contexts, as was announced in Mer-
itor, so we must have a way to limit liability and damages. In order
to do that, we will create an affirmative defense that employers
must plead and prove if they wish to limit either liability or
damages."
In our presentation today we are going to examine some of the
concerns that were initially raised by both plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' attorneys regarding the Faragher/Ellerth twins; we are going
to close with some remarks on the New York City Human Rights
Law (the "Human Rights Law") 185 in light of these two decisions.
The employee in Faragher, who was a lifeguard for the City of
Boca Raton, quit her job after enduring five years of sexual harass-
ment from two of her supervisors.186 Ms. Faragher's supervisors
repeatedly touched her and other female employees without invita-
tion and they made crudely demeaning references to women in
general.187 During a job interview with a woman he later hired as a
lifeguard, one of her supervisors said that female lifeguards had sex
with the male lifeguards at the beach at Boca Raton and asked
whether she would do the same thing.8
Ms. Faragher did not complain to higher management about her
supervisors, although she did have certain what she described as
"informal conversations" with some of her colleagues in the work-
place. Ultimately, she resigned her employment.18 9
Now, although the City of Boca Raton had adopted a sexual har-
assment policy many years before Ms. Faragher resigned, it had
completely failed to disseminate that policy to anyone who worked
in the Marine Safety Section, with the consequence that none of
183. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-66; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-805.
184. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
185. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8 (1999).
186. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
187. See id. at 780-82.
188. See id. at 782.
189. See id. at 780.
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the lifeguards, including the supervisors who really were at issue in
this case, were aware of it in any way.' 90
Ms. Ellerth quit her job after fifteen months as a sales person for
one of Burlington Industries' divisions allegedly because she had
been subjected to constant sexual harassment by one of her super-
visors.1 91 The supervisor was a mid-level manager who had the
power to hire, promote and fire, subject to higher approval, but he
was not a policy maker for Burlington Industries. Ms. Ellerth en-
dured repeated boorish and offensive remarks and gestures, as well
as uninvited physical contact. Her supervisor once told her to
"loosen up," and warned her that he could make her life "very easy
or very hard at Burlington.1 192 He also once said to Ms. Ellerth, in
response to a request that she made of him, "Are you wearing
shorter skirts yet, because it would make your job a heck of a lot
easier if you did?"' 93 Ms. Ellerth quit her job soon thereafter.
During her tenure at Burlington, Ms. Ellerth did not inform any-
one in authority about her supervisor's conduct, despite knowing
that Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment. In addi-
tion, although Ms. Ellerth had refused all of her supervisor's ad-
vances, she suffered no tangible retaliation as a result of refusing
those advances, and in fact she was promoted once.' 94
After a very lengthy analysis of the principles of agency law as
they may or may not apply to the hostile environment context, and
acknowledging that it was bound by its holding in Meritor that
agency principles constrain the imposition of "vicarious liability" in
the cases of supervisory harassment, the Court reached an accom-
modation between those agency principles and the equally basic
policies of Title VII that encourage forethought and preventive ac-
tion by employers and saving action, or avoidance of harm, by
employees. 195
In its joint holding in Faragher and Ellerth, the Court stated that
an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized em-
ployee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervi-
sor with authority over the employee.196 When no tangible
employment action is taken by the employer, the defending em-
190. See id. at 781-82.
191. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-749.
192, Id. at 748.
193. Id.
194, See id. at 749.
195. See id. at 755-65.
196. See id. at 769-71; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-03.
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ployer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages.' 97
As the Court stated, this defense "comprises two necessary ele-
ments: [1)] that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and [2)] that
the employer must plead and prove that the plaintiff employee un-
reasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
action or opportunities offered by the employer, or to avoid harm
otherwise. 198
Although the issue of co-worker-created liability was not before
the Faragher/Ellerth Court, the Court did reiterate the well-settled
principle that when harassment is attributable to a co-worker,
rather than a supervisor, the employer will be held liable only for
its own negligence; that is, if the employer knew or should have
known of the harassing behavior and failed to take prompt reme-
dial action. 199 In addition, the Court provided some guidance as to
what constitutes a tangible employment action - the taking of
which by a supervisor will automatically subject the employer to
liability. According to the Court and the guidelines that it set
forth, a tangible employment action constitutes a significant change
in employment status, such as a hiring, a firing, failure to promote,
a reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a de-
cision causing a significant change in benefits.200 We are going to
revisit this notion of tangible employment action later in our
discussion.
Initial reaction to Faragher and Ellerth was generally positive.
Whatever its doctrinal faults and inconsistencies, the holding had
seemingly eliminated the sometimes unrealistic and tortuous analy-
sis that some lower courts often evinced when faced with the issue
of employer liability for certain types of supervisory misconduct.
Nevertheless, as is often the case in our learned yet contentious
profession, the praise was not universal. Some members of the
plaintiffs' bar, of the employees' bar, contended that the affirma-
tive defense, actually the second prong of the affirmative defense,
places some responsibility on the shoulders of the alleged victim of
harassment to take steps or to complain about the harassment.
Some members of the plaintiffs' bar contended that the second
prong of the affirmative defense, based as it is on the doctrine of
197. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
198. See id. The Court used this standard in Faragher as well. See Faragher, 524
U.S. at 805.
199. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-801; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59.
200. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61.
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avoidable consequences, would have been more grounded in the
law if the Court had limited the defense to damages instead of ex-
tending it to liability. They reasoned that because "avoidable con-
sequences" is actually a doctrine applicable to the doctrine of
mitigation of damages, it was inappropriate for the Court to extend
its reach to defeating liability, or at least to potentially defeating
liability, on the part of an employer.2"'
Other members of the plaintiffs' bar expressed concern that the
courts would grant summary judgment based on the mere existence
of a sexual harassment policy, however inadequate and poorly im-
plemented that policy may be. As we will soon see when we dis-
cuss some of the cases that the Second Circuit has dealt with, this
fear is basically unfounded.
Some employers' advocates have expressed a similar concern re-
garding the difficulty of obtaining summary judgment. Their con-
cern was that the announcement of an absolute principle of
vicarious liability would make it next to impossible for employers
to prevail in summary judgment motions. That fear, now a year
and a half later, also has proven unfounded.2 °2
201. See The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, 3 LAB. & EM-
PLOYMENT L. NEWS 10 (1999).
202. District courts in the Second Circuit have addressed the Faragher/Ellerth af-
firmative defense in 14 cases: summary judgment was granted in five of them, denied
in nine. Of the five Court of Appeals cases that have addressed (or made mention of)
Faragher/Ellerth, one decision reversed the lower court's granting of summary judg-
ment. See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 180 F.3d 426
(2d Cir. 1999). One case has upheld the lower court's granting of summary judgment.
See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). In
Richardson, the Court reversed the granting of summary judgement by the lower
court because there was a question as to whether the employer's response to plain-
tiff's complaints of harassment was reasonable and adequate, thus precluding the em-
ployer from asserting that as a matter of law it "exercised reasonable care" under
Faragher. See Richardson, 180 F.3d at 450. Specifically, the court found that at least
some of Ms. Richardson's complaints of racial harassment had not been adequately
addressed by her employer; for example, a promised training in cultural awareness
was not conducted until three years after Ms. Richardson filed one of her complaints,
during that period of time other incidents of harassment occurred. See id.
In Caridad, the court upheld the granting of summary judgment by the district
court because it found that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of pre-
ventive and corrective opportunities provided by the employer. Ms. Caridad had as-
serted that she did not want Metro-North to investigate her complaints because she
did not think that an investigation would improve matters; she further stated that she
did not trust Metro-North or its equal employment office. The Court found that
Caridad's reluctance to complain was not based on a credible fear that her complaint
would not be taken seriously or that she would suffer some adverse employment ac-
tion as a result of filing a complaint.
Despite some initial uncertainty, see, e.g., Seepersad v. D.A.O.R. Sec., Inc., 1998
WL 474205 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1998); DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280
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Now we are going to talk to Al and Wayne about responses to
Faragher and Ellerth; I am going to pose some of the questions that
have been raised by Faragher and Ellerth.
Notwithstanding the Faragher/Ellerth efforts to clarify responsi-
bilities of employers and employees, there are a number of issues
that the Court, not surprisingly, did not resolve that will assuredly
be the subject of litigation for years to come.
One of the most salient of those that leaps to mind immediately
is: What does a good employer policy look like?
MR. OUTTEN: A good starting point on this is the guidance
that the U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (the
"EEOC") issued last June. On all the issues that we are talking
about today, I would commend to your reading the EEOC's En-
forcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors. °3 It is available on the EEOC's Web
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying the pre-FaragherlEllerth standard that an "employer can-
not be held liable for an employee's discriminatory act unless the employer became a
party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it"), most federal courts have
assumed that because New York courts require the same standard of proof for claims
brought under the New York State Human Rights Law (the "NYS Human Rights
Law"). See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1999). As for those brought under
Title VII, state and local claims should be analyzed under the FaragherlEllerth stan-
dards. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d. Cir. 1998).
Only one New York State court decision has addressed the applicability of the
FaragherlEllerth standards to a claim brought pursuant to the NYS Human Rights
Law. See Pace v. Ogden Servs. Corp., 692 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 1999). Ms. Ogden
had complained that her supervisor sexually harassed her over a period of a year. The
employer immediately informed the supervisor that the alleged sexually harassing be-
havior would not be tolerated, enrolled the supervisor in a sensitivity training session,
and conducted sensitivity training for all employees. In reaching its conclusion that
the lower court's granting of summary judgment was appropriate, the Third Depart-
ment employed the negligence standard, finding that the employer neither knew nor
should have known of the alleged harassment until plaintiff complained. In addition,
it found that the employer took immediate and adequate measures to ensure that the
offensive behavior would cease. Although the court did not employ the Faragherl
Ellerth standards, it stated in a footnote that it did not view either Faragher or Ellerth
as requiring a contrary result. Nevertheless, identity of result is not the same as iden-
tity of analysis. Although the court did not explicitly accept or reject the Faragheri
Ellerth standards, the fact that it did not employ them in reaching its decision suggests
that the issue of their applicability to state law claims remains unresolved.
203. Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harass-
ment by Supervisors, June 18, 1999, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) Notice No. 915.002
(filed after section 615 of Volume 1I of Compliance Manual) [hereinafter Enforcement
Guidance].
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site.2 °4 There, the EEOC provides a long and detailed breakdown
of each of the elements of the Faragher and Ellerth cases.
Obviously, the EEOC guidance is not a statement of the law and
it is not binding on the courts. In fact, there have been some nota-
ble instances in the last couple of years in which the courts have
not adopted, or have outright rejected, certain EEOC guidance.
That has not happened, to my knowledge, on any appreciable level
to this particular guidance, which has been out only about five
months. Nevertheless, it provides an excellent road map to analyze
and understand the issues.
On the issue that you asked about, the EEOC guidance ad-
dresses the minimum elements of an anti-harassment policy and
complaint procedure. Those include the following:
* a clear explanation of prohibited conduct;
* assurance that employees who make complaints of harass-
ment or provide information related to such complaints will
be protected against retaliation;
* a clearly described complaint process that provides accessi-
ble avenues of complaint;
• assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality
of harassment complaints to the extent possible;
" a complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough, and
impartial investigation;
" assurance that the employer will take immediate and appro-
priate corrective action when it determines that harassment
has occurred 20 5
One important exception to these general principles, however, is
that all of these things are context-related. As the Supreme Court
expressly acknowledged in Faragher, even these minimum stan-
dards for good policies may not be applicable to small employ-
ers. 20 6 Where there are only fifteen or twenty employees, for
example, the company may not have, or have the need for, such
elaborate, detailed, written procedures. So in that context, it may
be sufficient if, at a monthly staff meeting, the owner of the com-
pany or the CEO simply says, "This is what harassment is about
and I am not going to tolerate it. If any of you experiences any-
thing that you do not like, come right to the top, come to me."
That could be sufficient in that context.
204. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/
harassment.html>.
205. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 203 § V(C)(1).
206. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
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For most larger employers, however, something along the lines
of what the EEOC sets forth provides a starting point.
MR. FELIU: I agree the context is very important. I would add
to that, but let me hold that thought for a second.
In terms of the particular provisions, having drafted a number of
these over the years, the "model" policy has changed, at least for
me, in what I recommend. I have added over the years, not a duty
to report, but an encouragement to employees to report what they
believe to be improper or offensive behavior. The goal is not to
take punitive measures necessarily, but to help create a positive
workplace atmosphere. When I do training for clients, I try to
communicate to employees that if we are going to have a discrimi-
nation-free or harassment-free workplace, it is the job of all of us in
the room to make it be so. Hence, I like to have that notion em-
bodied in the policy.
In addition, traditionally there are separate discrimination and
sexual harassment policies. You may recall a number of years
back, the EEOC tried to encourage broader anti-harassment poli-
cies but Congress objected and the EEOC withdrew its proposal. I
did think at the time, and I think now, that the EEOC's notion was
a very good one. Harassment law is now well-established, not lim-
ited to the sexual context but applicable to all categories of dis-
crimination. Thus, now I draft broad-based harassment policies,
although I do very often carve out a sexual harassment subsection
to the policy because there are some issues, welcomeness and the
like, that are somewhat unique or more prevalent in that context.
I used to also be of the view that a standardized model EEO
policy was sufficient, "Here is Al's super-duper, cure-all policy; all
you need is to insert it into your handbook and that will take care
of your needs." With time, I have become far less interested in
giving a client my super-duper model than in working with the cli-
ent to draft a tailored policy that fits its workplace.
As Wayne indicated, certainly the size of the employer and so-
phistication of the employer are considerations. There have been a
number of cases recently where the employer has damaged itself
by having a "super-duper" policy with all the bells and whistles and
not lived up to its terms. In those cases, the courts have used the
employer's policies against them, arguing that the policies raised
the bar, finding that the employer created false expectations, and
punishing the employer and used the policies as evidence of, if not
malfeasance, a lack of due diligence. Hence, I am very careful in
trying to ensure that the policy fits the needs and capabilities of the
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employer. If the employer is unsophisticated, then it is probably
going to be a less detailed policy, because the smaller employer will
generally devote fewer resources to EEOC matters than larger
employers.
The other concern I have is to whom a complaint should be di-
rected. A few years back, any person in authority was sufficient.
The concern was give the employee as many options as possible, let
him or her decide where to go with the complaint, rather than have
the employer designate the recipient. I am less supportive of that
viewpoint today because the person to whom the report goes, given
the obligation to respond promptly and effectively to a complaint,
is crucial. Therefore, I am much more circumspect on this topic in
drafting a policy, by limiting the number of approved percipients of
complaints.
There was a case in federal court recently where the Human Re-
source Director received a complaint and came on to the com-
plaining employee. °7 Thus, obviously he was the wrong person in
that context. It is, however, certainly somebody with the sophisti-
cation to understand what he or she is supposed to do with the
complaint.
MR. OUTTEN: There is one thing that is important to empha-
size from the plaintiffs' point of view: it is not enough for the com-
pany to have good policies and procedures on the books. The
policies and procedures have to be properly communicated, people
have to be trained in what they say and how they work, they have
to be actually implemented, and they have to be followed. In har-
assment cases, it is often appropriate for the plaintiff to seek dis-
covery about not just what policies are promulgated, but also what
is done with policies: what kind of training and educational and
counseling programs does the company have, and what does the
company in fact do when people make complaints? Does the com-
pany follow its published policy, or is there some supplemental or
different policy or practice that is followed instead of what is on
paper?
MR. FELIU: I agree one hundred percent. I think that it is less
the policy than its implementation that matters. I dare you all to
pull up fifty post-Ellerth/Faragher cases and find more than one or
two that address the specific language of a policy. What you are
going to find ninety percent of the time are cases addressing how
the policy was or was not give effect in those cases.
207. See Ponticelli v. Zurich American Insurance Group., 16 F. Supp.2d 414 (1998).
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MR. WILLS: That is exactly right, and that is precisely the prob-
lem that the City of Boca Raton faced, you will recall from the
little exposition of facts I did earlier. They had a policy, they had
had one for years; it did not get to anybody.20 8 The supervisors
who ultimately were responsible for the misconduct in the work-
place never even received the policy.20 9 I agree that policy imple-
mentation cannot be emphasized too much.
Most policies now are going to say the right thing, to the extent
that people write a policy. There are many models available. Most
of them say the right thing. It is a question of are they imple-
mented, are they implemented effectively.
You are absolutely right, Al, you can look through fifty post-
Ellerth cases and you will not find anything about language of the
policy. You will find "well, they never got it," or "it was on page
thirty-eight of the employees' manual and they did not make me
sign for the manual, I never read it" or something like that. A very
important point.
MR. OUTITEN: All of this relates to a cutting-edge issue, which
is the extent to which, in trials of harassment cases, "management
practices" experts are appropriate to come in and criticize or com-
pliment, first, the policies and procedures that are on the books;
and, second, the way the company has actually gone about imple-
menting those.
Under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court recently in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,21 0 following up on Daubert v. Mer-
rill Dow Pharmaceuticals,21' I think there is room for the courts, as
gatekeepers, to allow such expert testimony, because we are get-
ting to the point where there is some "state-of-the-art" on what are
good policies and practices and how they should be implemented.
MR. FELIU: Once again, I agree. I agree that there is a place in
a trial for such a person, but it goes both ways. Obviously, the
employer is going to want to show that its policy is on the cutting
edge and that it has done everything required under the law, and
certainly the employee will try to do the reverse.
MR. WILLS: With regard to the second prong of the affirmative
defense, where the employer needs to show that the objecting or
victimized employee unreasonably failed to complain or unreason-
ably failed to avail herself or himself of corrective opportunities
208. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782.
209. See id.
210. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
211. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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offered by the employer or otherwise to avoid harm, that is the
affirmative defense as it has been stated.
What about the situation, when is it reasonable for an employee
not to complain about harassment? Are there situations where an
employee can legitimately say, "I did not complain about harass-
ment for the following reasons," and we do not have too many
cases in this area yet, where you think the court might uphold?
MR. FELIU: I am supposed to say, "no," but of course, there is
the "smell test." It would be difficult to say to the court or jury
with a straight face that "this employee should have gone to her
supervisor, who has been harassing her systematically for the last
five years, and complained, ladies and gentlemen of the jury."
That is one circumstance, back to my earlier point, where designat-
ing the wrong person causes the employer problems. If there is a
history of retaliation, courts will generally find the employee who
has failed in this context to bring his or her claim forward, to be
relieved of that burden.
Back to Faragher, if the policy was not circulated, the employee
does not know where to go with her complaint, the employer is
purposely evasive, etc., I would think that might be another
circumstance.
MR. OUTTEN: As in most issues on this topic, the EEOC has
addressed it and the EEOC Enforcement Guidance spells out
nicely the circumstances under which failure to complain would be
perfectly reasonable.212
First, understandably, is when the plaintiff reasonably believes
there is a risk of retaliation. Thus, in litigation, an appropriate area
for inquiry and discovery is the basis for the plaintiff to fear retalia-
tion: (a) does the policy explicitly prohibit retaliation; (b) is that
the way it really works; (c) what has been the experience of this
plaintiff in the past when she or he complained; and (d) what has
been the experience of other people who have engaged in pro-
tected conduct - have they been retaliated against? All of these
are fair grounds for discovery and for evidence at trial.
Second is when there are obstacles to complaint. For example, if
the person you are supposed to complain to works only 9:00 to 5:00
and you are on the night shift, that makes it difficult to comply. If
the person you are supposed to complain to is in the headquarters
office on the other side of the country and you have no way to get
212. See supra note 203.
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to that person, then it is reasonable for you not to have followed
the procedure.
Third is when the plaintiff reasonably believes that the complaint
process is ineffective. If employees have come to believe, based on
their own experience or the experience of others in the workplace,
that the process does not work, that it is a waste of time, and that it
can only get you in trouble, perhaps (which relates to the retalia-
tion) it may be perfectly reasonable in those circumstances to say,
"Well, it is reasonable not to make a complaint." Again, this inef-
fectiveness argument is grounds for discovery and litigation over
the extent to which the process has been used, and has been used
effectively.
MR. WILLS: Bearing mind, of course, and this is all embedded
in what Wayne just had to say, that the reasons a plaintiff may
choose not to use the process must actually be credible. There is
some Second Circuit law on that now, that the mere assertion that
"I do not trust the EEO office at my company" or "I do not trust
the company to investigate my complaint properly" without more
is insufficient to show that reasonable care has been exercised. So
again, I want to underscore that part of what Wayne just said, that
it is a matter of proving this, of showing that there is a history of
being retaliated against if you bring a complaint, or of unavailabil-
ity of the process, no effective implementation of a sexual harass-
ment policy.
MR. OUTTEN: Notably, the EEOC uses a "reasonable belief"
standard for both the fear-of-retaliation and the ineffectiveness
ground for not using the complaint process. The standard is both
subjective and objective. The employee has to believe it and the
belief has to be reasonable.
MR. FELIU: I think it is a very important point for the whole
affirmative defense concept, the whole Faragher/Ellerth infrastruc-
ture. The manifesto for that is a decision from last year issued by
Judge Brieant, called Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue. 13 Every em
ployers' counsel holds this case dear to their hearts. It really goes
to the argument that if there is going to be an effective affirmative
defense, the employee simply cannot use the defense of a genera-
lized fear of retaliation.
Judge Brieant wrote that at one point,
employees must be required to accept responsibility for alerting
their employers to the possibility of harassment. Without such a
213. 13 F. Supp.2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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requirement, it is difficult to see how Title VII's deterrent pur-
poses are to be served, or how employers can possibly avoid lia-
bility in Title VII cases. Put simply, an employer cannot combat
harassment of which it is unaware.214
That really is the core of the affirmative defense, I thought, and a
very succinct exposition of it.
MR. WILLS: What do you think the Court will do, and this
would be a fairly rare scenario, but an interesting one nonetheless,
in light of what Faragher/Ellerth announces by way of vicarious lia-
bility and affirmative defenses. What if a plaintiff were subjected
to one violent act of harassment, such as sexual assault in the work-
place by her supervisor, and she did not complain about it? Would
it be fair for the employer to defeat liability because, under
Faragher and Ellerth, she did not complain?
MR. OUTTEN: Let's go through the steps. To pick up on
something you did not actually mention in the overview, the first
question is, is this person an alter-ego of the employer? Is this the
president or some senior officer, owner, or partner? In a case
where there is strict liability, no defenses, that is it.
The second step is the analysis of whether there was a tangible
employment action? In this case, there are no affirmative defenses.
I assume in your hypothetical that there have not been any tangible
employment actions.
MR. WILLS: Right.
MR. OUTTEN: So we get squarely into Faragher and Ellerth
and the affirmative defenses. The question is whether the em-
ployee unreasonably fail to take corrective or preventive measures.
Well, if there is a single episode and there was no expectation or
warning that this was going to happen, there was no prior experi-
ence, then there is nothing the employee could reasonably have
been expected to do to prevent it from happening.
This reminds me of the old law school adage that "every dog gets
one bite." Once it has happened one time, or some arguable pre-
cursor to it has happened, then it may be reasonable to expect that
the person should have stepped forward, and, if she did not, then
she is responsible for not complaining.
MR. FELIU: I think it is the toughest set of facts, and a most
problematic one to have to defend. Let's go back to the beginning
in terms of Faragher and Ellerth. Justice Thomas in dissent essen-
tially writes, 'Where did this case come from? Where did this anal-
214. Id. at 492.
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ysis come from? This is just some policy statement with no
foundation in law.'215 To a certain extent, I agree with him. I think
it really was more a public policy decision by the Supreme Court
than a case based on the jurisprudence to that point.
The Court said that the primary objective of Title VII is not to
provide redress but to avoid harm.216 If that is true, that is a differ-
ent notion than I think many of us were working under for a good
number of years. Assuming that the primary objective of Title VII
is not to provide redress but to avoid harm, then taking preventive
measures becomes a priority, and the affirmative defense becomes
more comprehensible.
If that is true and, as Wayne said, if there was no notice, no rea-
son to believe that there was going to be an incident, it should not
much matter how heinous the crime may be because it could not
have been prevented. Employers have seen sort of the flip side of
that over the years, where they have done everything right, where
there is nothing more a reasonable city commission, court, or other
agency could ask of the employer. Nonetheless, they are held lia-
ble because some fool does something foolish and happens to be a
supervisor. In this case, it is the employee who suffers that indig-
nity; namely, the victim who has done nothing wrong is a victim in
any sense of the word, but there is no remedy, at least if we all
agree on the Ellerth and Faragher standard.
MR. OUTTEN: It is important to emphasize that the Supreme
Court made it clear that a primary purpose, if not the primary pur-
pose, of the discrimination laws is to prevent harm, not just to pro-
vide remedies.217 As between the employee and the employer in
this hypothetical, which of those two has the greater opportunity,
limited though it may be, to prevent this harm from happening?
Well, obviously that is the employer, through who it hires, how it
trains them, how it supervises them, how it counsels them. Even if
the employer in fact had no reason to think that the harasser was
going to engage in this kind of conduct, still as between the two of
them, the employer is the one best able to do something about it,
and therefore is strictly responsible.
MR. FELIU: When an employer hires an employee, he or she
comes full of prejudices, full of experiences, full of biases. There
are only so many questions that can be asked in an interview; there
215. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998); Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998).
216. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
217. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
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is only so far you can get into a psyche. If the greater good is to
incentivize employers who, I agree with Wayne, are uniquely in a
position to help create, enforce, promote discrimination-free and
harassment-free workplaces, then everything should be done to en-
courage those employers.
It is very discouraging to try to counsel employers and, if they do
not already understand the wisdom of that, try to share with them
the wisdom of that approach, and still say to them that "no matter
what you do, no matter what the circumstances, if something hide-
ous like that happens because someone violates everything you
have told them, every effort you have made to prevent them from
doing so, you are still going to be liable."
Strict liability is one of the problems I have with the Human
Rights Law. The strict liability notion is a problematic approach
with the greater good in mind, in my opinion. It is certainly the
better approach to remedy an individual harm and, as between in-
jured parties, certainly if that is the focus, the employee, the victim,
wins.
When looking at the greater good, however, I think it is a prob-
lematic jurisprudence.
MR. WILLS: Let us turn and take a look at that now. Before I
do, however, just one comment on something that Wayne said ear-
lier regarding the alter-ego of the employer. If somebody who is
high enough up in the company hierarchy makes certain kinds of
decisions, that individual is treated as the alter-ego of the employer
for purposes of liability, making it very easy to find the employer
liable under those circumstances. The language of Faragher and
Ellerth, though, is a little troubling there because it suggests an em-
ployer is subject to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile envi-
ronment created by "an individual with immediate or successively
higher authority over an individual." '218 Now, immediate authority
over an individual can be a very low-level supervisor who may have
immediate authority.
Now, what the Court meant by "authority" we do not know yet.
What the Court means by "supervisor" and who is a supervisor and
what is "authority" and what is "control," we do not know. It may
be suggesting, however, that in order for vicarious liability to at-
tack, this can be misconduct engaged in by a lower-level supervi-
sory employee. That is certainly the case under the Human Rights
218. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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Law, and the language in Faragher and Ellerth suggests that it may
be the case under federal law.
MR. OUTTEN: It is important to keep in mind two different
things. One is the alter-ego. The alter-ego does not relate at all to
the definition of supervisor. An alter-ego is the person who is the
company, that is a proxy for the corporation. You do not have any
agency analysis. There is no agent. This is the principal acting.
The EEOC uses the examples of the president, the owner, the part-
ner, or the corporate officer. It is not a "supervisor" analysis.
MR. WILLS: I was just clarifying that, in case people were con-
fused, because it was used in a context that suggested that it is the
very highest level.
MR. OUTTEN: For the alter-ego, it is. The Faragher and El-
lerth cases, however, dealt with agency principles. The bad actor
was not a principal; he was an agent.
MR. WILLS: That is absolutely correct.
MR. OUTTEN: That is where we get to the supervisor issue.
MR. WILLS: Just so that we do not confuse that, although we
do not really know what level supervisor we are actually dealing
with here, it is an "immediate or higher authority." The question
is, what is "authority," and that remains to be determined.
MR. OUTTEN: Again, the EEOC addresses that in its gui-
dance. The EEOC says that a person qualifies as an employee's
supervisor if either of two criteria are met: (1) "the individual has
authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment deci-
sions affecting the employee," such as hiring, firing, demotion, pro-
motion, compensation, or (2) "the individual has authority to direct
the employee's daily work activities," even if that individual has no
say over tangible employment actions.219
MR. WILLS: Right, even though they cannot hire and fire.
MR. OUTFEN: Either one constitutes a supervisor, and the in-
dividual can be very low level.
MR. WILLS: One quick point. We have a few minutes left. I
am not going to go through the Second Circuit cases. They are, in
the main, not all that interesting, except for the fact that some of
the fears of not being able to prevail in a summary judgment mo-
tion or concerns that the other side would always win in a summary
judgment motion have not been borne out. The courts have taken
a fairly even-handed look at the issue of vicarious liability, in par-
ticular the affirmative defenses.
219. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 203, § III(A).
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There was, however, one important and interesting case that
came out of the Second Circuit a few months ago, by the name of
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,22 ° where, among
other things, the court was reviewing the grant of summary judg-
ment. Nevertheless, most significant for that particular case was
the court's holding that a constructive discharge was definitely not
a tangible employment action.22 a You will recall that a tangible
employment action, taken by a supervisor, triggers automatic lia-
bility under the quid pro quo analysis. In the Second Circuit at
least, and we do not know how the other circuits will come out on
this, there may have been some decisions since I looked at them,
constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action.
So what is left of constructive discharge in our circuit?
MR. OUTTEN: Of course, the Second Circuit is wrong, which
surprises me, because generally it is reasonably good on these
things. We have to wait for other circuits to disagree and for the
Supreme Court eventually to pronounce the Second Circuit wrong
about that. That decision does add another nail in the coffin of the
constructive discharge doctrine, which is already tough enough in
the Second Circuit, and that already causes us plaintiffs' lawyers to
admonish our clients to think eighty-five times before considering
constructive discharge. As a matter of fact, one of the common
alternatives to that is to go out on sick leave, mental health leave,
because the constructive discharge doctrine is so tough in the Sec-
ond Circuit. This just makes it tougher in the context of sexual
harassment.
MR. FELIU: I would be more genteel and say it was not wrong,
it was just overstated. A per se rule is ridiculous. To say that in all
circumstances any constructive discharge, by definition, cannot be
a tangible employment action, that is just silly. In the abstract, it
would provide employers with an incentive to torture employees if
that is their way to encourage them to resign. It is a silly decision.
That is not to say that in many, most, some - you pick - cases
where the employee simply does not like the atmosphere, does not
make the effort to correct it, and then walks away and then sues.
That is a weak constructive discharge case and that person should
have his or her hand slapped. There was no tangible employment
action by that person's actions, but I think a per se rule was clearly
inappropriate in that case.
220. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
221. See id. at 294.
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MR. WILLS: It leaves plaintiffs in the awkward position of, en-
during a certain amount of sexual harassment until you cannot
stand it any longer and, leaving without complaining, and assuming
the employer has an effective policy, the employee has no cause of
action. If, however, you stay long enough and endure it long
enough and it makes you feel worse and worse and worse until
finally one day you get fired, you will have a cause of action. It is a
bizarre result. It might have been that they wanted to raise the bar
quite high in the Second Circuit for proving constructive discharge,
but the per se rule is, in my opinion, too broad.
We are coming to the end of our session. I just want to make a
few comments about the Human Rights Law that we alluded to it
earlier. The Human Rights Law for employer liability was written
and promulgated in 1991. It literally took the EEOC Enforcement
Guidance as of 1991 and made it law for the City of New York in
terms of employer liability.2 22 In the context of superior harass-
ment, there is only strict liability.223 When a manager or a supervi-
sor, the statute says "a person with managerial or supervisory
authority," engages in actionable or unlawful discriminatory con-
duct, the employer is automatically liable, there is no possibility of
defeating liability; nor is there a possibility under the current law
for either reducing or eliminating damages.224 The only mitigation
provision that exists in the Human Rights Law right now, or safe
harbor provision as it is sometimes known, is with reference to civil
penalties that the City may assess for certain types of discrimina-
tion, or punitive damages if the case is brought as a private right of
action.225
The City has a very strict law for the imposition of employer
liability.226 If a manager or a supervisor did it, the employer is lia-
ble - no possibility of defeating liability, no real mitigation of
damages. A respondent's only safe harbor is to show that it has
effective policies in place and they are effectively communicated; it
may reduce or eliminate civil penalties or punitive damages.227
The Human Rights Law's imposition of strict liability has been
praised by a number of people, along the lines of, "Well, it is, after
all, the employer who really has control of the workplace, who is
222. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13) (1996).
223. See id.
224. Id. §8-107(13)(b)(1).
225. See id. § 8-107(13)(e).
226. See id. § 8-107(13)(b)(1).
227. See id. § 8-107(13)(d), (e).
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able to control what happens in the workplace, able to provide
training, able to supervise employees, able to correct errant em-
ployees." That was the argument that certainly prevailed when the
law was first amended in 1991.
Others have criticized the law, claiming that it saddles employers
with economic consequences that it really should not be responsi-
ble for; because if an employer does all the right things and has a
good policy and makes every effort to make sure that discrimina-
tion does not take place in that workplace, and when it does ad-
dresses it promptly and effectively, why should that employer then
be held liable for something that really sometimes is out of its
control?
Another criticism that has been leveled against the Human
Rights Law is that it does not provide sufficient inducement for
employers to do the right thing. Saying that you might be able to
reduce civil penalties, which are seldom awarded, by the way; or
punitive damages, which are similarly seldom awarded in private
rights of action in state court under our law, really does not provide
enough inducement for an employer to go out and actually get a
good policy and be serious about making it as effective as possible.
I just lay out what the current state of the law is. I do not know
if anybody has any further comments on that.
MR. FELIU: I think at this point the Human Rights Law is not
dictating employers' actions.
MR. WILLS: I am quite sure of that.
MR. FELIU: The employers are going to do what they are going
to do. If the City is going to come after them, I view it as being like
the New York State Division of Human Rights was a number of
years back on the drug testing issue, and they took some stands
that were inconsistent with the federal and the Human Rights Law
at the time. Over time, the State fell into line. I would hope at
some point the City would as well. It does not make sense to have
such inconsistency among the various laws. At this point, I think
the net result has been that the Human Rights Law is not being
paid attention to by employers in developing their EEO policies
and practices. It is not driving what employers are doing in terms
of their policies.
MR. OUTTEN: I think it is fine. I have not had this happen,
but I bet you when you get in front of a jury, there will be argu-
ments about fairness, and jurors would in fact take into account
whether it is fair to hold the company responsible to some degree.
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They would probably take it into account in assessing damages, if
not liability.
MR. WILLS: Yes, de facto.
MR. OUTEN: As a practical matter.
MR. WILLS: Sure. Very good. Any questions?
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: If the violent act you described was a rape in the
workplace by the supervisor, then the employer would be exposed
to punitive damages as well as a violation of the Human Rights
Law?
MR. WILLS: Under the Human Rights Law, yes. If the victim
of that act prosecuted her claim in State court, or if she had an-
other federal claim and this were a supplemental claim, she could
prosecute it in federal court under the City's law, and punitive
damages would be available.
MR. OUTTEN: And under the federal law; of course, there are
the caps. Also, there is the Supreme Court's Kolstad decision
about seven or eight months ago,228 which would allow punitive
damages if the employer basically knowingly allowed the law to be
violated ...
MR. WILLS: Recklessly.
MR. OUTTEN: .. . recklessly allowed the law to be violated,
subject to the employer's ability to prove good-faith efforts.229
That would probably tie us back into the whole adequate policies-
and-procedures issue.
MR. WILLS: My point about the Human Rights Law was that
affirmative defenses are not available to an employer under the
Human Rights Law for a supervisor-created hostile environment.
AUDIENCE: And as I understand plaintiffs' attorney Wayne
Outten's position, she would not have to report the rape because
she could figure it is not going to happen again?
MR. OUTTEN: No, no. The rape has already happened, the
harm has been done, and the fact that she did not promptly report
it does not obviate the liability of the employer for the act that
occurred. That was my point. If she failed to report it and it hap-
pened again, the employer might not be responsible for the injury
from a second episode.
MR. WILLS: We disagree.
228. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
229. See id. at 2121.
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AUDIENCE: She can, however, fail to report the rape the first
time because she does not expect it to happen again?
MR. OUTTEN: Sure she could.
MR. WILLS: The question is - what would the court do with
that? Nevertheless, this is Wayne's opinion as to what a possible
solution to that by the court might be.
AUDIENCE: This is a follow-up question to that question. Es-
sentially you are suggesting that in an isolated incident, in order for
the employer to be vicariously liable, this isolated incident would
have to be tantamount to a criminal act, an assault or a rape?
MR. WILLS: Not necessarily. You understand the law of hos-
tile environment, which is copious at this point, looks to a number
of factors, particularly the severity or pervasiveness of the harass-
ing acts. It is certainly possible to imagine one very severe act,
such as a sexual assault, creating actionable hostile environment.
That is why I used this example. Obviously, isolated incidents of
much less significance, much less weight, may not be sufficient to
create a hostile environment. But the court looks always to sever-
ity or pervasiveness, and one very severe act may well create an
actionable environment.
MR. OUTTEN: It is worth nothing that, as the EEOC noted in
its Enforcement Guidance, there is no reason to encourage people
to come forth and complain about routine, ordinary, episodic, mi-
nor things that you might loosely call harassment. That would be
going too far. It would disrupt the work force. In addition, it is not
going to be deemed to be unreasonable for somebody to endure a
certain amount of such conduct and not complain about it, because
otherwise it would just be too much.
AUDIENCE: On federal law, in terms of either an alter-ego or
a model employee, terminating the sexual harasser to mitigate the
damages versus any another remedial action, there have been a
number of publicly reported cases of this. Do you advise that, or
do you see that as not the easiest way to mitigate the damages over
other alternative remedies?
MR. FELIU: I do not analyze it in terms of mitigating damages.
There has been an act of harassment, the complainant has come
forward, an investigation has been conducted, the supervisor who
is accused is in fact guilty of the crime. The question is, does the
punishment, the termination, fit the crime? Was the harassment
severe enough, was it persistent enough, etc.? Some employers
have over-reacted by immediately terminating the alleged harasser
thinking that it will somehow clean their houses, it will insulate
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them from all liability, and then they get sued for defamation or on
some other basis by the alleged harasser. Certainly, if the em-
ployer wants to go that way, I think ultimately they will prevail in
that counter-suit, so it is rather a safe strategy for employers.
Nevertheless, the alleged harasser has rights as well, legal or
otherwise. I think that there are certainly more than a few occa-
sions where employers have arguably punished the alleged harass-
ers beyond what the allegations warranted. Sometimes "zero
tolerance" policies go too far. I am troubled by the notion that a
dirty joke or a stupid remark can result in the loss of twenty-year
career. That person should be counseled, or have a pay raise with-
held. There are a variety of things that can be done. In any event,
I think the punishment should fit the crime.
Now, if there is a fear that person does not "get it" and will con-
tinue, that is different. That is certainly a good argument for either
transferring that person as far away as you can from the victim or
getting rid of the harasser. Assuming, however, the person has
been humbly corrected and recognizes the error of his or her ways,
then I would suggest termination would be an overreaction.
MR. OUTTEN: I represent primarily victims of harassment, but
I also represent the alleged harassers on occasion, when I feel that
they are innocent, when I feel that the punishment does not fit the
crime, or when I think it is just unfair. I think it is just fundamen-
tally unfair, as a matter of human dignity and fairness, to fire some-
body for a minor episode, particularly when there is a reasonable
chance of remediation and the person has been a long-term con-
tributor to the company.
The alleged harasser does not have many legal rights in that situ-
ation, but I have had some success in arguing with companies just
to make the punishment fit the crime. Again, the EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance does not suggest otherwise. The remedy should be
what is "appropriate in the circumstances." Plainly, firing some-
body after a long and successful career over something that is rela-
tively minor is not necessary to "prevent or remedy" in many
situations. Sometimes it is.
There are lots of effective steps short of termination, such as sus-
pension, loss of pay, reduction of bonus, forfeiture of stock options,
reassignment, transfer, demotion, loss of having direct reports for
awhile, together with counseling, training, and supervision. Those
are the kinds of things that can be very effective and fair.
AUDIENCE: If the City were to adopt the Faragher/Ellerth
standard, could it do so without the need to change the Adminis-
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trative Code? Could the administrative law judge decide to apply
that standard?
MR. WILLS: My belief is that that the answer is no, based on
the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; they were so spe-
cific about including provisions for the mitigation only of civil pen-
alties and only of punitive damages and only in this context,
context B and C, not context A, that I think that if the Commission
were to adopt the articulated by Faragher/Ellerth, it may be de-
feated on appeal.
I do not think it could be done that way; if it is to be done at all,
and I take no position on that here, it will need to be done
legislatively.
If there is nothing else, thank you all very much.
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
DEVELOPMENTS IN SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW
MR. WILLS: We are going to begin our last panel of the day.
By way of brief introduction, in April of 1986, New York City be-
came one of the first political jurisdictions in the United States to
enact a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation in employment, housing, and public accommodations.230
Now nearly fourteen years old, the law has proven to be an impor-
tant means of securing equal opportunity not only for members of
the gay and lesbian community, but also members of many other
communities because it defines sexual orientation as heterosexual-
ity, homosexuality, or bisexuality.231 The importance of this law is
evident in light of the fact that only eleven states,232 not New York
State, afford such protection, and that efforts to pass the Employ-
ment Non-discrimination Act,233 which would prohibit employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, have proven
unsuccessful. Similarly, efforts to litigate sexual orientation dis-
crimination claims based on Title VII sexual harassment law234
have generally met discouraging ends.
Nevertheless, we are not going to end on that discouraging note.
I am very pleased that we are joined today by Doni Gewirtzman,
who is a staff attorney at the New York Headquarters of Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the nation's oldest and largest
legal organization dedicated to the full recognition of civil rights of
lesbians, gay men and persons with HIV/AIDS. Since joining
Lambda in 1998, Mr. Gewirtzman has represented a Salt Lake City
High School Gay/Straight Alliance in their lawsuit against their
school district, which banned all extracurricular student groups in
order to prevent the club from meeting.235 Mr. Gewirtzman also
authored Lambda's brief in Arzig v. BenkendorJ 36 and has coordi-
nated Lambda's efforts on behalf of older lesbians and gay men, as
well as the regulations concerning reproductive technologies.
230. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.
231. See id. at § 8-102.
232. The eleven states are California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin.
233. S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994).
234. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1999).
235. East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (D.
Utah 1998).
236. Brief for LAMBDA, Estate of Carl Benkendorf v. Arzig, No. A-005469-97T5
(N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. filed 1998).
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Mr. Gewirtzman graduated from the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law in 1998. He was the Senior Notes and
Comments Editor of the California Law Review.
MR. GEWIRTZMAN: 2 7 Thank you all for waiting around. It
is really delightful to speak with you today.
As many of you know, federal and New York State law provide
no explicit statutory remedies for discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Consequently, the New York City Commission
Human Rights (the "Commission") is often the sole resource avail-
able to victims of sexual orientation discrimination - particularly
poor victims - within New York City. The Commission does tre-
mendous work and I just want to express our appreciation.
Randy asked me initially to talk a little bit about whatever pro-
gress has been made on federal or state anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. Upon hearing this request, I had a flashback to a "Simpsons"
episode. You may know this one. It is the one where Lisa becomes
a finalist for a magazine-sponsored essay contest about "Why I
Love America." She flies down to D.C. with Homer, Marge, and
Bart. Right after arriving, she discovers with horror that Washing-
ton is awash in corrupt, high-priced lobbyists. Instead of giving her
inspirational speech on diversity, "Bubble On, Oh Melting Pot,"
she gets up to the podium and delivers a series of extemporaneous
remarks, entitled "Cesspool on the Potomac. ' 238 I promised myself
that I was not going to engage in this sort of diatribe, so I am going
to briefly touch on the current status of state and federal anti-dis-
crimination legislation, and then I am going to talk about recent
developments in equal protection law, specifically in the area of
public employment.
The bill in Washington is known as the Employment Non-Dis-
crimination Act ("ENDA").23 9 If passed, this bill would provide
federal protections against employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation.24 ° I would note that this bill will not amend Ti-
tle VII, which is not limited to employment. Instead, ENDA will
be a separate universe unto itself, largely for political reasons.
ENDA is obviously very important to the thirty-nine states, in-
cluding New York, that do not provide any legal remedies for em-
237. The panelist wishes to thank David Buckel and Robert Schonberg for their
assistance and insights in preparing these remarks.
238. For a complete list of episodes, scripts and other "Simpsoniana," see
<www.snpp.com>.
239. S. 2238.
240. See id. § 3.
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ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation. I also want
to note that this bill is not a panacea for anti-gay discrimination.
ENDA only covers employment. 41 It does not cover housing, pub-
lic accommodations, or employment benefits.242 Furthermore,
ENDA has a large exemption for religious organizations.243 Sena-
tor Jeffords introduced ENDA again in the past legislative ses-
244 thsion, but the Republican leadership prevented it from getting to
the floor in either the House or the Senate for a vote. My sense is
that ENDA has taken a back seat to hate crimes legislation, but
that did not seem to go anywhere this year either.
On the State level, the State Assembly once again passed the
State anti-discrimination bill, but Republican leadership in the
State Senate has refused to allow the bill to go for a vote in the
State Senate. It is believed that, if passed, the Governor would
sign the bill, but who knows? For consolation, I personally take
great strength in knowing that, outside of my immediate family, the
New York State Legislature is the single most dysfunctional group
of people I have ever interacted with.
Hence, given the current lack of federal and state remedies in
New York State, the main thrust of my remarks, given the transi-
tional theme of today's Symposium, will be on how recent develop-
ments in constitutional theory, specifically the Equal Protection
Clause245 and the First Amendment,246 are allowing us to break
new ground in the fight against anti-gay discrimination in public
employment. There is a huge legal framework that is relevant in
public employment cases, including collective bargaining agree-
ments, state law, etc. This framework is outside the scope of my
remarks.
What I am going to do is focus on four recent cases. Along with
giving you a sense of the way that sexual orientation discrimination
plays itself out in a public employment context, two major themes I
hope will emerge. First, we have reached the dawn of a new day
with regard to sexual orientation discrimination in public employ-
ment outside of the military. With solid facts and with good lawyer-
ing, cases that would have been lost as recently as five years ago
are now able to go forward, and some are actually obtaining sub-
241. See id.
242. See id. § 4.
243. See id. § 7.
244. See 145 CONG. REC. S. 7596 (1999).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
246. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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stantial damage awards. Second, as litigators, we no longer have to
run in fear from the "rational basis" test in equal protection doc-
trine. We have received repeated indications from lower courts in
the area of public employment law that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Romer v. Evans, overturning Colorado's discriminatory
Amendment 2,247 was a real watershed in this area, and it is helping
to finally turn the tide.
The first case is Quinn v. Nassau County Police Department,248
which was decided this past June by a federal district court out on
Long Island. James Quinn joined the Nassau County Police De-
partment in 1986 and a year later his fellow officers found out he is
gay.249 From 1987 to when he left the force in 1996, Quinn's fellow
officers subjected Quinn to a steady stream of harassment and
abuse and Quinn's supervisors did nothing to stop the harass-
ment.250 For example, Quinn introduced at trial nineteen cartoons
that were posted on the precinct bulletin board depicting him as, "a
homosexual, a child molester, a transvestite, and a sado-masochist"
among other things.25 ' His fellow officers also put rocks in the
hubcaps of his car so that when Quinn pursued criminals, the rocks
would make noise and the criminals would escape.252 On one occa-
sion, Quinn found his nightstick in his patrol car with the words
"P.O. Quinn's dildo" carved into it.253 Eventually, the Police De-
partment transferred Quinn to a precinct far from his home.254
Had Officer Quinn walked into your law office five years ago,
you probably would not have agreed to take this case. Why not?
The first thing you would have done is run to your statute book and
look up Title VII,255 and the New York State anti-discrimination
law, only to discover that they provide no legal protections against
sexual orientation discrimination. Depressing. Then, all of a sud-
den, a big red sign would begin flashing above your head. You
would think to yourself, "Okay, this is a public employer. Maybe I
have a constitutional claim here. Why don't I take this research a
step further?" At that point, you would have another weird flash-
back to the nightmare that was your first-year constitutional law
247. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
248. 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
249. See id. at 351.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 352.
255. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
1218
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN TRANSITION
class. You begin to recall, in horror, your professor talking about
the "rational basis" test and using the Socratic Method to torture
your classmate into demonstrating something along the lines of
"you have to show that the state legislature was legally insane in
order to win an equal protection case where the rational basis stan-
dard applies." This throws you into fits of depression, and you
promptly show Officer Quinn the door.
Nevertheless, the district court in this case ruled in Officer
Quinn's favor on the Equal Protection claim. 6 This is huge. Why
is this huge? For the first time that we are aware of, a court specifi-
cally found that a hostile work environment based on sexual orien-
tation harassment can rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.257 In public employment context, this case partially fills
the gap in Title VII protection.258 Although the Supreme Court
recently held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,259 the
Court also held that the harassment has to be based on sex. 2 60 Be-
yond this hostile work environment issue, the Quinn court also said
that, under Romer, 61 this sort of harassment cannot even pass ra-
tional basis review.262 This is not the insanity test anymore. You
can actually win an Equal Protection claim in a sexual orientation
discrimination case where the rational basis test applies.
The court let stand a jury award of $360,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages.263 This decision, along with two others I am
going to talk about, would have been impossible without Romer,264
and collectively they demonstrate the potentially tremendous im-
pact that Romer2 65 could have as it is applied in more and more
lower courts.
The second case, Weaver v. Nebo School District,266 was decided
last year by a federal district court in Utah. Wendy Weaver was a
public school teacher at an Utah high school who also coached the
256. See id. at 357.
257. See id. at 358-59.
258. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1999).
259. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
260. See id. at 1002. Query whether or not calling somebody a "faggot" every day
for eight years is based on sex, which is actionable under Title VII, or sexual orienta-
tion, which is not.
261. 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
262. See Quinn, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 356-58.
263. See id. at 353, 363.
264. 517 U.S. at 620.
265. Id.
266. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998).
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girls' volleyball team.267 As coach of the volleyball team, she or-
ganized a summer volleyball camp for the team, and she called up
all the team members to let them know when the camp was to
start. During one of these calls, one of the team members asked
her, "Are you gay?" Ms. Weaver responded, "Yes." This set off a
whole series of meetings,268 and eventually the school district re-
moved Weaver as volleyball coach. 269  Later, the Directors of the
Nebo School District gave Weaver a letter stating that she was "not
to make any comments, announcements, or statements to students,
staff members, or parents of students regarding [her] homosexual
orientation or lifestyle. If students, staff members, or parents of
students ask about [her] sexual orientation, [she was to] tell them
that the subject is private and personal and inappropriate to discuss
with them. 27 ° This letter was placed in Weaver's personal file.27t
As a consequence, Weaver filed a suit based on a First Amendment
and an Equal Protection claim, and she won on both.272
I want to talk about the First Amendment claim here for a sec-
ond. Because Weaver was a public employee, the court used Pick-
ering v. Board of Education of Township High School2 73 to deal
with the First Amendment claim. Under Pickering, the court had
to determine whether the employee's speech is on a matter of pub-
lic concern, and whether the employee's interest in speaking out-
weighs the employer's interest in regulating the speech.274
I want to focus on the first element, speaking on a matter of
public concern. After noting that the issue in the case was speech
that occurred outside the classroom,275 this court did a ground-
breaking thing. The court found that Weaver's speech about her
sexual orientation was a matter of public concern and was pro-
267. See id. at 1280.
268. See id. at 1281. Actually, school officials had been discussing her sexual orien-
tation for some time in response to phone calls from a number of people, including
her ex-husband. See id.
269. See id. at 1282.
270. Id.
271. See id. Among other things, it appears that the school officials in Utah were
worried that Weaver might see students in public places, like the supermarket, and
suddenly and spontaneously blurt out that she is a lesbian. In the district's defense,
we have to acknowledge that this has long been a problem with heterosexuals, who
compulsively blurt out their sexual orientation in all sorts of public places, particularly
supermarkets.
272. See Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
273. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
274. See id.
275. See Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 If she was getting up and saying "I am a
lesbian" in the middle of class, there would be different concerns.
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tected under the First Amendment.276 The court did so first be-
cause "coming out" necessarily involves you in a larger public
debate about gay people.277 This is amazing. It is as if somebody
paid attention during their queer theory course and then became a
federal judge. The court also found constitutional liability because
internal discussions within the school district about the case had
elevated this issue out of the realm of the private into a matter of
public concern.278
On the Equal Protection claim, after referencing Matthew Shep-
ard,279 the court did the same thing as the Quinn court:280 it relied
upon Romer2 81 to hold that anti-gay bias can never be a legitimate
basis for a state action. 82 The judge then ordered the district to
remove the nasty letters they had placed in Wendy Weaver's file,
gave her the volleyball job back, and gave her $1500 in damages,
the stipend she lost for coaching the team.283 Piece of good news
number two.
Case number three, another teacher case decided by a federal
district court in Ohio, is Glover v. Williamsburg School District.284
Bruce Glover was a teacher at an elementary school in Ohio.2 8 5
He received above-average performance evaluations during his
first semester teaching at the school.286 In the middle of the school
year, however, the district superintendent received a call reporting
that Glover had been seen holding hands with his male partner at a
Christmas party for sixth graders.287 As it turned out, this rumor
was totally and entirely false. 288 But who cares?
276. See id. ("Indeed, the public reaction in the Nebo School District to rumors
about Ms. Weaver's sexual orientation clearly is evidence of public concern over her
sexual orientation.").
277. See id. at 1284 n.3.
278. See id. As for the second element, because the defendants could not "point to
any actual disruptive events" since the situation began, the court found that Weaver's
interests outweighed those of the defendants. Id. at 1284-85.
279. See id. at 1287.
.280. 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
281. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
282. See id. at 1287-89.
283. See id. at 1291.
284. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
285. See id. at 1162.
286. See id. at 1163-64.
287. See id. at 1164.
288. See id. at 1164-65.
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Glover's performance reviews for the second semester were sig-
nificantly worse. 89 Instead of getting observed two times, which
was the legal requirement, the principal visited his class six
times.290 Glover claimed the lower ratings and these increased vis-
its were due to discrimination, 291 but the Board chose not to inves-
tigate his claims and decided not to renew his contract, claiming
that Glover had problems with classroom management. 92 After,
Glover brought an Equal Protection claim in this case and was
successful.293
What I want to emphasize here, for those practitioners out there,
is how good lawyering was able to convince the judge that the de-
fendant's stated explanation for not renewing the contract was pre-
text for sexual orientation discrimination. Glover's attorney did
four really smart things here. First, he showed that the defendants
had renewed the contract of another new teacher whose ratings
were lower than Glover's for behavior management.294 As a result,
Glover established a benchmark, a similarly situated individual by
which the judge can assess the differential treatment. That is key.
Second, the attorney had teachers in neighboring classrooms testify
that there were no disturbances overheard from Glover's class-
room, but they heard screaming kids or chaos or a ruckus from the
renewed teacher's classroom. 295 Third, an expert witness testified
that classroom management is a common problem for new teachers
and there was no reason to treat Glover differently for renewal
purposes than any other teacher.296 Finally, Glover showed that
the district's rationale for not renewing the contract had shifted
over time and used this shifting to establish pretext.297 After re-
jecting the defendant's explanation, the court, like the court in
Quinn,298 used Romer to show that sexual orientation can never be
a legitimate government purpose, 299 reinstated Glover, and gave
289. See Glover v. Williamsburg School Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166 (S.D. Ohio
1998).
290. See id. at 1165.
291. See id. at 1166.
292. See id. at 1167.
293. See id. at 1174.
294. See Glover v. Williamsburg School Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171 (S.D. Ohio
1998).
295. See id. at 1172.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 1172-73.
298. 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
299. See id. at 1169.
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him back pay, emotional distress damages, and attorney's fees and
costs. 30 0 Yes, take these cases.
Thus far, smooth sailing, right? I want to put one final case on
your radar screen. It is an Eleventh Circuit case called Shahar v.
Bowers.3° 1 Robin Shahar clerked for the Georgia State Attorney
General's Office while she was a law student and was offered a job
as an Assistant Attorney General after graduation.30 2 Before start-
ing her job, Shahar got engaged to her female partner and they
planned a marriage ceremony.30 3 The Attorney General at the
time, Michael Bowers, of Bowers v. Hardwick,3"4 found out about
her engagement plans and revoked the job offer.30 5 Shahar sued
the state for violating her First Amendment and Equal Protection
rights.306
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was a setback on both counts.
On the First Amendment claim, the decision turned on that balanc-
ing part of the Pickering test.30 7 The court agreed with the Attor-
ney General's argument that he could not carry out the mission of
his office to uphold the law if he had an attorney on staff who holds
herself out as married when Georgia law does not allow gay people
to get married.30 8
With regards to the Equal Protection claim, the Eleventh Circuit,
unsurprisingly, was totally dismissive of Romer, holding that
Romer was not an employment case and did not apply, and that
this case is about conduct, a commitment ceremony, and not an
across-the-board denial of rights the way Romer was.30 9 Note,
though, that the court ignored the differential treatment with re-
gard to conduct, namely, partners in opposite-six couples can have
as many commitment ceremonies as they want and not get their job
offers revoked, but partners in same-sex couples cannot. The best
thing to do with this case is to argue that the case is limited to the
government lawyer setting, where the mission of the organization
300. See id. at 1175-76.
301. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
302. See id. at 1100.
303. See id.
304. 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
305. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100-01.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 1110
308. See id. Adultery is illegal within the State of Georgia, and three days after the
Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision, Michael Bowers held a press conference and
admitted that he had a ten-year adulterous affair while he was the Attorney General.
The adultery must also have cramped his ability to carry out the mission of his office.
309. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110.
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is to uphold the law. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind
that Shahar could have an impact on other public employment
cases.
This concludes the update on the equal protection front, but I
am happy to take questions on any number of issues that we are
dealing with, including marriage, talking about how sexual orienta-
tion discrimination can be sex discrimination, for those of you that
are stuck with litigating under federal and state laws, or anything
else that comes to mind.
Thanks so much.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
AUDIENCE: Some of the issues that have come up in the last
couple of years have involved the New York State education law.
These have been the cases where people, who have applied to
teach in New York City or New York State public schools, have
had sodomy convictions in other jurisdictions. Because that is a
criminal conviction, they have not been permitted to teach in the
State of New York or have not been permitted to have licenses. I
am wondering whether that issue has come up at Lambda and what
your strategies are?
MR. GEWIRTZMAN: I am not aware of any case that we have
litigated on this issue. Many states have passed these sex offender
reporting statutes, and very often these poor guys who were picked
up forty years ago in a parking lot and given some sort of lewd
conduct arrest now have "sex offender" stamped all over every
public record they have. Very often, this information ends up get-
ting exposed to employers and can really be disastrous for some of
them. We have, at times, been able to get in at the right time and
added our input to the drafting process. In deciding which offenses
should be reported, you might want to exclude these.
AUDIENCE: Can you give us an example of sexual orientation
brought as a sex discrimination case?
MR. GEWIRTZMAN: That is a great question because I get to
talk about our marriage work, which is terrific. As you know,
Lambda has been involved in a number of cases trying to ensure
that lesbians and gay men are able to enjoy the freedom to marry.
The success, to the extent that we have had success in this area, has
come from making sex discrimination arguments under state con-
stitutional provisions.
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We brought a lawsuit in Hawaii.31 ° We believed that the Hawaii
Supreme Court was poised at any moment to rule in our favor and
accept our argument that depriving same-sex couples the right to
marry constitutes sex discrimination because the denial was en-
tirely based on the sex of the partner. If the couple suing was of
different sexes, there would not be any problem. During this time,
the Mormon Church and a number of other religious organizations
dropped a ton of money into a ballot initiative in Hawaii, and last
November the initiative passed.311 The initiative was worded so
that the Hawaii State Constitution is amended to say that the Ha-
waii State Legislature has the power to define marriage as being
between a man and a woman.312 Thus far, the Hawaii State Legis-
lature, for whatever reason, bad legal advice; who knows, has not
acted. So this case is continuing to go on. We could get a ruling
from the Hawaii Supreme Court any day.313
At the same time, there is another case currently being litigated
in front of the Vermont Supreme Court called Baker v. State of
Vermont. This is not our case, but we filed an amicus in this case
on the same sort of state constitutional principles. The Vermont
Supreme Court could rule any day.314 I saw a tape of the oral argu-
ment there. It was really exciting, because the State's attorney is in
there arguing that they are not allowing the marriage because none
of the other forty-nine states and no country in the world allows
these kind of marriages and they should not either. One of the five
Vermont Supreme Court justices looks at him and says, "Well,
somebody has to be first." I thought that was an exciting possibil-
ity. At any rate, that is where we have been most successful.
But in terms of thinking about this in the context of Title VII,
look at Price Waterhouse31 5 and what it has to say about gender
stereotyping. If you are firing somebody because they are not liv-
ing up to the employer's expectations about what a man or a wo-
310. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. (Haw. 1999).
311. See Gustav Neibuhr, Religious Coalition Plans Gay Rights Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1999, at A10. The coalition included Protestants, Roman Catholics,
Jews, and Muslims. See id.
312. See Baehr, No. 91-1394-05, slip op. at 1.
313. Shortly after this Symposium, the Hawaii Supreme Court issued its decision in
Baehr v. Miike. See infra App. A for the unpublished opinion.
314. Shortly after this Symposium, the Vermont Supreme Court issued its historic
decision in Baker v. State of Vermont. See No. 98-032, 1999 WL 1211709 (Vt. Dec. 20,
1999).
315. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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man is supposed to behave like, it is possible that you could
construe a Title VII claim under gender stereotyping. 316
MR. WILLS: This, however, is extraordinarily difficult. In fact,
there are several recent decisions, very disappointing ones for
plaintiffs, where it has been attempted.317 In one, the court actu-
ally, this was bringing a sexual orientation claim basically under the
guise of, if you will, sexual harassment law and trying to bring it in
under sex. Nevertheless, it has been extraordinarily difficult to
bring those claims pursuant to Title VII, given the very narrow
construction the courts give to sex, as opposed to even gender. In
fact, some courts make that distinction and say, "Title VII uses the
word 'sex' for a reason; it is not gender and it does not encompass
an area as broad as gender." So it is quite difficult, but not
impossible.
AUDIENCE: Looking to the future, say you win one of these
cases and Vermont recognizes marriage between same-sex couples;
what happens when they move out of state? Have you projected a
strategy of how you are going to deal with that?
MR. GEWIRTZMAN: Massive unprecedented civil litigation.
What will happen, I would imagine, is that couples, some working
with legal organizations, some not, will immediately fly to Vermont
from all over the country, get married, go home, and try to have
their marriages enforced within the state. Thirty-some-odd states
already have anti-marriage legislation; some do not. So there will
likely be litigation on this issue in the other forty-nine states on a
variety of different issues. It is very, very complicated. There are
giant workbooks that we have about this stuff, looking at different
states and what is promising and what is not. But there are so many
different variables involved, who knows what is going to happen.
It will be exciting, though.
I just wanted to leave with one note. If you have cases involving
sexual orientation discrimination, please call us. This is what we do
for a living. The law in this area is not easy. It really requires crea-
tive approaches and risk taking, and often it is helpful to work with
attorneys with experience in this area.
AUDIENCE: Do you also litigate transgender cases?
MR. GEWIRTZMAN: That is a phenomenal question. The an-
swer is yes, we do litigate transgender cases. At the same time, our
316. See id. at 250.
317. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, No. CV 96-4334, 1999 WL 345956 (E.D.N.Y.
May 26, 1999); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.
1999).
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mission statement does not specifically include transgender which
upsets some. We have, however, always given a broad reading to
our mission - we have been involved in all sorts of civil rights cases,
including reproductive rights and race related cases. So within the
organization, we don't see our mission to further the civil rights of
lesbians, gay men, and persons with HIV/AIDS as limiting us from
taking transgender cases.
Thanks.
MR. WILLS: Thank you all very much.
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APPENDIX A
Baehr v. Miike
The following is the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State
of Hawaii in Baehr v. Miike, dated December 9, 1999:
Summary Disposition Order
Pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules 201 and 202
(1993), this court takes judicial notice of the following: On April
29, 1997, both houses of the Hawaii legislature passed, upon final
reading, House Bill No. 117 proposing an amendment to the Ha-
waii Constitution (the marriage amendment). See 1997 House
Journal at 922; 1.997 Senate Journal at 766. The bill proposed the
addition of the following language to article I of the Constitution:
"Section 23. The legislature shall have the power to reserve mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples." See 1997 Haw. Sess. L. H.B. 117
§ 2, at 1247. The marriage amendment was ratified by the electo-
rate in November 1998.
In light of the foregoing, and upon carefully reviewing the record
and the briefs and supplemental briefs submitted by the parties and
amicus curiae and having given due consideration to the arguments
made and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve the defend-
ant-appellant Lawrence Mike's appeal as follows:
On December 11, 1996, the first circuit court entered judgement
in favor of plaintiffs-appellees Ninia Baehr, Genora Dancel,
Tammy Rodrigues, Antoinette Pregil, Pat Lagon and Joseph Me-
lillo (collectively the "plaintiffs") and against Miike, ruling (1) that
the sex-based classification in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 572-1 (1985) was "unconstitutional" by virtue of being "in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of the Ha-
waii Constitution," (2) that Miike, his agents and any person acing
in concert with or by or through Miike were enjoined from denying
an application for a marriage license because applicants were of
the same sex, and (3) that costs should be awarded against Miike
and in favor of the plaintiffs. The circuit court subsequently stayed
enforcement of the injunction against Miike.
The passage of the marriage amendment placed HRS § 572-1 on
new footing. The marriage amendment validating HRS § 572-1 by
taking the statute out of the ambit of the equal protection clause of
the Hawaii Constitution, at least insofar as the statute, both on its
face and as applied, purported to limit access to the marital status
to opposite-sex couples. Accordingly, whether or not in the past it
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was violative of the equal protection clause in the foregoing re-
spect, HRS § 572-1 no longer is.318 In light of the marriage amend-
ment, HRS § 572-1 must be given full force and effect.
The plaintiffs seek a limited scope of relief in the present lawsuit,
i.e., access to applications for marriage licenses and the consequent
legally recognized marital status. Inasmuch as HRS § 572-1 is now
a valid statute, the relief sought by the plaintiffs is unavailable. The
marriage amendment has rendered the plaintiffs' complaint moot.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the circuit
court be reversed and that the case be remanded for entry of judg-
ment in favor of Miike and against the plaintiffs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the circuit court shall not
enter costs or attorneys' fees against the plaintiffs.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, December 9, 1999.
318. In this connection, we feel compelled to address two fundamental misappre-
hensions advanced by Justice Ramil in his concurrence in the result that we reach
today. First, Justice Ramil appears to misread the plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin,
74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration and clarification granted in part, 74 Haw.
650, 875 P.2d 225 (1993) [hereinafter, "Baehr I"], to stand for the proposition that
HRS § 572-1 (1985) defines the legal status of marriage "to include unions between
persons of the same sex." Concurrence at 1. Actually, that opinion expressly ac-
knowledged that "[r]udimentary principles of statutory construction renders manifest
the fact that, by its plain language, HRS § 572-1 restricts the marital relation to a male
and a female." Baehr 1, 74 Haw. at 563, 852 P.2d at 60. Second, because, in his view,
HRS § 572-1 limits access to a marriage license on the basis of "sexual orientation,"
rather than "sex," see concurrence at 1 n.1, Justice Ramil asserts that the plurality
opinion in Baehr I mistakenly subjected the statute to strict scrutiny, see id. at 2-3.
Notwithstanding the fact that HRS § 572-1 obviously does not forbid a homosexual
person from marrying a person of the opposite sex, but assuming arguendo that Jus-
tice Ramil is correct that the touchstone of the statute is sexual orientation, rather
than sex, it would still have been necessary, prior to the ratification of the marriage
amendment, to subject HRS § 572-1 to strict scrutiny in order to assess its constitu-
tionality for purposes of the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of the Ha-
waii Constitution. This is so because the framers of the 1978 Hawaii Constitution,
sitting as a committee of the whole, expressly declared their intention that a proscrip-
tion against discrimination based on sexual orientation be subsumed within the
clause's prohibition against discrimination based on sex. See Stand. Comm. Rep. No.
69, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1978, at 675
(1980). Indeed, citing the foregoing constitutional history, Lewin conceded that very
point in his answering brief in Baehr I when he argued that article 1, section 6 of the
Hawaii Constitution (containing on express right "to privacy") did not protect sexual
orientation because it was already protected under article I, section 5. Lewin could
hardly have done otherwise, inasmuch as his proposed order granting his motion for
judgment on the pleadings in Baehr I contained the statement that "[u]ndoubtedly,
the delegates (to the convention) meant what they said; Sexual orientation [i]s already
covered under Article I, Section 5 of the State Constitution."
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